IO Files: US/A/C.1/606
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John Foster Dulles of the United States Delegation
I had told Mr. Gromyko about a week earlier that I would be glad, before the veto item was reached on the Political Committee Agenda, to tell him what we had in mind. Mr. Wainhouse arranged a meeting which took place in the Delegates’ Lounge at 1:15 p.m. on Saturday, November 15.
I said that it was our idea that no definitive action should be taken at this session of the Assembly. The matter was too complicated and there was too little time to arrive at considered views as to the substance of the question. We did, however, think that the matter should be studied between now and the next session. Gromyko interrupted to ask “Studied by whom?” I said by the Interim Committee or possibly a subcommittee of the Interim Committee or a special committee. I went on to say that the United States was opposed to any amendment of the veto in relation to really substantive action by the Security Council which might affect the interests and position of any Member state. We did, however, think that there was an area, particularly under Chapter VI, where Security Council action was, in a broad sense, procedural, not involving substantive rights as to the merits of a case, and that we were prepared in such a matter and organizational matters to explore the possibility of trying to find some better procedures which would enable the Security Council to function more efficiently. I said that, of course, not much could be done without the approval of all Permanent Members as there could not be a Charter amendment without such approval and that there ought preferably to be agreement of all the Permanent Members with reference to procedural matters, and that we hoped that any study over the coming year would involve consultation between the Assembly and the Security Council and between the Permanent Members.
Mr. Gromyko said that in their opinion the whole matter of veto should not be considered at all by the Assembly and that it should be dropped from the agenda. I said that whatever one might think that was a result which would be quite impractical in view of the number of states who were insistent that something should be done. Mr. Gromyko went on to say that the Soviet position was that there should be no change whatever in voting procedures and rules, and that the [Page 225] Soviet Delegation was not prepared to consider the matter. He said obviously consideration by the Interim Committee would be particularly objectionable because of their attitude toward the Interim Committee.
I said that I wanted to emphasize that the United States was not attempting to bring about a change of Security Council voting procedure which would enable the Security Council to take action which might seriously prejudice the Soviet Union. We realize that no great power would willingly submit itself to that sort of dictation under conditions where political considerations might play a part in the decision. I said that the United States probably would not be willing to do that even though it might feel that it was unlikely that a majority of the Security Council would seek to act against the United States. I could understand that the Soviet Union would be particularly sensitive about this matter, and I wanted to reassure him as strongly as possible that our attitude did not involve any trick or strategem designed to use the Security Council against the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko said he was glad to hear that.
Our talk ended at 1:30, having lasted about fifteen minutes.