Department of State Atomic Energy Files
Memorandum by Mr. Edmund A. Guillion to the Under Secretary of State ( Acheson )
Mr. Acheson: Developments in Belgium in the last two weeks have an indirect but very important bearing on the United States atomic energy program. A new Government has been formed, without Communist participation; this Government plans to nationalize uranium and to begin research in Belgium; and M. Godding, the Minister of Colonies, is no longer in the Cabinet. The following is the story:
The Belgian Government fell on March 11, and on March 19 Monsieur Paul Henri Spaak succeeded in forming a government of 19 ministries comprising 9 Catholic Socialist members,1 8 Belgian Socialist members and 2 “technicians”. Significantly, no Communists were included in the Government. Little information has so far been received concerning the reasons for the Government’s fall, but the immediate issue appears to have been disagreement between the Socialists and Liberals on the one hand and Communists on the other over the price of coal. The Communists, who were for a lower price, appeared to have grasped the issue as one on which they could pose as public champions.
Our Embassy reports that this issue was generally considered to be a pretext for the Communists’ exit. Hitherto they have preferred to stay in the Government and have even indicated that their ends would best be served by Belgian economic recovery. The Embassy thinks the move was due to instructions from abroad rather than to any factors in Belgian politics. Now that the Communists are out of the Government, they are free to attack Government handling of uranium which is what we have feared for some time.
So far the Embassy has not indicated that there is any direct connection between the Communists’ withdrawal and the atomic energy question. However, there are other developments, which coupled with the new Communist tactics, give cause for concern.
The two parties now represented in the Cabinet have agreed on a “political platform plank” calling for the nationalization of uranium [Page 803] deposits. The Communist defection was partly responsible because, in order to keep the Left Wing Socialists from following the Communists out of the Government, Spaak had to swing his platform far to the Left. The program specified a number of targets for nationalization, among them the National Bank and the Association Nationale de Crédit, and included a plan for participation of workers in the management of industry.
As you are aware, nationalization of Union Minière is contrary to our interests inasmuch as it would presumably be more difficult for a national company to refuse Russian requests for uranium than for a private company. However, the Regent and Spaak have told our Ambassor that existing contracts should preclude granting the Russian requests.
Spaak has defended nationalization on the grounds that the US, UK and Canada had established rigid controls over raw materials and that Belgium had to do something similar.
Another disturbing development has been the decision to allocate ten million francs ($250,000.00) for uranium research, which will involve diversion of some mineral to Belgium. Our Belgian friends do not think that the amount will be sufficient for any significant development. Nevertheless, from our point of view it is dangerous that the principle of diversion should be established and that research should be brought into Europe at a point where its materials and results might become easily available to the Russians. Spaak pointed out that our new legislation (the McMahon Act) made it very difficult to object to the research project since it apparently prevented the Belgians from getting needed information from this country.
Finally, the Cabinet crisis has meant the disappearance from the Cabinet of the Liberal member, M. Godding, the Minister of Colonies, who had been a key man in our relations with the Congo. Pierre Wigny, who replaces him as Colonial Minister, is a Catholic Socialist and is not known to our Embassy, although Spaak has indicated he would not be particularly “in the picture”.
There seems little that we could have done or can do about these developments which, although limited in their immediate effects, are rather disturbing for the long range. Nevertheless, there are some conclusions to be drawn. Do you concur in the following?: (a) The thesis developed in Mr. Snapp’s2 and my paper3 about the dangers to our procurement program which would result from a deterioration in US-UK-Belgian cooperation is reinforced by these developments; (b) the necessity of finding some solution to the problems presented by the [Page 804] restrictive clauses on exchange of information in the McMahon Act has become more urgent; and (c) assuming a solution of (a), Ambassador Kirk’s suggestion that we should bring Belgian scientists to this country should be adopted. The Atomic Energy Commission was not originally receptive to this last idea, but they might wish to reconsider it at the present time. It is true that we are to some degree locking the barn door after the horse is stolen, but we might be able at least to keep some control of the Belgian research program by bringing scientists here.4
- i.e., members of the Belgian Social Christian Party.↩
- Roy B. Snapp, Special Assistant to the General Manager of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.↩
- Not printed.↩
- In a notation at the bottom of the final page of the source text, Acheson stated that he agreed that developments in Belgium were adverse to United States interests and should be taken very seriously.↩