IO Files: US/A/351
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Boss of the United States Delegation Staff of Advisers
| Participants: | Ralph Harry, Australian Delegation1 |
| S. Sen, Indian Delegation2 | |
| John C. Ross, United States Delegation |
During the interval preceding the election of the president, Mr. Harry came up to me in a very discouraged frame of mind at the turn of support from Evatt to Aranha for the presidency. There was more than a little note of suspicion in his remarks that our support for Evatt was not very sincere. He said that since we had pledged our support he assumed that we would follow through. He implied, however, that if the only votes Evatt got were those of the United States and a few others it would not look as though our support had amounted to very much.
Harry went on to say, somewhat cryptically, that the Indians had been supporting Evatt and were in a good position to swing all the [Page 126] Middle and Near Eastern votes. However, in the situation as it had now developed, it appeared that there might be a deadlock between Aranha and Evatt; there had been several indications that Madam Pandit might have a very good chance as a dark-horse candidate and the Indians would probably not be slow to take advantage of any such opportunity.
Harry stated that the Indians were rather “sore” at the United States because we had not included India on our slate for any office. Harry went on to say that if in reconsidering our slate in the present situation of confusion there was anything we could do for the Indians he thought this might serve the purpose of holding the Indians and the Middle and Near Eastern group in line in support of Evatt’s candidacy.
I told Harry I didn’t know that we could do anything at all along this line but I would see.
I subsequently found Sen and asked him what the thoughts of his government were in the present situation regarding elections. He said his delegation wanted a place on the General Committee. They were very disappointed that the United States did not have them on its slate for any office.
They had not at all considered the possibility of the presidency. In the present confused situation, however, they saw they might have a chance. What they wanted was a vice-presidency rather than a committee chairmanship because they wanted to avoid spreading themselves too thin.
Sen, almost immediately afterwards, checked with his delegation and confirmed the accuracy of the statements he had made to me.
I reported to Ambassador Johnson and discussions within the U.S. Delegation revealed that it would be possible for the United States to support India for Committee 5.
I thereupon informed both the Australians and the Indians and they were both very pleased at United States action.
Following the election and Evatt’s defeat, I made very clear to Colonel Hodgson of the Australian Delegation that our support had not wavered. I gave him, in strict confidence, the background of the conversation on Sen with Aranha which led to initial withdrawal and had made it possible for us to support Evatt. I also made it clear that our support of Evatt had been as strong as we could possibly make it. The fact that Aranha had come back into the race had not been a result of any influence we had used with any of the Latin Americans.
I think this last conversation served the purpose of clarifying doubts and suspicions which quite obviously still lingered in the Australian minds.