IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/48
Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 13, 1947, 10 a.m.
[Here follow the list of persons (36) present and a discussion of the first agenda item.]
Voting Procedure in the Security Council
In introducing this subject, Mr. Thompson stated that the veto had to date been used eighteen times in the Security Council, ten times since the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution in December 1946, calling upon the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with a view to ensuring that the exercise of the veto would not impede the functioning of the Security Council, and recommending the adoption by the Security Council of practices and procedures which would improve the operation of the Council. Pursuant to that resolution, the United States, in August of this year, made certain proposals in the Security Council for procedural rules and interpretations. Mr. Thompson traced the history of these discussions on the problem of voting in the Security Council at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, and pointed out that at San Francisco certain members of the United States Delegation, particularly Senators Connally and Vandenberg, were of the opinion that the veto should not apply in proceedings of pacific settlement under Chapter VI of the Charter. He referred to a recent letter of the Secretary to Senator Vandenberg,1 in which the [Page 171] Secretary expressed the hope of the United States Government that the five permanent members of the Security Council might find it desirable in the future to clarify and to modify the unanimity requirement in its application to matters dealing with settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter. The United States objective, Mr. Thompson stated, was to make the Security Council a more effective body. As one means of obtaining this objective, the United States was willing to support any improvement through interpretation consistent with the Charter but not necessarily limited by the Four Power statement made at San Francisco. As another means, it would be willing to accept the elimination of the unanimity requirement with reference to (a) matters arising under Chapter VI of the Charter, (b) applications for membership, and (c) the election of a Secretary-General. The United States believed that a committee should be created which would study and make recommendations on proposals for such improvements.
Ambassador Austin remarked that there existed a hazard in any effort to amend the Charter which was not inherent in an effort to amend the voting rules of the Security Council. He stated that it was entirely within the power of the Security Council, by a vote of seven members, including the five permanent members, to transfer a question from the category of substantive matters to that of procedural matters. In his view, the principle of unanimity was sound, and he was not convinced as yet that it should not be applied both to changes in the rules and amendment of the Charter. There was no occasion, he [Page 172] held, for amendment of the text of the Charter, since the United States objective may be obtained by the above-mentioned transfer. The rulemaking activity of the Security Council should be stimulated.
Mr. Dulles expressed his agreement with the Department recommendations and stated that emphasis should be placed on interpretation rather than on amendment. Ambassador Johnson thought that this was not a good psychological moment to push for an amendment and that an effort should be made to keep the rules of procedure fluid.
The Secretary recalled the pressure exerted by various groups and by the Congress in this matter. He also agreed that hasty action might lead toward disruption of the United Nations. Ambassador Johnson raised the question of the consistent violation by the Soviet Union of its undertaking in the Four Power Statement that the veto should not be used for frivolous purposes.
Mr. Notter emphasized the grave risk which in his view was involved in the United States position. In his opinion, the Four Power Statement was a part of the Charter fabric and to disturb it was to disturb the basis on which, this fabric was woven. Ambassador Austin agreed with Mr. Notter that the risk in trying to obtain agreement on procedural and non-procedural categories was smaller than that involved in an effort to obtain an amendment of the Charter. Mr. Fahy thought that all the United States proposed was a study by a committee; this did not involve a threat to the universality of the United Nations.
The Secretary said that it may happen that at some time the United States would find itself in a minority and that it is necessary to think in terms of twenty to thirty years.
Mr. Bohlen disagreed with Mr. Notter on the question of the risk involved. He did not believe that the consideration of this question would induce the Soviets to walk out of the United Nations, particularly because they were in a position to block any effort for an amendment. In his view, the risk was that the United Nations would cover up actions inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter in the same manner as the League of Nations had done.
Interim Committee of the General Assembly on Peace and Security
Mr. Sandifer explained that the main purpose of the United States proposal for the establishment of such a Committee was the desire to improve the effectiveness of the General Assembly, particularly in the light of the inability of the Security Council to take action in a number of cases. He referred to the draft resolution before the meeting (SD/A/C.1/86).2
[Page 173]Mr. Dulles considered the proposed resolution as an important step required by experience. Answering the Secretary’s question as to what objections to the establishment of the Committee might be expected, Mr. Dulles said that it could be argued that it constituted an effort to circumvent the Security Council and the veto. Mr. Sandifer stated that the effectiveness of this objection might be reduced if the proposal was presented as being designed to develop the broad powers of the General Assembly and improve its functioning. Messrs. Fahy, Stevenson and Ambassador Sayre expressed their agreement with the proposal but Mr. Stevenson remarked that it would increase the budget of the Organization. Mr. Rusk stated that a preliminary estimate of the close cost ranged up to $2,000,000.
Mr. Bohlen declared that the Soviets would probably attack the proposal as a usurpation of the Security Council’s power by the General Assembly; this was indicated in an article published in a Communist paper in Prague by a member of the Communist Internationale, in which it was said that all discussions in the United Nations relating to the interpretation of the Charter were due to the fact that the United States was being impeded by the “valiant action” of the Soviet Union in its attempts to use the United Nations for its imperialistic purposes.
Mr. Bohlen opposed the proposal that the Committee should consider the subject of indirect aggression. Such activities were very hard to pin down, and the Commission might come out with a whitewash of individual actions. Mr. Rusk pointed out that the Committee would attempt to develop a code of conduct in connection with this matter rather than to deal with individual acts of indirect aggression. It was agreed that the text of the resolution might be improved so as to indicate clearly that the Committee would deal with principles and not with specific cases of indirect aggression.
[Here follows discussion of other items on the agenda.]
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The letter, dated July 28, read as follows:
↩“Dear Senator Vandenberg: I am glad to have this opportunity to give you the views of the Department of State on Senate Concurrent Resolution 23 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 24, as requested by you in your letters of July 10.
“Senate Concurrent Resolution 23 would express the view of the Congress that action should be taken under the provisions of the United Nations Charter to propose and adopt amendments and revisions that will strengthen the United Nations as an instrument to prevent war and maintain world peace. Senate Concurrent Resolution 24 indicates the desire of the Congress that the President immediately take the initiative in calling a general conference of the United Nations pursuant to Article 109 of the Charter for the purpose of enabling the United Nations to enact, interpret, and enforce world law to prevent war.
“The Charter is not regarded by the Department as a perfect instrument. No comprehensive agreement which is acceptable to all parties can be regarded as perfect by any one of them. Nevertheless, it is the firm policy of this Government, as you know, to work for the improvement of the Charter in the light of experience.
“International political conditions are such that the Department does not regard fundamental revision of the Charter as feasible at this time, nor considers it wise at present for this Government to take the initiative in this regard. Such action, in the prevailing international conditions might be interpreted as a lack of faith in the United Nations on our part, and it might thus further increase the difficulty of obtaining agreed solutions of the many complex problems now confronting the United Nations.
“The Department hopes that suitable practices and procedures may be developed, by common agreement under the Charter and in the light of experience, to reduce uncertainties and differences of opinion in the application of the voting formula in the Security Council. It especially hopes that the five permanent Members of the Security Council may find it desirable in the future, in full agreement among themselves and with other Members, to clarify and to modify the unanimity requirement in its application to matters dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the Charter. Efforts to these ends are considered practical within the processes of step-by-step progress. To attempt more would risk the difficulties to which I have alluded, and, in the absence of full agreement by all the five permanent Members on any important amendment of the Charter, would fail of fruition. As you know, a general conference of the United Nations can be called for the purpose of reviewing the Charter without the concurrence of the five permanent Members of the Security Council, but any alteration of the Charter requires the ratification of two-thirds of the Members of the United Nations including the permanent Members of the Security Council.
“For these reasons the Department does not favor positive action of Senate Concurrent Resolution 23 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 24 at this time.
“Due to the urgency of the matter, this letter has not been cleared with the Bureau of the Budget, to which a copy is being sent.
“Faithfully yours,
G. C. Marshall”
(Lot 71–D 440, Box 19232, Folder “Committee 1”)
- See text incorporated in Doc. US/A/C–1/143, September 18.↩