855.6359/5–1447: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium

top secret
us urgent

683. For the Ambassador from Acheson. 1. The Department is in complete agreement with your analyses over recent weeks of the atomic energy situation in Belgium, and the dangers to our procurement [Page 813] program and to security presented by recent political changes there. For your own strictly confidential information, the Department is at present engaged with the Atomic Energy Commission in studying whether the provisions of the Act will allow us in view of its primary objective which is to “assure the common defense and security” to use information as a counter in the dealings necessary to assuring continuing supplies of raw materials in the required amounts. We are trying to establish whether this proposition, which applies not only to our relations with Belgium, is correct, and, if so, what our course should be. In any case, we shall try to hasten a decision. The outcome of discussions in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission will also obviously have a bearing on our future course.

2. If you are able to see Spaak before your departure1 you may inform him in the sense of the following paragraphs; if not, your Chargé may act for you.

3. I testified on May 12 before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the arrangements by which we have been securing raw materials for the program. I informed the Committee of the existence of the Belgian agreements, and of their duration. I did not discuss quantities, consignments, prospects, price or other details. I did refer generally to recent developments in Belgium as reported in your telegrams. The Committee appeared to understand fully the need for secrecy in respect to the arrangements, although there was much speculation on the extent to which the main outlines of the agreement might already be known to unauthorized persons. I believe that the session was successful and that it will facilitate our further handling of the program.

4. We are somewhat concerned about recent developments in Belgium, although we understand the difficulties of Spaak’s position and the pressures on his government. We trust that no arrangements made in pursuant of the decisions to nationalize uranium and to extend research in Belgium will interfere with the execution of present agreements and contracts. We, here, are investigating every possibility of extending the base of cooperation with the Belgians within the provisions of law. Some little time may lapse, however, before we can arrive at a decision, since we have not yet progressed beyond the stage of basic studies within some of the Executive departments. We cannot, therefore, give any assurances and Spaak should make only the most restricted use of this information. As to publicity on existing contracts, we shall consult with the British about any statement Spaak should make if he is forced to do so. We do not presently see that my statement to the Committee is any occasion for such a statement.

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5. You may also indicate to Spaak, with reference to his desire to send Belgian scientists here to study the development of atomic energy for industrial purposes, that these uses do not seem as imminent as he appears to believe, judging from his conversations with you. No plants or other installations have yet been designed or operated for such uses nor can there be until a number of important engineering and technical problems are solved. I am sending you, under separate cover, copies of a recent statement by Oppenheimer before a committee to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission which deals with these prospects.

6. We are aware of our obligations to Belgium, under Sec. 9a of the agreement, and will do all in our power to carry them through when the time comes, but our research and development have not yet entered the stage where the cooperation envisaged by this section would become operative.

7. We note that Belgium has begun a small research program and the British and ourselves would be glad to see that some Congo ore is provided for that purpose as stipulated in the agreement. We should be glad to know how much will be required and when.

8. For your own information, and, in accordance with your suggestion, we are exploring the possibility of bringing a Belgian scientist here to see as much as the law permits, or of sending a scientist to Belgium.2

9. We are concerned about the presence of Communists in the directorate of the Belgian research program. Certainly it would be difficult for this country to enter into arrangements for exchange of research findings if the Belgian research center were penetrated by Communists.

10. I realize that it has been difficult for the Belgians to prevent this, especially in view of the undesirability of aggravating the debate on disposition of Congo ores but could there not be more vigilance by the government on this score now that the Communists are out of the government?

11. I am anxious that Spaak be strengthened in his appreciation of the necessity of continuing cooperation with us, if such strengthening is needed, and that his conviction be shared as widely as possible in Belgium, together with an awareness of the alternatives.

12. In this connection, am I correct in assuming that while the Belgian Communists have raised a hue and cry about Anglo-American domination of Belgium’s unique resource, there has been no corresponding clamor from the Right and Center about Communist infiltration into the Belgian research program in the interests of a third [Page 815] power. Is the history of the atomic spy ring in Canada popularly known in Belgium? Is the Belgian public aware of the obstructionist role of the Soviet Union in the United Nations, which more than any other factor has prevented an agreement on international control of atomic energy? We assume that Spaak himself is well aware of the discouraging rate of progress in the United Nations at this time, as well as of the relation of the United Nations picture to what the Communists are trying to do in Belgium.

13. It would be reassuring if there were more concern in the press and parliament about Communist influence in the research program and Communist motives in agitating the question of the disposition of Congo ore. (For your information, I realize that manifestations of such concern may understandably not have been reported as fully as the Communists’ attacks on the status quo, so anything you may say to Spaak on this point may be modified accordingly.)

14. With regard to your suggestions about Joliot-Curie, we do not feel that it would be practicable to “debunk” his scientific reputation, although his Communist affiliations can be stressed.3

15. I realize that some of these points may already be covered in the memorandum Spaak promised you,4 but it would be interesting to have his reaction to the foregoing nevertheless.

16. Paragraphs 3 through 14 of foregoing have been discussed with British here who appear to be in general agreement. You may keep your British colleague informed.

Marshall
  1. Ambassador Kirk left for Washington on May 16, returning to Brussels on June 27.
  2. Ambassador Kirk offered this suggestion in telegram 604, April 15, not printed (855a.646/4–1547).
  3. In telegram 604, April 15, Ambassador Kirk bad stated “Communists have had considerable success in building up Joliot-Curie as man who knows most atomic ‘secrets’ and who will gladly work with Belgians (and Belgian uranium) in developing nuclear industrial power in Belgium. I suggest that one line of attack would be to debunk Joliot-Curie’s reputation. This would be a delicate operation and American scientists would be in a better position than we to pass on both its practicability and best methods.” (855a.646/4–1547)
  4. In telegram 640, April 20, Ambassador Kirk had reported that Spaak had indicated that he intended to soon give him a memorandum on atomic energy questions (855A.6359/4–2047). For text of this memorandum, see telegram 777 from Brussels, May 14, supra.