IO Files: US/A/C.5/89
United States Delegation Working Paper
Principle of a Ceiling in the Contributions Scale
The United States Representative on Committee 5 is under instructions to introduce a resolution which would secure adoption by General Assembly of the principle that no one Member should contribute in normal times more than one-third of the cost of the administrative expenses of the United Nations. General opposition is expected to the adoption (at least at this time) of the principle of a ceiling and in particular to the adoption of the principle of a ceiling of 33.33 per cent.
It will be helpful if the political officers will explore this question with the other Delegations so that we may know how far we can go at this session and what approach we should use. At the moment we believe the best opportunity will arise when Committee 5 considers revision of Rule 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly.
background
In accordance with Rule 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure the Committee on Contributions, a body of ten experts serving in their individual capacities, is instructed to “advise the General Assembly concerning the apportionment under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the expenses of the Organization among Members, broadly according to capacity to pay”. The Committee has no other specific terms of reference, although the first part of the first session of the General Assembly drew the Committee’s attention to considerations which were recommended by the Preparatory Commission. The pertinent parts of the Preparatory Commission’s recommendations are attached as Annex I. Although relative capacity to pay is the major consideration in the Preparatory Commission’s recommendations and in Article 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure, adoption of the ceiling principle has not been foreclosed.
The United States has maintained from the beginning that no one Member should pay a preponderant share of the United Nations expenses, although it took a leading part in support of the concept of capacity to pay as a major factor in establishing a scale. Last year [Page 254] Senator Vandenberg stated firmly in Committee 5 that in normal times no one country should contribute more than one-third to the administrative expenses and inserted a reservation to this effect in the Committee’s report to the General Assembly (A/274).
Congressional interest in this question dictates that the United States Delegation do its utmost at this session to secure adoption of the ceiling principle. The recent announcement that a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations has been appointed, because of the heavy United States obligations, to investigate how the United Nations and other international organizations spend their funds and account for them is further indication that the Delegation must move forward in this matter.
u.s. argument
In an organization of sovereign equals, in which each member has an equal vote on program and expenditures, it is inappropriate for any one Member to pay a preponderant share. Conversely it is an unhealthy situation for the organization itself to be unduly dependent for financial support on any one member. The Secretary-General made the point last year in the Fifth Committee that such a condition would be unhealthy from the standpoint of the Secretariat.
This concept of broad financial support is partly recognized by the adoption by the General Assembly, by implication, of a “floor” in the scale of contributions. Right Members are each assessed .04 per cent although their relative capacities to pay are not all equal. The concept of broad support has not, however, been implemented by clear recognition of the principle of a maximum at the other end of the scale.
The United States recognizes the obvious need of taking account of relative capacities to pay. If the budget were nominal, each Member, having an equal voice, could be expected to pay an equal share. The United Nations budget is too large, however, to admit of equal contributions if membership is to be universal. Nevertheless, the fact that the budget is large does not justify complete disregard of the factor of sovereign equality.
Other Delegations may argue that the present assessment of 39.89 per cent for the United States is already a compromise between an assessment based solely on relative capacities to pay and an assessment based on equality of financial obligations. (Last year the Committee on Contributions reported a scale of relative capacities to pay based on available statistical data which indicated that the United States had a relative capacity to pay of 49.89 per cent.) This argument can be met on two grounds. (1) The calculations made by the Committee on Contributions last year were admittedly not precise because of the absence of comparable statistical information for each country and because of [Page 255] the impossibility of comparing the national incomes of highly industrialized societies with the national incomes of agricultural societies. (2) Even though the present United States contribution may be at a rate which is below its theoretical relative capacity to pay, it does no, in the opinion of the United States Government, reflect adequately the concept of sovereign equality. The United States position is that 33⅓ per cent would be high enough to take adequate account of the greater United States capacity to pay on the one hand and would not on the other hand, in the words of the Preparatory Commission recommendations, be so low as seriously to obscure the relation between its contributions and its capacity to pay. If each Member were assessed on the basis of sovereign equality, the assessment for each Member would be 1.75 percent.
It might also be pointed out that contributions by the permanent members of the Security Council should not be too widely divergent. France and China are each assessed 6 per cent; the U.S.S.R., 6.34 per cent; and the United Kingdom, 11.48 per cent.
points to stress
In discussing this problem with other Delegations, it is desirable to find out:
1. If there is a willingness to recognize the principle of a ceiling in normal times.
2. If a maximum of 33⅓ per cent is an acceptable ceiling.
3. If support would be given to the formal recognition of the principle of a ceiling by amendment of Rule 43 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure.
The present Rule 43 now reads in part as follows:
The Committee on Contributions shall advise the General Assembly concerning the apportionment under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the expenses of the Organization among Members, broadly according to capacity to pay.
It might be amended by adding to this sentence either:
and taking account of the principle that normally no single Member shall contribute more than one-third of the total contributions for administrative expenses.
or
within maximum and minimum limits which shall be determined by the General Assembly.
The addition of the principle of a ceiling and a floor to Rule 43 is appropriate since this rule already gives capacity to pay as a guide to the Contributions Committee. To include a specific percentage such as 33⅓ might be resisted on the grounds that a substantive matter was being placed in a procedural rule. However, an expression of views on this question would be helpful.
It should be emphasized that the United States is not pressing for an immediate application of a 33.33 per cent ceiling. As Senator [Page 256] Vandenberg stated in Committee 5 last year and as the United States Representative has stated on two occasions in Committee 5 this year, the United States is willing to pay the additional contribution which is represented by the difference between 33.33 and 39.89 per cent because the United States recognizes the serious economic difficulties which face other Members at this time. It is to be expected, however, that the current economic difficulties in the rest of the world will decrease. Indeed, with economic recovery, increased industrialization of many countries, and the addition of new Members to the United Nations, the position of the United States on a scale of relative capacities to pay may be expected steadily to decline.
In talking with other Delegations it is important to stress the fact that the United States recognizes that operational expenses as distinguished from administrative expenses would require a greater contribution by those Members which are in a position to pay large amounts. For example: United States accepted an assessment of 45.75 per cent of the IRO budget. If only 75 percent of the IRO contributions are actually subscribed, as is possible under its constitution, the United States contribution would be more than 61 per cent.
The report of the Committee on Contributions has already been examined and approved by Committee 5. In this Committee the United States Delegation agreed to recommend to the Congress that it appropriate 39.89 per cent of the total contributions assessed in 1948.
further background material
Additional background material will be found under Tab 1(f) of the Instruction Book in the position paper entitled “Member Contributions to the United Nations” (SD/A/C.5/58) and under Tabs 6(c), 6(d), and 6(e) of the Committee 5 Background Book.1 The statement of the United States Representative on the report of the Committee on Contributions made on October 42 in Committee 5 is attached for further reference.3
- None printed.↩
- The summary record of the United States statement made on October 4 is found in United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Fifth Committee, p. 44.↩
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A proposal to amend Rule 43 along the lines of providing for maximum and minimum limits for contributions by Members was submitted to the Fifth Committee by the United States, and was considered by the Committee at a meeting on November 6. Adlai Stevenson spoke for the United States. After some deliberation the Committee decided at the same meeting to defer consideration of this item along with a proposal submitted by the Chairman of the Contributions Committee. For the Committee’s discussion, see Ibid., pp. 350–357; Mr. Stevenson’s exposition of the U.S. view is found Ibid., pp. 350–351.
However, in its report to the General Assembly on the scale of assessments for the 1948 budget (U.N. Doc. A/462), the Fifth Committee included, at the request of the United States member, the conviction of the United States that in an organization of sovereign equals no single member should pay more than 33⅓ per cent of the regular (administrative) budget.
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