IO Files: US/A/M(Chr)/54
Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States Delegation, New York, September 22, 1947, 9:15 a.m.
[Here follow the list of persons (32) present and a discussion of three agenda items.]
Security Council Slates
Ambassador Austin then raised again the question of elections to the Security Council. Events had suggested, he said, the possibility of reversing the Delegation position. Recalling the Delegation view maintaining support for Czechoslovakia as the East European country to replace Poland on the Security Council and the refusal to accept any other East European country, he read from a memorandum of conversation (US/A/412) with Papanek,1 in which the latter had “literally pleaded” that the Delegation help keep Czechoslovakia off the Security Council. Papanek, according to the memorandum, had said Czechoslovakia on the Security Council would have to act as a “complete puppet”, “following the party line” and hurting public opinion in Czechoslovakia. He had said that the Czech Delegation could not say publicly it did not wish to be on the Security Council, but had argued that on the Economic and Social Council his country could help maintain contact with the West. He had said also that Czechoslovakia was under Russian pressure to sit on the Security Council, but it had appeared unclear as to whether the United States had switched from the Ukraine or was merely considering whom to back.
[Page 135]Ambassador Johnson reported that, at Ambassador Austin’s direction, he had told Gromyko that Czechoslovakia should serve or that no East European country would be supported.2 There was a doubt in his mind, however, he said, whether the Delegation was really wise in trying to keep an East European state off the Security Council simply because it could not get Czechoslovakia. He observed that the United States was engaged in bitter political warfare against the Soviet Union, and said he agreed 100 per cent with that policy, but that until the United States had broken with the Soviet Union, there was a moral obligation to carry out the agreement made with the U.S.S.R. regarding the continuous presence of two East European countries on the Security Council. Ambassador Johnson sympathized with those to whom the Ukraine was repugnant, but was not sure but that it would be worse to oppose the Ukraine. He felt the issue which should be made the occasion for such a step should be another one. Therefore, he felt the Delegation might reconsider the matter. If the Ukraine went on the Security Council, it would at least be known exactly where we stood, for the Ukraine would simply be an echoing voice. There would be no question of trying to influence the Ukraine, as in the case of Czechoslovakia. He repeated that it was necessary to carry out the obligations in commitments made to the U.S.S.R. during the organizational period of United Nations and noted that Yugoslavia and Byelorussia were the only other alternatives. The Delegation could not possibly vote for Yugoslavia in view of the United States changes [charges?] against that country.
Summing up the positions previously accepted: strong support for Czechoslovakia; no pressure on Czechoslovakia if it refused; firm opposition to the Ukraine, Yugoslavia or Byelorussia; support of India, if Czechoslovakia was out, without mention of this previously to the U.S.S.R. Ambassador Austin asked whether the Delegation wished to review the question of firm opposition to Ukraine. He said he was just going to leave it with the Delegation for consideration.
Mr. Stevenson asked whether Masaryk had been consulted in the matter, in view of Papanek’s statement, and when this statement was made. The Senator said it had been made the day before. Mr. Stevenson then said he echoed Ambassador Johnson’s view on the Ukraine, but asked whether discussion with Masaryk might not be advisable, since what Papanek said seemed somewhat at variance with what Masaryk had indicated.
Ambassador Johnson raised the question of Argentina’s Security Council candidacy, which he called a corollary to the case of Czechoslovakia. He had canvassed the Latin American delegations, he said, [Page 136] including Aranha (Brazil), and there was no doubt in his mind that the bulk of them supported Argentina and thought it would be a good thing if the United States did likewise. He had made it clear to Aranha that the Delegation would consider sympathetically any candidate generally supported by the Latin Americans. No caucus of the Latin Americans on the subject had been held as yet, but the feeling among them seemed to be that Argentine Security Council membership was in the logic of the situation. Several had said they felt Security Council membership would have a sobering effect on Argentina. Aranha had said he felt Argentina was unquestionably the greatest power in Latin America and that it would be a good thing to get it definitely on our side by support.
Mr. Bohlen explained that the Department’s opposition to the Ukraine had nothing to do with the fact the United States was engaged in political warfare with the Soviet Union. It was based rather on the fact that the Ukraine was not independent of the Soviet Union. Ambassador Johnson agreed entirely, but pointed out that the United States voted for Ukraine to be in the United Nations. What is the good of throwing an East Asiatic country at Russia and saying take this if not Czechoslovakia, he asked. He merely thought the situation should be reconsidered, and that the fact that the Ukraine had no real independent existence should not necessarily be decisive. Mr. Stine-bower3 added that the Ukraine had already been elected to the Economic and Social Council, and that Byelorussia had since been elected to replace it, and that the United States had thus already committed itself that any independent country was eligible to United Nations Councils. We would have to narrow the grounds for exclusion, he felt, and would have to be careful what kind of argument we used against the Ukraine. Mr. Stevenson agreed. He also agreed with Mr. Bohlen’s general reasoning, but did not see how the Security Council was different from other United Nations Councils.
Mr. Bohlen said the Ukraine and Byelorussia were admitted into the United Nations not on grounds of their independence but on other grounds. India and the Philippines had been admitted similarly, without possessing full independence at the time. To be accepted into the United Nations it was not necessary for a country to be fully independent. In reply to Mr. Stinebower’s point, he recalled the special qualifications clause for Security Council membership. The Ukraine did not have constitutional independence, being bound by decisions of a central government.
Ambassador Johnson then indicated he felt if the Ukraine was to [Page 137] be opposed that the Delegation should be prepared to state the reason, publicly.
Mr. Bohlen said the Department would prefer Yugoslavia to the Ukraine because there was hope that the situation there was a temporary phenomenon, whereas the Ukrainian status was permanent. Yugoslavia enjoyed all the prerogatives of an independent nation, he pointed out.
The meeting adjourned at 10:30.