Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, Volume II

CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 2161: CFM(D) (47) (G) Documents

Report by the Deputies for Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers in Compliance With Section IV (a) of the Council’s Instructions of 12th December, 1946. ⁶⁹

CFM(D) (47) (G)70

Lancaster House, London , 25th February, 1947.

In accordance with the instructions of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France, the Ministers Deputies for Germany, Sir William Strang, the Hon. Robert Murphy, Monsieur F. T. Gousev and Monsieur Couve de Murville met in London on the 14th January, 1947.

Under Paragraph IV (a) of the Ministers’ Decisions, dated 12th December, 1946 (Document CFM(NY) 74),⁷⁰ the Deputies for Germany were instructed to “hear the views of the Governments of neighbouring Allied States, and of other Allied States which participated with their armed forces in the common struggle against Germany, which wish to present their views on the German problem.” The Deputies accordingly heard at Lancaster House the views of a number of Allied Governments.

Of the eighteen Allied Governments invited in the letter of 31st December, 1946, despatched by the Secretary-General of the Council of Foreign Ministers,⁷¹ the Governments of sixteen countries submitted written memoranda: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Byelorussia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Ukraine and Yugoslavia. Of these sixteen Governments all except Brazil,⁷² Norway and Canada supplemented their written memoranda with oral statements to the Council of Deputies. The Government of China in a letter to the Secretary-General in London expressed its intention of submitting a memorandum at a later date. No communication has been received from the Government of India.

In compliance with Paragraph IV (c) of their instructions the Deputies for Germany present herewith their report to the Council of Foreign Ministers for the session in Moscow beginning on 10th March, 1947.

• William Strang .
• F. T. Gousev .
• Robert Murphy .
• Maurice Couve de Murville .

Part I
List of Memoranda and Statements Presented to the Deputies by Each Country, Together With a List of the Principal Questions Raised

australia

Represented by: Lieut.-Col. Hodgson.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 24th January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum presented by the Australian Government to the Deputies appointed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, 13th January, 1947 (CFM(D)47(G)5).

2. Statement by Lieut.-Col. Hodgson, of the Australian Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 24th January, 1947 (CFM(D)47(G)25).

3. Memorandum: Views of the Australian Government, 14th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)61).

I.—General Observations.

1. Extent of Australia’s war effort.

2. Questions of procedure.

3. Owing to the absence of a German Government, an interim agreement, prior to the final settlement, will be necessary. Contents of the interim agreement.

II.—Fundamental Principles.

1. Observance of general undertakings in Atlantic and United Nations’ Charter.

2. Impartial examination of all relevant facts.

3. No unnecessary burdens and humiliations to be imposed upon the ex-enemy States.

4. Necessity of an overall settlement.

III.—Political Principles on the Settlement With Germany.

1. Should be based on the Potsdam Agreement in its two aspects: negative (demilitarisation, disarmament, denazification) and positive (democratisation of Germany).

The following remarks are made in this respect:

(a) clause for protection of human rights to be inserted in the Treaty;

(b) need for uniform measures of denazification within Germany;

(c) necessity of uniform principles in education and justice.

2. Allied Control System to be modified so as to give all belligerents the possibility of expressing their views on the occupation policy. Setting up of a policy-making body on parallel lines to the Far-Eastern Commission.

3. Political Structure of Germany.—Necessity of central administrations—Should be established immediately.

Not advisable to set up a provisional German Government too soon. Special committee should study the problem. But ultimate decision on the political structure of Germany to rest with the Germans themselves.

4. Frontiers and Territorial Claims.—Australia has no commitments in that matter but insists on observance of fundamental principles stated above with possible exceptions for security claims of paramount importance. Economic considerations should also be taken into account.

IV.—Economic Principles.

Potsdam Agreement contradictory in so far as industrial disarmament, if carried out to the letter, would risk wrecking the German economy. Necessary to restate economic purposes of Potsdam in that respect.

belgium

Represented by: Baron de Gruben.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 31st January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum submitted to the New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, 14th November, 1946 (CFM(D) (47) (G)63).

2. Communication from H.E. the Belgian Ambassador in London, enclosing two memoranda (VI and VII), 19th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)17).

3. Memorandum: Considerations of the Belgian Government on the policy of the Allied Powers concerning Germany, 17th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47(G)17).

4. Memorandum: Belgian claims in respect of Germany, 17th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)17).

5. Statement by Baron de Gruben, of the Belgian Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 31st January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)40).

1. Fundamental problem is gradual replacement of necessary present regime of restraint by one of free German co-operation. Allies must guard against laxity and division. Necessity of permanent unity and vigilance among the Allies.

2. Germany to be a confederation of States.

3. The economic unity of Germany must be secured.

4. General control of disarmament. Approval of American Draft Treaty for Disarmament and Demilitarisation of Germany. Measures for security and control which are envisaged for the whole country should be applied strictly to those regions which are most important from the point of view of military and economic security.

5. Control of Rhineland and Ruhr. Problems of the Ruhr and the Rhineland to be considered in the general framework of Germany as a whole.

Special military regime in the areas of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. After a possible evacuation of the rest of Germany a compulsory regime of limited military occupation by units of the French, Luxemburg, Belgian, Dutch and British armies to be retained in those regions.

Establishment of international economic control over the Ruhr basin. The international organ of control to consist of the representatives of the five occupying powers—participation of the other powers to be defined by the Great Powers.

6. The Agreement reached by the Control Council on 26th March, 1946, establishing the level of German industry, has greatly hindered Germany in the re-establishment of her economic equilibrium.

7. Prohibition of manufacture and import of certain articles, likely to be used for war purposes.

8. Need for control of German commercial policy and practices.

9. Territorial claims.

10. Other claims:

(a) The delivery of raw materials and electrical power.

(b) Demands relating to transport, communications and the waterways.

(c) Demands relating to the restitution of works of art and historical archives.

brazil

Document: Communication from the Brazilian Ambassador to the Council of Foreign Ministers, 22nd January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47)(G)20).

1. The Brazilian Government considers it indispensable to destroy the unity of the Reich.

When a federal structure is set up in Germany it will be necessary to endow it with an economic regime which will proscribe internal customs barriers.

2. The Brazilian Government supports the internationalisation of the Ruhr and the creation of a special economic regime for the Saar as desired by the French Government.

3. The Brazilian Government desires to share in the division for reparations of the assets situated in Germany and liable to transfer.

byelorussian s.s.r.

Presented by: Mr. Kiselev.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 8th February, 1947.

Document: Statement by Mr. Kiselev, of the Byelorussian Delegation at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 8th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)50).

1. The Byelorussian people are vitally interested in a solution of the German problem which would guarantee them against any repetition of invasion by Germany.

2. Extent of damage caused to the Byelorussian S.S.R. by the Germans:

(a) The majority of towns and villages destroyed;

(b) Direct material damages amounting to 15,000 million American dollars, of which 4,720 million dollars represent losses of personal belongings of citizens;

(c) Particularly heavy destruction wrought on agriculture (sown area of grain decreased by 60 per cent., that of potatoes dropped to one-half, etc. …);

(d) Policy of extermination of the population of Byelorussia.

3. Contribution of the Byelorussian people to the war against Germany:

(a) Guerrillas (over 300,000);

(b) Armed forces (one million soldiers and officers).

4. Byelorussian demands for reparations (1,500 million American dollars which constitutes not more than 10 per cent. of damage inflicted).

5. The German question can be successfully resolved only by the application of the principles adopted at Potsdam and the Crimea:

(a) Complete disarmament and demilitarisation for a period of 40 years.

Liquidation of the economic potential of Germany with a view to safeguarding the future against German aggression.

Inter-Allied control of the Ruhr by the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.

Liquidation of the excessive concentration of Germany’s economic power.

Liquidation of trusts and cartels.

(b) Democratic land reform to eliminate the economic power of reaction and militarism.

(c) Reconstruction of Germany on new democratic lines, complete eradication of Nazism and its ideology.

(d) Political structure of Germany; a united Germany in which the organs of local self-government of the Laender and provinces will be invested with broad democratic rights.

(e) Democratic parties and anti-Fascist trade unions could render important assistance to the occupying powers in the implementation of the Crimean and Potsdam decisions.

(f) The setting up of a strict control over Germany by the four occupying powers, the control body of these powers must be invested with the power to carry out sanctions.

(g) The immediate liquidation of anti-social Fascist organisations, consisting of war criminals and accomplices of the Hitlerite hangmen. All Nazi criminals to be handed over and punished.

canada

Document: Memorandum on the German Peace Settlement, 30th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)41).

I.—General Observations.

Canada’s interest in the German problem: Canada involved in war against Germany twice in a generation.

Canada’s contribution to victory, justifying her participation in the preparation of the peace settlement.

II.—Elaboration of an International Statute for Germany.

Paramount purpose of the peace settlement is to prevent recurrence of war, but in such a manner that the Germans may ultimately resume a peaceful place in the European and world community.

Early conclusion of a formal peace treaty unnecessary. Advantages of an international Statute constituting a new German State and governing its relations with other States.

III.—Constitutional and Territorial Questions.

Need to reconstitute a German State: this State to be federal and not unitary in character.

Limitations to be imposed on powers of Central German Government, in particular financial and military powers.

Need for control of the executive by a democratically elected legislature.

Relations between Central Government and Governments of the States to be described in a formal Constitution.

German frontiers to be determined with a view to securing maximum stability in Europe.

IV.—Economic Questions.

Three fold Canadian interest in Germany’s economic future:

Prevention of new aggressive war.

Prevention of economic depression in Germany which would react adversely on Europe as a whole.

German industrial capacity to be used for the benefit of all countries.

Early establishment of Economic Commission for Europe desirable.

Control of German industry in special areas, e.g., Ruhr to be administered by an international authority.

Need to abolish centralisation and monopoly in German industry and finance.

German foreign trade to be conducted in a manner providing equal opportunity for all nations.

V.—Reparations.

Existing arrangements to be reviewed in the light of level of economy and standard of living to be permitted to Germany.

VI.—Disarmament and Demilitarisation.

Peace Treaty should contain specific provisions for abolition of German armaments and armed forces: need for effective international safeguards.

Framing of satisfactory peace settlement with Germany a world problem. Nations preparing the Peace Treaty are trustees for the United Nations. The United Nations the only long-term safeguard for peace.

czechoslovakia

Represented by: M. Heidrich, M. Hajdu and M. Lisicky.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 30th January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum of the Czechoslovak Government to the Conference of Foreign Ministers’ Deputies in London, 22nd January, 1947, (CFM(D) (47) (G)21).

2. Statements made by members of the Czechoslovak Delegation at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 30th January, 1947, (CFM(D) (47) (G)36).

1. The crux of the problem of the future political settlement of Germany is the organisation of Four Power control extending to all branches of German life. Such control, for which Four Power military occupation is the sole guarantee, must continue until there is the absolute certainty that Germany has not the material possibility of again becoming an aggressor, and the knowledge that the will of the German people is no longer directed to this end.

2. Removal of material conditions of a fresh German aggression by complete military and economic disarmament, co-ordinated with Germany’s reparations obligations.

3. German economic unity desirable provided there is agreement regarding political unity.

4. Federalisation of Germany presents difficulties and would not itself suffice to safeguard the interests of the Czechoslovak Republic.

5. The necessity to implement, without delay, the decision of the Potsdam Agreement on reparations.

6. The economic resources of the Ruhr and Rhine Districts not to be excluded from an all-German economic system, and to be under effective control. Czechoslovakia to participate in this control should States other than the occupying powers be invited to do so.

7. Denazification and democratisation of Germany.

8. Need for the liquidation of cartels, the nationalisation of industry belonging to Nazis, wide spread land reform, uniform currency, control of external trade, credit and investment.

9. Nullity of Munich Agreement to be declared.

10. Claims for adjustment of Czechoslovak/German frontier, for detailed list see Annex.

11. Question of ex-Czechoslovak Nationals of German origin.

12. Participation of Czechoslovakia in the control of Germany with regard to questions in which Czechoslovakia has a direct interest.

13. Czechoslovak reparation and other claims.

denmark

Represented by: Count Reventlow.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 13th February, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum containing the views of the Royal Danish Government regarding the Future Settlement of Germany, 5th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)46).

2. Statement by Count Reventlow, of the Danish Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 15th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)60).

1. Definition of the problem confronting the Allies. Need to safeguard against German aggression, whilst creating economic and social conditions for the restoration of Germany on a democratic basis.

2. Political questions:

(a) General views of Danish Government on military and political questions. Importance of disarmament and demilitarisation; denazification and education of German youth; decentralisation of political structure.

(b) Need for guarantee of common civic and democratic rights for all inhabitants of Germany, including “non-German groups of population.” Special provisions required to safeguard the privileges of the latter.

(c) Danish interest in South Schleswig. Need for measures to protect the Danish element there.

(d) Proposal for administrative separation of South Schleswig from Holstein.

(e) Request for removal of refugees from South Schleswig.

(f) Proposal that Kiel Canal should be administered by an international body.

3. Economic questions:

(a) Importance of Danish-German trade for the Danish economy.

(b) Need for dissolution of monopolistic concerns in Germany.

(c) Economic organisation of Germany: Importance of avoiding internal economic barriers.

(d) Need to ensure non-discrimination by Germany in matters of commerce, communications, etc.

(e) Reparations. Danish desire to obtain reparations from current production.

4. Control Measures. Need for special organs of control after withdrawal of Allied occupation forces.

5. Request for surrender of Danish archives removed to Germany.

6. Request for removal of German refugees from Denmark as soon as possible; refusal to grant them Danish citizenship.

7. Procedure for the preparation of a Peace Treaty.

greece

Represented by: M. Aghnides.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 29th January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum: Views of the Greek Government presented 20th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)19). (Includes EAC document 5137 giving the views of the Royal Hellenic Government on the terms of surrender to be imposed upon Germany and the machinery required to ensure the fulfilment of these terms.)

2. Statement by M. Aghnides at the 29th January, 1947, meeting of the Deputies for Germany (CFM(D) (47) (G)33).

3. Communication from the Greek Government of 7th February, providing supplementary answers to questions (CFM(D) (47) (G)51).

1. Greece’s interest in future economic and political structure of Germany.—“Confederation of German States” suggested, but “German economy should not be excessively decentralised”.

2. Commercial Policy.—Basis of Germany’s future commercial policy to be laid down in the Peace Treaty. Need to safeguard against German economic domination of the Balkan countries.

3. Reparations.—Particular strength of Greek claims on account of Greece’s losses and absence of other sources of compensation.

Need for revision of Paris Agreement in Greece’s favour.

Germany’s liability, to include reparations from current production, to be fixed at highest possible figure.

4. Restitution.—No distinction to be made between goods removed by force and goods obtained against payment in occupation currency. Objects of artistic value to be replaced where they cannot be returned.

5. Greece’s commercial dependence on the German market, particularly as regards tobacco.—Proposal that Peace Treaty should contain clause requiring Germany to obtain a substantial proportion of her tobacco imports by preferential purchase from Greece.

6. Other Special Claims.—Including repayment of advances to German occupation authorities, German liability for expenses of mine clearance, claims to German war material and for payment by Germany of cost of repatriating and maintaining Greek nationals removed to Germany during the war.

luxemburg

Represented by: Mr. Wehrer.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 7th February, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum: Views of the Luxemburg Government, 5th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)47).

2. Statement by M. Wehrer, of the Luxemburg Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 7th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)49).

General Remarks.

Security considerations to be given absolute priority in the settlement of the German question.

The need of vigilance in applying measures of demilitarization and denazification.

A.—Observations on Allied Policy Towards Germany.

Primary importance of decentralizing Germany.

Proposal to set up self-governing German States, such States to be free to join a Confederation should one be created.

Special status of the Ruhr—Need for Allied control.

Status of Rhineland.

B.—Luxemburg Claims in Respect of Germany.

1. Review of Total Damage Suffered by the Grand-Duchy.

2. Territorial Claims:

Demand for exclusive possession of rivers Our, Sure and Moselle, forming the present frontier between Luxemburg and Germany.

Cession of bordering territories as defined on map annexed to Memorandum.

The Grand-Duchy to acquire and operate the railway line on the German bank of the Moselle.

Germany to build and bear the cost of construction of a dam and hydroelectric power station on the Our.

3. Economic Claims:

The working and production of the mines of the Eschweiler-Bergwerkes-Verein to be placed at the entire disposal of Luxemburg.

The direct supply of coal and coke by Germany or, failing that, the temporary concession of mines in the Aachen and Ruhr districts (Nordstern mining concessions).

Germany to deliver fuel and miscellaneous supplies to ensure the working of mines and metallurgical industry. These supplies to be in exchange for Luxemburg products.

4. Additional Claims:

Claims relating to certain German works of art and archives.

Luxemburg property, interests and rights in Germany to be guaranteed.

netherlands

Represented by: Jonkheer van Vredenburch and Dr. Hirschfeld.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 28th January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum: Views of the Netherlands Government, 14th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)9).

2. Additional Memorandum of the Netherlands Government with regard to the demarcation of the future Netherlands German frontier and related problems, 25th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)24).

3. Statements made by Jonkheer van Vredenburch and Dr. Hirschfeld, of the Netherlands Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 28th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)28).

4. Communication from the Netherlands Ambassador, London, dated 18th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)64).

General Observations.

Need to reconcile guarantees of security and achievement of a minimum of prosperity in Germany.

Need for a common Allied policy in respect of military occupation, denazification and control of the Press and other public utterances.

I.—Preparation of the Peace Treaty With Germany.

A.—Political Principles.

Application of the Potsdam principles on decentralization of political organization.

Setting up of a German Confederacy.

B.—Economic Principles.

Application of the Potsdam principles on economic decentralisation and on deconcentration of German concerns.

Socialisation as against nationalisation.

Raising the German standard of life within the limits compatible with security.

C.—The Rhineland and the Ruhr.

Need for special measures of security in these territories.

Minimum of control measures.

Representation of the Netherlands in an international control body to be instituted.

D.—The Saar Territory.

Position of the Netherlands with respect to the French desiderata.

II.—Economic and Financial Aspects of the German Problem.

1. Fitting the German economic problems into the framework of European economy.

2. Principles to govern Reparations from capital or from current production.

3. Disarmament of Germany and determination of the level of German industry.

4. Decentralisation of industry, and representation of labour in the management. Regime of concerns taken over. International organization of control.

5. Trade policy; principles of non-discrimination.

6. Financial policy: currency, public debt, acknowledgement of foreign debts, credit policy.

7. General observations: need to allow Germany a tolerable standard of living and to provide for the establishment of a central direction in economic and financial matters.

Treatment of Allied nationals and undertakings in Germany.

III.—Demilitarization and Disarmament of Germany.

Approval of the American draft treaty aiming at the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany.

Fitting this draft into the framework of the United Nations Charter.

Participation in this Treaty of the Allied States neighbouring on Germany.

IV.—Cultural and Spiritual Aspects of the German Problem.

Threats to the whole world resulting from the spiritual, moral and cultural degeneration of Germany, and suggested cure.

Netherlands offer to participate in the spiritual recovery of Germany or of certain parts of Germany.

V.—Special Claims of the Netherlands Government.

1. Historical aspects of the Netherlands-German frontier region and justification of claims submitted.

2. Description of the situation obtaining in the Netherlands-German frontier region with regard to water drainage and supply, reclamation, and land and water communications.

3. Economic desiderata:

• Mining concessions in German territory.
• Preventing unfair competition of the German seaports.
• Demands respecting the German canal system.
• Demands respecting the monetary system of Germany.

new zealand

Represented by: Mr. W. J. Jordan, High Commissioner for New Zealand.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 4th February, 1947.

Document: Statement by Mr. W. J. Jordan at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 4th February, 1947. (CFM(D) (47) (G) (45—Revised))

Part I.

General Aims and Principles.—Alleviation of present economic distress without impairing security against German aggression … unity of the principal signatory powers, acceptability of the settlement to the German people.

Procedure. Opposition to any procedure similar to that of the Paris Peace Conference.

Territorial Problems. Some detachment of historical German territory in order to place it under international control may be a lesser evil than possibility of a powerful Germany.

Demilitarization. Demilitarization and disarmament should be complete and continuing in order to prevent the renewal of German aggression.

Political Structure. The Germany most likely to be a peaceful member of Europe would be constituted as a federation.

Social Aspects (Denazification and Democratization). Domination of militaristic elements in German society should be broken. Land reform and break-up of dangerous monopolies should be required by the treaty.

Relationship of the Treaty with the United Nations. Provision should be made for the acceptance of treaties by the United Nations and obligation to support Germany’s admission to the United Nations should not be incorporated in the treaty.

norway

Documents:

1. Memorandum of the Norwegian Government on Allied policy with regard to Germany, 28th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)34).

2. Communication from the Norwegian Ambassador in London, 13th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)58).

1. Military and Political Questions:

(a) Control necessary particularly of the Ruhr after the conclusion of peace treaty until reparations are paid and political views of Germans are no longer a danger to peace.

Restrictions to be limited to a definite period so that Germany can look forward to regaining her place in the family of nations.

(b) Complete demilitarization to include effective controls, and to apply to industrial production, propaganda and para-military organizations.

(c) Restrictions to be placed on Germany’s sea-going merchant navy.

(d) Political unity of Germany to be maintained.

(e) Thorough decentralisation of administration required: local autonomy, and limited powers for Central Government, Liquidation of Prussia.

(f) Democratization the ultimate aim of Allied Policy. Spiritual isolation of Germany to be broken down.

(g) Guarantees of human rights required in Germany.

(h) Germany to cooperate in disposing of war criminals: this to include extradition of Allied nationals.

2. Economic Questions:

(a) Economic unity essential.

(b) German trusts and cartels to be liquidated and German economy brought under public control.

(c) Norway’s claim for reparations is approximately 3 billion dollars. Non-fulfilment of Potsdam decisions regarding reparations.

(d) Necessity of determining the extent of reparations and of making equipment available without delay.

(e) As soon as German economy permits, surplus products from current production to be used for reparations.

(f) Plan for level of industry to balance considerations of security against the interests of the Allies in obtaining reparations and other economic considerations.

Paring down of German industry important feature of German demilitarization.

(g) Germany not to be left in an economic vacuum: Importance to world economy.

(h) Control of German discriminatory trade practices.

poland

Represented by: M. Leszczycki and M. Wierblowski.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 27th January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum: Views of the Polish Government, January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)62).

2. Statement by M. Wierblowski, of the Polish Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 27th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)27).

1. Poland has sustained heavy losses in the war and therefore the problem of security from fresh German aggression is fundamental to Polish policy. Hence Polish interest in the German settlement and European peace.

2. To secure peace and security throughout the whole world the Great Powers should set in operation for a long period a thoroughly effective and comprehensive control over Germany. Need for unanimity between Great Powers.

3. Right up to the moment when the Treaty comes into force the ultimate power in Germany should be vested in the Allied Control Council.

4. Disarmament can only be given real value by demilitarization, which is connected with another extremely important problem, denazification. Importance of Allied control in this respect.

5. Punishment of the Hitlerite war criminals.

6. Democratic re-education of the German people.

7. Political unity of Germany should be conditional upon success in democratization. It will facilitate Allied control.

8. Necessity to complete the liquidation of Prussia.

9. Request for final definition of the Polish Western frontier at the Peace Conference.

10. The necessity of economic unity.

11. Reconstruction of the devastated countries in Europe should progress faster than the reconstruction of the German economy.

12. Reparation deliveries out of capital equipment and current production.

13. Poland’s losses and damage in the field of culture, science, sanitation, should be replaced by German equipment of equal value.

14. Liquidation of all forms of cartelised and monopolistic concerns in Germany.

15. Poland’s economic claims.

union of south africa

Represented by: Mr. E. K. Scallan.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 24th January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Statement on procedure by the Government of the Union of South Africa, 14th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)7).

2. Statements by Mr. Scallan and Mr. Sole, of the South African Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 24th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)23).

3. Memorandum: Draft outline of proposals by the South African Government for the Association of the Active Belligerent Powers with the further (post-Moscow) examination of the German problem, 28th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)26).

General Observations:

The Government of South Africa favour (1) Political conditions which will secure the world against any German reversion to dictatorship or any revival of German aggressive policy; (2) Economic conditions which will enable the Germans and the world outside Germany to benefit from German industrial resources; (3) Constitutional machinery which is acceptable to the German people.

South African Government is gravely disturbed about the economic situation in Central Europe and stresses the urgency of a speedy and fair settlement.

Economic Problems:

The South African Government urges that the scale for German economic activity under the Potsdam Agreement be immediately reviewed and improved; coal deliveries, reparation deliveries and the dismantling of industrial plants be reconsidered; and the food situation improved.

Future Constitutional Set-up:

South Africa favours a decentralized, federalized Germany …^72a eliminating Prussia, and with a central German Government to express German unity for economic, diplomatic and other essential purposes.

German Boundaries:

The South African Government deprecates moving the eastern boundary of Germany to or beyond the Oder.

The association of the Saar with France should be limited to its integration into the French customs and economic system.

The South African Government agrees in principle with the minor boundary adjustments proposed by the Governments of Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.

The South African Government will study the boundary claims of the Government of Czechoslovakia.

The South African Government believes all governments directly interested should be entitled to participate in the work of the boundary commissions.

The Rhineland-Ruhr:

The Rhineland-Ruhr problem calls for special treatment; and requires assurance that the Ruhr is not prevented from making an important contribution towards economic recovery.

Discussion of Procedure: [Page references were given here in source text.]

ukraine

Represented by: M. Senin.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 7th February, 1947.

Document: Statement by M. Senin of the Ukrainian Delegation at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 7th February, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)48).

1. Vital interest of the Ukraine in the settlement of the German problem.

2. History of German aggressive designs against the Ukraine.

3. Great sufferings experienced by the Ukrainian people at the hands of the Hitlerite invaders.

Total damage to property exceeds 285 milliard roubles.

4. Contribution of the Ukraine to the war effort of the United Nations, including guerrilla activities.

5. Germany to make good in kind to the fullest possible extent the damage sustained by the Ukraine, by means of removal of German industrial equipment including removals from the western zones of occupation.

6. Prussianism and Junkerdom must be eradicated, together with the magnates of monopolistic capital.

7. Political and economic conditions to be created for Germany which will guarantee security and prevent aggression in the future.

8. Germany to be deprived of her industrial war-potential, in which all Germany’s war industry must be included.

9. Prolonged period of joint Allied control required for that part of heavy industry which Germany retains, especially in the Ruhr area.

10. War criminals and collaborators, including those in Displaced Persons Camps in Germany must be dealt with. Organizations of persons of Ukrainian origin to be prohibited. Displaced Persons Camps to be closed and their inmates repatriated.

11. Complete denazification demands that the existence and activities of Fascist or similar organizations be prohibited, and that active Nazis should not occupy responsible positions in any sphere of German life.

12. Germany to be a single democratic state with local self government for the Laender.

yugoslavia

Represented by: M. Ivekovic and M. Vilfan.

Date of Hearing by Deputies: 28th January, 1947.

Documents:

1. Memorandum by the Yugoslav Government, 29th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)32).

2. Statement by M. Ivekovic, of the Yugoslav Delegation, at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany, 28th January, 1947 (CFM(D) (47) (G)30).

1. The starting point for the solution of the problem of post-war Germany is the military, economic and spiritual disarmament of Germany.

2. The common policy of the occupation authorities is to be based on the economic unity of Germany according to the Potsdam decisions, which also do not aim to destroy the political unity of Germany.

3. The liquidation of Prussia as the primary instigator and torch-bearer of German aggression.

4. The territorial claims of Poland towards Germany are entirely justified.

5. The claims of Czechoslovakia for the adjustment of her frontier with Germany are justified for reasons of security.

6. It is necessary to guarantee the basic national rights of the Lusatian Serbs in Germany.

7. German minority problems in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe to be settled.

8. Claims of France and Germany’s Western neighbours are considered sympathetically.

9. A clear and final policy should be adopted in regard to the level of German industry in accordance with the Potsdam Decisions.

10. The problem of reparations is the corner-stone of the entire economic policy of the Great Powers towards Germany. Hitherto the above policy has diverged fundamentally from the decisions of the Crimea and Potsdam Conferences.

11. The occupation authorities in Western Germany are delaying the delivery as reparations of German industrial equipment. So far, Yugoslavia has received on account of German reparations hardly 0.04 per cent. of the total sum of losses (nine billion American dollars).

12. In Western Germany, German trusts and combines have not been liquidated as stipulated in the Articles of the Potsdam Decisions.

13. German economy is being restored at the expense of Germany’s victims.

14. Full denazification of German public and economic life in Western Germany has not been accomplished.

15. Concrete proposals by the Yugoslav Government in order to arrive at an immediate solution of the question of reparations.

Part II
A.—Views of the Allied Governments on the Principal Aspects of the German Problem

1.—disarmament, demilitarization and military control

Australia.

Provisions for the immediate demilitarization of Germany should be incorporated in an inter-Allied interim agreement.

Permanent demilitarization should be settled by the Peace Treaty.

Australia agrees with the principle referred to in paragraph three of the Potsdam Agreement.

Belgium.

The Belgian Government considers that the essential task facing the Allied Powers is to ensure the security of Germany’s neighbours through disarmament and other means, and that they are fully entitled to take certain precautions against the re-establishment of an economic potential, capable of becoming a danger to that security.

Certain forms of production, which can easily be converted for military ends, should be forbidden.

In order to avert German re-armament, the import into Germany of war materials should be prohibited and the import of the means to manufacture them should be prohibited, or at least placed under strict control.

As regards the military control of Germany, the American proposal for disarmament and demilitarization of Germany is an efficient way, through the concerted action of the Great Powers, of stopping Germany from becoming once again a danger to the peace of the world, and it is desired that such a treaty be established in the near future.

After the evacuation of other parts of Germany has been completed, a regime of military occupation should be retained in the Ruhr and Rhineland districts, to safeguard the security of the whole country.

Brazil.

No comments.

Byelorussia.

(a) Germany must remain disarmed and demilitarized for at least 40 years and the following measures must be imposed:

Germany to be prohibited from having armed forces, land, naval or air; all kinds of military and para-military organizations to be abolished; any system of reserves to be prohibited. The Allies must take measures against the retention of the organ of the German General Staff, and against the existence of conditions whereby the training of an officers’ corps would be possible inside Germany or beyond its frontiers.

No financial basis to be allowed outside Germany for the preparation of a new war.

No secret laboratory to remain in Germany or abroad for the revival of war industry.

All kinds of militaristic activities and propaganda to be prohibited by law.

(b) These measures must be accompanied by the liquidation of the military economic potential of Germany:

By the immediate carrying out of a programme of military and economic disarmament of the Ruhr area.

By the destruction of trusts and cartels and by placing the management of all the largest industrial, transport, commercial and banking institutions in the hands of democratic organs. The liquidation of the economic bases of Prussian Junkerdom, the historic stronghold of reaction and hotbed of aggressive aspirations of Germany.

Canada.

“The Canadian Government favours the complete demilitarization of Germany.” Measures to be taken should include safeguards against clandestine preparations for rearmament and the prohibition of the construction or possession by the Germans of weapons adaptable to mass destruction. Germany should be left with only a police force for purposes of domestic security.

Effective international safeguards must be established against violations and evasions by Germany. In the Canadian Government’s view the demilitarization of Germany cannot be related to any general arms reduction plan adopted by the United Nations. It may, however, be expedient to use the machinery to be established under the United Nations for purposes of inspection and control. The German settlement should both contain specific provisions for the abolition of German armaments and armed forces, and also specify the action to be taken by the Powers concerned in the event of a German violation of the provisions relating to disarmament.

Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia examines the German problem from the point of view of security, which demands “the liquidation, by means of complete military disarmament, of material conditions for a fresh German aggression.”

Czechoslovakia considers the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany of 5th June, 1945, of the Four Great Powers, and the Potsdam Agreement, as a basis for the fulfilment of these conditions.

Czechoslovakia considers the sole guarantee of security to be military control in the form of long term quadripartite military occupation. This control should apply to all spheres of German social life and should guarantee the fulfilment by Germany of her obligations. Military control to continue until such time as the following conditions are realised:—

(a) the absolute certainty that Germany has not the material possibility of again becoming an aggressor;

(b) the knowledge that the will of the German people is no longer directed to this end.

Denmark.

Denmark, as one of the earliest victims of German aggression, “has an especial interest in the complete disarmament of Germany and in seeing that German militarism is lastingly exterminated.” The Danish Government assume that effective measures will be undertaken to prevent the military training of German youth and the reappearance of a German munitions industry. When the occupation forces are withdrawn from Germany, the Danish Government assume that it will be necessary to retain special organs of control which can be placed under the jurisdiction of the Security Council of the United Nations.

Greece.

No comments.

Luxembourg.

The settlement of the German question must be governed absolutely by considerations of security.

The Allies must concentrate first and foremost, in common agreement and in accordance with the principles laid down at Potsdam, on the total and permanent disarmament and demilitarization of Germany.

Netherlands.

(a) “To prevent German aggression in future, a durable disarmament of Germany is essential”:

by the prohibition of the manufacture of armaments of all kinds in so far as these are not required for arming the police forces;

by measures appropriate to meet the problems of atomic energy, self-propelled weapons, armour and connected items;

by the supervision of engineering works, of certain chemical industries and of shipyards;

by the supervision of the police, fire brigade, air-raid precaution and customs organizations;

by an Allied control on the importation of arms into Germany, as well as on importation of scarce raw materials that may be used by the armament industry. The Allied Powers should also mutually agree to exercise control on exports of that nature from their countries to Germany.

(b) The Netherlands Government approve of the American draft treaty aiming at the demilitarization and disarmament of Germany.

They believe that such a treaty should be fitted into the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, more particularly of Chapter VIII concerning regional arrangements.

They request that, beside the Four Great Powers, all other Allied States neighbouring on Germany, namely Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Poland may, if they so desire, be able to participate in such a Treaty.

(c) Military Control.—1. The Allied military occupation should eventually be restricted to a certain number of strategic areas and points.

2. “The military boundaries of the zones of occupation could be abolished.”

3. “The armies of occupation might then be gradually converted to a police force on a military footing, subordinate to the highest civil occupying authority.”

New Zealand.

The New Zealand Government considers that the draft treaty on disarmament and demobilization of Germany submitted by the Secretary of State of the United States in 1946 offers a suitable basis for discussion of these problems. The New Zealand Government considers that the demilitarization of Germany should be complete and continuous, keeping pace with the progress of invention.

Norway.

In spite of her weakened condition, Germany if left to her own devices might re-emerge as a strong military power.

The Norwegian Government assumes that the re-establishment of military forces will be prohibited and that controls will be retained to prevent this, even after the end of Allied occupation, within the framework of international security of organizations.

Demilitarization must apply to para-military organizations, to military instruction and to industrial production.

The Norwegian Government link this problem with that of denazification and of the level of industry, to which reference should be made.

Restrictions must be placed on Germany’s Merchant Navy which had been used as an auxiliary for the armed forces and as a training pool. This applies especially to trawling and whaling ships, but in general Germany must be prevented “from acquiring the ownership of or controlling interests in ships of certain types and above certain sizes.”

Control during a limited period over certain features of German life is required beyond the conclusion of peace until “the political views of the German people and of the responsible German authorities no longer constitute a menace to peace.”

Poland.

The decisions of the Potsdam Agreement on the question of democratization and pacific reconstruction of Germany by means of disarmament, demilitarization and denazification are the necessary conditions of an international order.

“Uniformity in the principles of implementing the programme of disarmament, demilitarization and denazification on the territory of the whole of Germany will determine the efficiency of the realization of this programme; and the achievements in the process of implementation will be decisive in determining the possibility of concluding a Peace Treaty.”

The speed of Germany’s disarmament up to the present time has been too slow. Disarmament can become real only on condition that demilitarization is carried out.

“Together with the destruction of war industries as centres of German militarism, we have to prevent the creation of cells around which militarism could be rebuilt, by methods like para-military organizations and youth organizations of a military character, similar to those created after 1918.”

After the coming into force of the Peace Treaty, Germany should—until her full democratic and peaceful reconstruction is completed—continue to remain under the control of Allied Civil and Military Authorities on the territory of Germany.

Union of South Africa.

The South African Government supports demilitarization and such military supervision as is necessary for Germany. The fundamental aim should be to prevent the re-emergence of strong military power.

Ukraine.

Full disarmament and demilitarization is the most important task facing the Allies in Germany. For this end it is essential not only to abolish the German Army, its General Staff and all military organizations and to destroy the whole of Germany’s war industry, but also to eradicate the social basis of German militarism—that is, the Prussian Junker class, and the magnates of German monopolistic capital, since these elements are the carriers of German militaristic ideology and of the imperialistic schemes of Hitlerite Germany.

The realization of these measures should create such political and economic conditions in Germany as would guarantee security and prevent aggression in the future, which is the primary interest of the Ukrainian people.

Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government considers that the starting point for the solution of the problem of post-war Germany is the “military, economic and spiritual disarmament of Germany carried out over a long period of Allied occupation and control.” The destruction of the economic foundations of German imperialism is closely connected with successful denazification—purging German economy of Nazis—the breaking up of cartels, syndicates, trusts and other associations of a monopolistic character, and the liquidation of the large landed estates as the economic basis of the Junkers.

The Yugoslav Government indicates the necessity for the liquidation of Prussia as the basis of German aggression against her eastern neighbours and other nations.

2.—territorial problems and control of special areas

Australia.

The fixing of Germany’s frontiers should be based on the Atlantic Charter and on the Charter of the United Nations, taking into account, however, that certain claims made on grounds of security may be of paramount importance. Account should be taken of the effect on the economy of Europe as a whole which any particular change might have.

The major German frontier questions will be the Polish-German boundary, the future of the Saar, the Ruhr and the Rhineland.

The Australian Government has not yet undertaken any commitment on these questions and urges that they be decided according to the principles and by the methods outlined above.

The agreement with Germany should include provision for review, subject to safeguards against abuse.

Belgium.

There should be established a regime of military occupation in the Ruhr and Rhine Districts after the evacuation of the rest of Germany has been completed. “The military occupation of a region may be a means of exerting pressure on the remainder of the territory. From this point of view, the purpose of the regime envisaged would also be to guarantee the carrying out of the measures imposed on Germany as a whole, both politically and economically.”

Elements of the French, Luxembourg, Belgian, Dutch and British Armies would take part in this occupation, which would be maintained as long as political circumstances demanded.

A collective organization made up of one delegate from each of the governments whose troops take part in the occupation would be set up, modelled on the Supreme Inter-Allied Commission for the Rhineland set up by the Rhineland Agreement annexed to the Versailles Treaty.

The Belgian Government considers that “the economic system of the regions of occupation [Ruhr-Rhineland] should be subject to special control measures. On the territory of the whole area occupied the carrying into effect of the measures taken in Germany in order to ensure economic disarmament should be supervised. Should need arise, appropriate sanctions will have to be imposed in cases of infringement of the statute to be imposed on Germany.”

The Belgian Government considers that “in order to carry out these tasks [of industrial control] an international body would be set up consisting in any event of the representatives of the five occupying Powers. The participation of other States in this organization would depend on the measures taken by the Great Powers within the framework of their general policy concerning Germany.”

Brazil.

The Brazilian Government is ready to support the proposals of France for the internationalization of the Ruhr and for the creation of a special economic regime for the Saar, on the understanding that carrying these measures into effect will not harm the supplies indispensable to the normal economy of the German state, as measures supplementing, on a different plane, the decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam.

Byelorussian S.S.R.

The Ruhr area is of vital interest to all the Allied Nations and must be submitted to a special regime different from that in any other part of Germany.

The Ruhr area, although remaining a component part of Germany, must be placed under the control of the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in order to prevent the re-establishment of a war-economic potential and its transformation into a hotbed of new aggressive wars.

Canada.

“The frontiers of Germany should be drawn with a view to securing in the European States system as great a measure of stability as possible.” For this purpose large numbers of Germans should not be allowed to remain outside Germany’s frontiers. Transfers of population may assist in avoiding this, but “extensive movements of population which are made on political grounds without reference to economic and social conditions have grave disadvantages and may create serious dangers.”

The boundaries of Germany should therefore be drawn, so far as possible, on an ethnic basis, but this does not, of course, mean the inclusion of Austria in Germany.

When the total occupation of Germany ends, industries in certain areas such as the Ruhr should be administered by an international authority composed of representatives of all Allied countries having a major trading interest with Germany. The control of industries in such special areas should not be abandoned until Germany has acquired a new understanding of her responsibility for the prosperity of Europe as a whole.

Czechoslovakia.

As regards the Ruhr and Rhine Districts, Czechoslovakia will support an agreement which, on the one hand, will not place the economic resources of these districts outside the framework of an all-German economic system, and, on the other hand, will ensure effective control on the part of the occupying Powers. In the event of countries other than the occupying Powers being invited to participate in the control of this territory, the Czechoslovak Government consider its participation in the control of these districts as justifiable.

Denmark.

No observations.

Greece.

No observations.

Luxembourg.

The views of the Luxembourg Government in this respect are governed by the primary problem of security.

(a) The Ruhr.

Luxembourg proposes that exports of coal, steel and electricity from the Ruhr should be controlled by international bodies comprising representatives of the neighbouring countries and that in addition control should be exercised throughout Germany over the utilization of these commodities.

Without going yet into the details of the proposed organization, the Luxembourg Government expresses the opinion that the aims pursued could be attained even if the Ruhr territory were kept inside the framework of the Federation or of the future German economic system, provided the Germans do not actually have control.

(b) The Rhineland.

The status of the Rhineland should be that of a security zone including the whole left bank of the Rhine, and a minimum of territory on the right bank.

The Rhineland should comprise one or more self-governing German states which could eventually adhere to a confederation and to a unified German economic system, should the population so decide.

Military occupation of the Rhineland should last as long as circumstances render necessary, irrespective of the occupation of the rest of Germany. Luxembourg is prepared to participate.

The regime applicable to the Rhineland should be placed under the permanent control of an international body which should necessarily comprise representatives of Germany’s western neighbours.

Netherlands.

(a) The Saar territory.

The Netherlands Government appreciate in principle the French desiderata concerning the Saar. But the Netherlands Government deem it desirable that a decision on the Saar territory should be taken together with the decision regarding the desiderata formulated by the other western countries neighbouring on Germany.

(b) The Rhineland and the Ruhr.

Special measures of security are required, but their degree will depend on the statute to be projected for Germany; if consistent political decentralization of Germany is achieved and if deconcentration of economic power in Germany is accompanied by effective demilitarization and disarmament, it stands to reason that there would be no necessity to conceive for the Rhineland and the Ruhr measures differing completely from the general projects.

It would then be sufficient:

• to create a separate regime for industries;
• to impose stricter sanctions in the event of German infringements;
• to ensure the application of the regime for a long period (of a duration at least equal to that envisaged for the treaty concerning disarmament and demilitarization);
• to maintain allied occupation at a certain number of strategic points for a longer period;
• the troops for this occupation should be supplied by the Allied Powers, primarily responsible for preventing a German aggression in Western Europe.

New Zealand.

While doubtful that a sufficient degree of acquiescence on the part of the German people in the peace settlement will be realised if portions of historical German territory are detached from Germany, the New Zealand Government recommends that careful study be given to the question of providing physical guarantees against a revival of German aggression by detaching and placing under international control certain areas which are vital to Germany’s war potential, if some such detachment may be a lesser evil to the alternative of the freedom of a large and powerful Germany to resume without effective check her former courses of aggression. The New Zealand Government does not commit itself to support any specific proposal for territorial revision.

Norway.

A particularly strict control will presumably be required in the Ruhr district with its concentration of heavy industries.

Poland.

The Polish Government “expects from the Peace Conference the formal, final confirmation of our Western frontiers.”

Union of South Africa.

The South African Government opposes any attempt to block off large, specifically German, homelands for incorporation into weaker neighbouring countries and it would therefore deprecate moving the eastern boundary of Germany to or beyond the Oder. The South African Government believes that “a moderate readjustment of boundaries in favour of Poland should be feasible.”

The South African Government recognizes the economic importance of the Saar to France. It urges that the association of the Saar with France be limited to its integration into the French customs and economic system.

The South African Government agrees in principle with the minor boundary readjustments proposed by the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, subject to further scrutiny. The South African Government defers for study the claims for boundary adjustments put forward by the Government of Czechoslovakia.

The South African Government believes that it would be unwise to divorce the policy adopted toward the Rhineland and Ruhr from the policy adopted towards the rest of Germany. Special control measures should not operate to prevent the Ruhr from making a most important contribution toward the economic recovery both of Germany itself and of the neighbouring countries. The retention of the Rhineland-Ruhr region as part of a decentralized, federalized Germany, with special measures of Allied control will be the most appropriate solution to this problem.

Ukraine.

Control of the Four Powers must, in the first place, be established for the industry of the Ruhr, which is the arsenal of German militarism.

Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government considers necessary the destruction of German domination over the Polish territories to the East of the Oder and Neisse. The territorial demands of Poland towards Germany are entirely justifiable.

The claims of Czechoslovakia for the adjustment of her frontier with Germany are justified for reasons of security.

Claims of France and Germany’s Western neighbours are considered sympathetically.

3.—political questions

Constitutional Structure

Australia.

The principles of Allied policy in Germany should be incorporated in an interim agreement, prepared and signed by all effective belligerents. This agreement would, in fact, be no more than an enlargement of the agreement concluded at Potsdam, with the principles of which Australia agrees.

Potsdam provisions concerning decentralization of political structure and restoration of local self-government should be uniformly executed.

The interim agreement should permit of the immediate establishment of the central German administrative departments provided for at Potsdam.

With regard to the proposal by the former United States’ Secretary of State to establish a provisional Central German Government, Australia draws the attention of the Deputies to the necessity, should this proposal be approved, of obtaining advice from responsible democratic Germans as soon as possible. To that effect, a special committee of the present Conference could be established for the purpose of formulating the principles to be adopted in this matter by the Control authorities.

The Australian Government does not think that speed is desirable in setting up a central Government (as distinct from central government departments which would be necessary now). Therefore, any Government that may be set up should be provisional and fully subject to Allied direction and control so that the Germans may serve their apprenticeship in democracy.

The Australian Government stresses the danger of forcing rigid political rules on the Germans before they have been able to decide for themselves on the choice of the most suitable political solution about union, federation or confederation. Not advisable to force a solution upon the Germans as this could lead to a resurgence of Fascism.

Belgium.

The Belgian Government consider that Germany’s unity was the primary condition in the success of her attempt to establish supremacy. Any division of this unity contributes to the security of her neighbours. Nevertheless, too radical a solution of this problem, such as the definite amputation or the entire breaking up of her territories, by deeply wounding national pride, would give rise to a ferment of rebellion.

Germany should be established as a confederation of states. These will agree on the delegation of certain powers to a central body. Such powers should be limited to certain activities, destined to safeguard the economic unity of Germany, e.g., commercial policy, trade treaties, tariffs, commercial law, currency and credit, transport, communications and certain other economic functions.

In the view of the Belgian Government the framework of the constitutional structure would be drawn up by the Allies and would be embodied in the Treaty signed by the Governments of the German states. These Governments must themselves first be set up and must have a constitution and be regularly established.

Brazil.

The Brazilian Government considers it indispensable to destroy the unity of the Reich and to support any measure aiming at the autonomy of the countries which constitute the Reich. It supports a federal structure in Germany endowed with an economic regime “which will proscribe internal customs barriers and render possible the balance of power between the federated states”.

Byelorussia.

There must be a unified Germany within which “wide democratic powers are given to the local organs of self-government in the ‘Laender’ and provinces.” Dismembered into small states, Germany would not be viable either in an economic or political sense. Such dismemberment would evoke profound discontent among the German people and convert the centre of Europe into a new hotbed of unrest. The dismemberment of Germany could also provide a basis for a struggle among other powers for the inclusion of German states into their spheres of influence and thus it would bear the seed of future international conflicts.

Canada.

The Canadian Government believe that a German state of some kind will have to be reconstituted; but that to prevent a centralized state becoming the instrument of despotism and armed aggression this state should be federal and not unitary in character. Decentralization can be made acceptable if carried out in the economic, as well as in the political, fields. The political authority of the German States and the economic ties between the various parts of Germany and the neighbouring sections of Europe, should be developed.

Since the German people have not yet learned “to impose the restraints upon all Governments, both central and local, which are present in a truly democratic community,” the central Government of Germany should be granted only such authority as is necessary to maintain essential common services. The residual authority should rest with the member States and the central Government’s powers should be strictly circumscribed, particularly in financial and military matters.

The relations between the central Government and the Governments of the states should be defined in a formal Constitution. This Constitution should be so conceived that it ensures the democratic control of government by the German people. A popularly elected legislature should have direct control over the executive.

Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak Government considers the problem of Germany’s political structure as secondary to the establishment of effective Four Power Control.

The Czechoslovak Government cannot agree with such plans for the federalization of Germany as have hitherto been officially published. In the form submitted these plans do not solve the problem of control and could create a basis for the concentration of reactionary, nationalistic and aggressive forces.

Federalization might have a bad effect on the development of affairs in Germany. The idea that federalization would deprive Germany of her dangerous character might lead the Allies, particularly the more distant ones, to diminish their vigilance. In Germany itself the enforced dismemberment of the country against the wish of the people might give impetus to pan-German nationalism and lead the Great Powers to follow divergent policies.

Need of complete and permanent abolition of Prussia.

Denmark.

“The Danish Government hold the view that in order to counteract the formation of a new dictatorial central power in Germany it would be desirable to carry out administrative decentralization whether Germany becomes a federation of states, a federal state or a unified state”.

Greece.

The Greek Government believes that a proper degree of political decentralization “might well be secured through a confederation of German states.” The Government notes that a strongly centralized Germany “may again become a threat to the peace of the world” and that while a certain amount of centralization may be “indispensable, some check must be exerted on the central machinery through the moderating and centrifugal influences of the component German states”.

Luxembourg.

The unification of Germany made Prussian supremacy possible; the fact that it was achieved was the cause of the three last wars, the fact that it was respected by the Versailles Treaty was the origin of the Hitler adventure. Therefore, it is of primary necessity to decentralize Germany in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement.

The solution of the problem resides in the setting up of autonomous German states, free to join or remain outside an eventual confederation or the regime of economic unity provided for by the Potsdam Agreement. In the event of a confederation appearing necessary, it would be advisable to proceed from the bottom upwards. By giving the provinces of Prussia the independent status of the other German states, this political transformation will result in the liquidation of Prussia. In accordance with these principles, the new political and territorial organization of Germany should be drawn up by an interallied commission of experts co-operating with representatives of the states to be set up.

The competence of the confederation should be kept strictly within the limits set by its new status. Furthermore, the provisions relating to this new political organization should be included in an international agreement (peace treaty or any other international instrument) in order that Germany be bound and under the obligation to carry out such organization.

Netherlands.

Germany should be established as a confederation of states rather than a federal state.

It should be considered whether the provisional boundaries of the ‘Laender’ should not be modified in the light of political, ethnographical, historical, geographical, economic and social factors.

The organization of the ‘Laender’ should be strengthened by constitutional laws before central German ruling bodies are formed.

It would be advisable to grant the German Government only the powers which would be delegated by the ‘Laender’ and to include in the constitutions of those ‘Laender’ regulations under which certain powers cannot be delegated to the central Government.

New Zealand.

The New Zealand Government considers that the Germany most likely to be a peaceful member of Europe would be constituted as a federation in which Prussia would be broken up into regions which would serve as constituent federal units and in which territorial reorganization would be effected, eliminating obvious anomalies of size or population among federal states. The New Zealand Government recommends that local autonomy be encouraged and that the powers left to the central authority be restricted to limited functions.

Norway.

There is no indication of any trends in Germany favouring partition, and partition at the dictation of the victorious powers would strengthen rather than weaken German nationalism and render difficult a uniform solution of economic problems. Political unity must be maintained. A thorough decentralization of administration is required in the interests of security. The local units should be given a high degree of autonomy, particularly in the cultural and educational spheres and the authority of the central Government limited to the fields of foreign policy, public finance, economics and communications where central leadership is necessary. The German police must be decentralized and administered exclusively by the local authorities. This process should include the prevention of Prussia from playing a dominant role in German political life. A basic change in the social order is necessary.

Poland.

Germany’s political structure should not be strongly unified. Progress in the field of democratic and peaceful reconstruction is a prerequisite for the settlement of Germany’s political status.

There is no necessity to dismember Germany into a series of almost autonomous states. The wheel of history cannot be reversed.

“If Germany is broken up there will be a strong tendency towards unity again, a tendency which, while strengthening all chauvinist and reactionary forces of a pan-German character, will favour in no lesser degree harmful outbursts of regional nationalisms.”

Were Germany dismembered, it would be difficult to establish a single and effective control over Germany.

Liquidation of Prussia.

This question has already been partly decided from the territorial point of view. Prussia must, however, be liquidated as an administrative unit and with the aid of agrarian reforms the stronghold of the Junkers must be destroyed.

An end must be made of Prussian militarism, of the eternal Junker spirit of conquest, and of the “Drang nach Osten”.

Union of South Africa.

“South Africa favours a decentralized, federalized Germany following as far as convenient the traditional and historic lines of division but eliminating Prussia and with a central German Government to express German unity for economic, diplomatic and other essential purposes.” The fundamental aim should be to prevent the re-emergence of strong military power but in other economic and social respects not unduly to limit German development, so that eventually she may once more be able to play her part as the great nation she is and as a full member of the European polity. The South African Government proposes that a joint allied and German body be set up after the signing of the Peace treaty, to draft a German constitution in accordance with the principles laid down by this treaty.

Ukraine.

Germany must be a single democratic state with local organs of self-government in the Laender. The central Government must be elected by the people. Complete denazification and democratization are the prerequisites for the establishment of such a state.

Yugoslavia.

The Potsdam decision concerning decentralization of the political structure and development of local responsibility is recalled.

It has not been the aim of the Allies to destroy the political unity of Germany.

“No policy applied in the transitional period can achieve the permanent partition of Germany, which was the creation of historical developments”.

Denazification and Democratization

Australia.

Australia agrees with paragraph 4 of the Potsdam Agreement, but considers that a clause similar to Article 15 of the Italian Treaty, ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms, should be inserted in the suggested interim Agreement.

Australia agrees with paragraph 6 of the Potsdam Agreement relating to denazification, on the understanding that uniform measures be taken throughout Germany and that former Nazis be brought to trial as soon as possible.

Australia urges that, in accordance with paragraphs 2, 7 and 8 of the Potsdam Agreement, uniform measures shall be taken throughout Germany in respect of education and justice and suggests the creation of a central education department.

Belgium.

The Belgian Government approves the laws regarding denazification enacted by the Control Council.

“The fundamental problem in Germany is the establishment of a stable democratic and peaceful regime by gradually substituting in place of restraint the free co-operation of the German people”.

Brazil.

No comments.

Byelorussian S.S.R.

(1) Denazification.

Democratization and eradication of Fascism must be preceded by a radical purge of Nazis and their hangers-on from all spheres of political and economic life, particularly the democratic organizations, parties and the trade unions. Active Nazis have not yet been completely removed from organs of German administration, public organizations, private enterprises, the educational system and other institutions. Despite the Berlin decisions, industrial magnates, active Nazis, are allowed to retain responsible posts. The aims and tasks of the democratization of Germany require the most rapid and determined completion of denazification.

(2) Democratization.

Mass democratic organizations (democratic parties, trade unions, etc.) must be widely drawn into the process of democratization of Germany, denazification of the administrative apparatus and eradication of the Fascist ideology.

The trade unions in Germany must be unified and developed throughout German territory.

A democratic land reform will destroy the economic basis of Junkerdom and undermine the forces of reaction and militarism.

Canada.

No specific comments on denazification.

The Canadian Government insists on the need for democratic control of Government in Germany by the German people (see under constitutional structure).

Czechoslovakia.

Every effort should be made to develop a new democratic spirit in Germany particularly through the control of cultural life. All ideologies which could serve as a basis for the rebirth of future aggression should be suppressed and all material bases of German imperialism and aggression liquidated.

One of the conditions of future democratic development in Germany is the removal of all active Nazis, members of the S.A., S.S. and other Nazi organizations, not only from key positions, but from any posts they may fill in administrative organs and in the economic life of Germany.

Denmark.

The Danish Government assume that denazification will be carried out in such a way as to prevent former active members of the Nazi Party from occupying leading posts in German public life.

Teaching in schools, etc., should not be used “to force upon coming generations an ideology of a character similar to Nazism.” Education in democratic methods would also be assisted by political decentralization and the encouragement of local autonomy.

Greece.

No comments.

Luxembourg.

Denazification and the punishing of war criminals must not only be a matter of justice but must constitute a great lesson for Germany in the future. Denazification is to be applied to the whole of German territory.

Netherlands.

The denazification policy in Germany must be closely supervised by the Allies. It is a dangerous thing to leave denazification to the Germans; they might be either too lenient or too severe.

New Zealand.

The German people should be helped to break the domination of those elements in German society which have been the chief supports of German militarism. Treaty obligations to be honoured by the German Government should provide for such land reform and measures designed to break dangerous monopolies as have not been completed under the occupation.

Norway.

The necessary measures must be taken to prohibit Nazi organizations and propaganda and “to prevent persons who have been politically prominent during the Nazi regime from occupying leading positions in the political, administrative or economic life of Germany.” The Norwegian Government lays stress on the spiritual regeneration of Germany. The democratic re-education of the German people must be the ultimate aim of Allied policy. It must mainly be a German concern; the necessary support must be given to elements working towards this end. It may be desirable to keep the educational system under control for a period of time.

As one of the methods of breaking down the spiritual isolation caused by the Hitler regime the Allied authorities should grant the German people the widest possible freedom of expression.

Poland.

Denazification and re-education together with disarmament and demilitarization are the fundamental demands of the Polish Government. In the realm of re-education the Polish Government recommends the adoption of all possible measures for “transformation of the German mentality and the development of democratic institutions”.

Achievements in the sphere of denazification throughout Germany have been insufficient.

The importance of the democratic education of the younger generation of Germans on the foundation of a constructive long-term plan of re-education is emphasized.

Poland considers that the realization of a plan of pacific and democratic reconstruction of the German state is a prerequisite for the signing of a peace treaty.

Union of South Africa.

No comments.

Ukraine.

In order to bring about full denazification, Germany must be obliged not to permit the existence or activities of Fascist or similar organizations, which aim at depriving the people of its democratic rights or conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations. It is also essential to prohibit former active Nazi-party members and persons who actively supported the Hitler regime, from occupying any responsible positions in the machinery of State, in local government, in the police, in industry, in ideological institutions and so on.

All attempts at Nazi or militaristic activity or propaganda must be severely punished.

Yugoslavia.

Successful denazification is a necessary condition for the destruction of German imperialism and aggression. “On the other hand, a consistent policy of denazification will bring about through practical experience common forms of organization of the German economy.”

The democratic re-education of the German people should be carried out by gradual participation in local administration.

Political Controls

Australia.

Problems of control should be settled by the interim Agreement, which would give the present machinery full Allied sanction.

The Australian Government also proposes that an inter-Allied body for Germany be established on parallel lines to the Far Eastern Commission.

Belgium.

No specific suggestions made.

Brazil.

No comments.

Byelorussian S.S.R.

Strict control on the part of the four Allied Powers over the whole of Germany’s economic and political life provides an indispensable guarantee of security as long as the roots of German militarism have not been destroyed and as long as Germany has not become a genuinely democratic and peace-loving nation. It will be necessary to establish strict supervision over the fulfilment by Germany of all the obligations which will be imposed on her by the Allied States, by virtue of the Peace Treaty. The controlling body must be invested with broad powers to carry out such sanctions as this body will find appropriate, in case of violation of the provisions of the Peace Treaty by Germany.

Canada.

“Provisions for the protection of such minorities as cannot be avoided should be made through the appropriate organ of the United Nations.”

Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak Government considers that an effective system of control should be established in which all the four occupying powers would share and which would embrace all political, economic, cultural and other spheres of German life, and which would relate to the whole of Germany.

Denmark.

Provision should be made “to ensure in an effective manner to all inhabitants of Germany common civic and democratic rights of liberty.” Such rights would include the right to form political parties, the freedom to form associations and gatherings, freedom of faith, freedom of the press as well as personal freedom and the legal protection of the individual.

The above rights should be expressly guaranteed by the Peace Treaty to all the “non-German groups of population” within Germany and specified in so far as they have no relation to these groups. There should for instance be no restriction on the languages used in newspapers and books, or in churches, schools or political gatherings. It should be laid down that a non-German group of the population “is not to be placed in a position inferior to the remainder of the population either politically, economically or culturally,” that there should be no restrictions upon the right to vote or to stand as a candidate for municipal, provincial and legislative councils, and that proportional representation on such councils must be guaranteed to the “non-German groups of population.” The Danish Government explain that by “non-German groups of population” they mean “parts of the population not of German mentality regardless of whether they are German nationals.” It is recommended that a special international body be set up to decide, with binding effect on the German authorities, questions submitted to them by members of the non-German population groups and that the right of these groups to submit complaints should be ensured.

Greece.

No comments.

Luxembourg.

The Luxembourg memorandum does not suggest any other political control beyond that to be applied in the Ruhr and the Rhineland.

Netherlands.

So long as the occupation lasts, certain restrictions will have to be imposed on freedom of expression in Germany, with reference to Allied policy and interests.

New Zealand.

No comments.

Norway.

The maintenance of extensive controls for a long period will impair the active co-operation of the German people.

Restrictions must be clearly determined and limited to a definite period so that the German nation may look forward to regaining its position as a member of the family of nations.

The German authorities must guarantee to all persons under German jurisdiction the basic human rights. In particular, racial discrimination must be forbidden. This applies similarly to non-German groups living within the borders of Germany.

Poland.

The Polish Government demands the establishment by the Allied Control Council of an effective control over Germany until such time as the Peace Treaty comes into force. With the gradual implementation of the above programme the German authorities “would be able to function within a defined sphere under the control of the Allied Control Council”.

When the treaty comes into force military and civic control should be retained until a fully democratic and pacific reconstruction of Germany has been effected.

Poland’s security is bound up with these controls, which should be organically related to all fields of German life which could become the sources of future aggression.

Throughout the whole of Germany’s territory propaganda “directed towards the revision of frontiers, the union of Germany with Austria, the idea of superiority of the Germans over other nations” should be forbidden.

The Polish Government raises the question of a more energetic prosecution of war criminals and also of the extradition of traitors who, regardless of their nationality, ought to be extradited to their countries to be judged and punished if, by their collaboration with the Axis Powers, they acted to the detriment of their nation or other United Nations.

Ukraine.

It is essential that citizens of the United Nations who have been active collaborators or traitors, or who are guilty of offences against the laws of their countries, should be handed over to their Governments so that judicial action may be taken against them.

Union of South Africa.

No comments.

Yugoslavia.

No comments.

4.—economic questions

Economic Principles

Australia.

The Australian Government draws attention to certain contradictions in some of the clauses of the Potsdam Agreement, which provide that a certain standard of living shall be maintained in Germany and at the same time provide for an economic disarmament which, if it were carried out to the letter, would bring about a complete impoverishment of the country. The Level of Industry Plan, approved in March, 1946, represents an inadequate compromise in this respect between these two purposes and its effects will undoubtedly be unemployment, poverty and the loss of morale.

Australia urges, therefore, that the economic problems be considered, not piecemeal, but in relation to the problems of Europe as a whole and proposes that the economic purposes of Potsdam should be restated in a new agreement, making clear the need of a reasonable degree of prosperity in Germany and the part which Germany will play in the economic rehabilitation of Europe.

Australia is in favour of an upward revision of the Level of Industry Plan.

Australia advocates strict execution of the principle of German economic unity which should simplify Germany’s trade relations with the Allies. In the opinion of the Australian Government detailed information concerning present trading arrangements in the Allied zones should be provided to the countries invited to give their views.

Belgium.

The Allies, faced by the conflicting demands of security on the one hand and German prosperity on the other, must seek a formula which will safeguard the former without endangering the latter. The Control Council’s decision of 26th March, 1946, fixing the level of German economy, has made it very hard to extricate Germany from chaos and to re-establish her economic equilibrium.

The level of German industry established by the Control Council’s decision of 26th March, 1946, could, within the limits imposed by security, be raised in most branches of industry by making allowances both for Germany’s economic requirements and the interests of the other European nations. The Belgian Government are prepared to co-operate in establishing a scheme of quantitative restrictions on German capacity.

Germany must be forced to respect international agreements with regard to trade. These agreements prohibit currency and foreign exchange manipulations, dumping, and any policy of discrimination.

Brazil.

The Brazilian Government desires to proscribe internal customs barriers in a federated Germany.

Byelorussian S.S.R.

The military economic potential of Germany and concentration of economic power must be liquidated.

A democratic land reform will constitute a radical solution of the problem of supplying food, of providing work and of accommodation of the Germans repatriated from other European countries.

Canada.

Canada has a threefold interest in Germany’s economic future.

(i) The Germans should not be allowed to strengthen their economy to such a point that they could again wage aggressive war.

(ii) There should not be such economic depression and unrest in Germany as would affect the stability of Europe.

(iii) German industrial capacity should be used for the benefit of all countries, in particular of European countries which trade with Germany.

The early establishment of an Economic Commission for Europe would do much to attain these ends.

During the period of control of German industries in special areas, other countries should not be allowed to exploit those industries for purposes detrimental to the European and world economy.

German foreign trade should be conducted in a manner which will provide equal opportunity for all nations.

Czechoslovakia.

Subject to agreement on political unity, Germany should form a single economic unit. The following principles should apply to the whole of Germany:—

Decartelisation: All cartels and combines should be dissolved. All agreements regarding cartels should be declared invalid. Steps should be taken to prevent the transfer of German shares to foreign concerns. Germany to be excluded from participation in foreign cartels, trusts and foreign companies;

Nationalisation of enterprises which were formerly owned by Nazis;

Land reform throughout the entire territory of Germany;

Uniform currency throughout Germany;

Foreign Trade, credit and investments to be subject to strict control;

The volume of exports and imports to be determined with regard to the gradual raising of the standard of living, so that Germany may be in a position to provide for her needs and for her reparation obligations by her own means. Fulfilment of reparations obligations to have priority.

Denmark.

The Danish Government are as disinclined as their Allies to allow economic considerations to be the only decisive factor in determining the economic future of Germany. “The primary object must be to prevent the reconstruction by Germany of a productive apparatus which might serve as a basis for renewed aggression.”

Subject to this, however, the Danish Government “consider it important that needless restrictions on German participation in the economic life of Europe be avoided and that an administrative machinery be created … to re-establish normal economic relations between Germany and her neighbours.”

The Danish Government favour the use of normal trade channels to the widest possible extent, i.e., foreign and German firms should be permitted to enter into normal business relations, subject to any necessary controls.

The restoration of Germany to her position in the European economy, subject to the limitations imposed by security considerations, can be achieved “only if Germany does not become disintegrated by tariff or other economic frontiers” such as the existing sharp division of the agricultural areas of Eastern Germany and the industrial districts of Western Germany. The productive capacity and the purchasing power of Germany will be indispensable factors in the economic and social reconstruction of Europe, while a disorganised. Germany will constitute a serious menace not only to reconstruction but also to peace.

The monopolistic concerns which have characterized the economic life of Germany should be dissolved and their re-appearance prevented.

Germany should be admitted to the proposed system for promotion of international trade relations.

Measures must be taken to prevent the resumption of the discriminatory trade and monetary practices pursued by Germany in the period between the wars. Similarly equal rights of access for all states to German territory by all forms of communication must be ensured.

The Danish Government urge that the Allied authorities should ensure, in implementing industrial re-conversion in Germany, that no single country will be compelled to bear more than its fair share of the burden involved in the cut in exports from Germany of a given commodity.

Greece.

The Greek Government favours economic deconcentration which would allow an “honourable place” for Germany in world trade while ensuring that it would be unable to dominate the European economy. The Greek Government believes it “would ultimately damage European long-term recovery if the German industrial organization were broken up through excessive decentralization”.

Luxembourg.

The Luxembourg Government considers that the powers of the Confederation should be restricted to the requirements of economic unity as provided for at Potsdam, but that the States should be free to enter this economic unity or not as they wish.

The Luxembourg Government desires that allied concerns destroyed in Germany shall be the first to derive the benefit of any rules relating to reconstruction, in the event of a system of priority being set up by the authorities concerned.

Netherlands.

(a) General principles.—It will be necessary to guard against renewed German economic aggression in the future. It is not less important, however, that Germany should contribute to the recovery of the European economy. If these two fundamental principles are to be reconciled, it is essential:—

(1) that the German economy should be allowed to recover to a reasonable extent;

(2) that the Potsdam principles providing for the decentralization of the industrial structure and the deconcentration of economic power should be implemented;

(3) that certain areas should be subject to special control measures.

(b) Economic unity.—The Netherlands Government is in favour of the economic unity of Germany within the framework of a decentralized political and economic structure. Although all concentration of power should be avoided, co-ordination for the whole of Germany will be required as regards industrial production, agriculture, food supply and the price and wage policy, while for foreign trade traffic and currency as well as for taxation, central direction will be necessary. A central economic policy will be required with a view to elaborate plans for guiding the German economy.

(c) Economic structure.—The achievement of economic unity entails the deconcentration of economic power by means of a decentralization and decartelisation of industry.

The Netherlands Government considers that it would be dangerous to nationalize concerns under the German State, or States, which would result in the establishment of super-trusts.

On the other hand, they do not object to certain concerns being socialized. Furthermore, politically unreliable owners may be expropriated for the benefit of the German State, their rights of ownership being transferred to the Allies as a guarantee.

(d) Standard of life.—The standard of life of the German people must be equal to that of the other peoples of continental Europe.

The Level of Industry Plan of March, 1946, will have to be revised to enable Germany to meet its liabilities and responsibilities. Security should be sought rather by prohibiting certain manufactures—see “Disarmament”—and controlling certain imports, than by imposing maximum quotas on the production of German industries.

Germany must expand its agricultural production, but it would be dangerous to go too far in that direction. It is advisable on the contrary to envisage commercial interchanges with neighbouring countries within the framework of a sound economy. The Netherlands are particularly interested in maintaining their exports of agricultural products to Germany.

(e) Financial aspects.—Germany must return to a sound financial system and a healthy currency situation, taking into account the interests of the neighbouring states. The German Mark debts will have to be adjusted, and the treaty will have to provide for the control of the internal debt.

Debts to the Allies where expressed in other currency than marks will have to be guaranteed. Allied holdings must be fully respected and preference granted to such holdings and to shares held by Allied owners in German concerns.

Foreign loans should be restricted.

New Zealand.

The New Zealand Government supports the immediate alleviation of acute economic distress in Germany as a necessary prerequisite for any peace settlement.

Norway.

The principle of German economic unity should be maintained.

The solution of the question of the level of industry must balance the needs of security with the interests of the Allies in obtaining reparations and with other economic considerations.

From the point of view of security a paring down of German industry is desirable, but in the interests of world economy it must not be so reduced as to leave Germany an economic vacuum.

German trusts and cartels must be liquidated and German economy brought under public control.

Restrictions on German Merchant Navy.

Non-discrimination in German commercial policy.

Poland.

The Polish Government considers that the economic plan for Germany accepted at Potsdam may be executed on the condition that Germany be given economic unity and that agrarian reforms be undertaken and trusts and monopolies liquidated. If, however, this plan should be subjected to changes in the direction of an increase in the fixed level of production in Germany, then in any case “the priority in the reconstruction of countries devastated by Germany” must be maintained. “In such a way it would be possible to avoid the re-creation in Europe of a condition of marked economic inequality between different parts of the continent.” At the present time the level of German economy, as fixed by the Allied Control Council is equitable in relation to “those difficult conditions in which the majority of countries which were occupied and devastated by Germany, still find themselves”.

“The Ruhr Basin should not serve Germany’s needs only, but all countries whose economy is linked with this powerful economic centre of the continent”.

The reconstruction of the European economy does not imply the reconstruction of Germany and Germany alone.

Poland attaches importance to the normalization of Polish-German trade relations as soon as possible.

Union of South Africa.

The South African Government believes it will be a fatal policy to deprive Germany of the necessary means for its economic recovery, as well as the restoration of its food situation, and the heavy onus which all the occupying powers bear in this respect should cease, otherwise Germany will justly blame the growing disaster of Europe on the Allies. The revulsion of feeling, even in Allied countries, may ultimately become intense.

Coal deliveries, reparation deliveries and the dismantling of industrial plant should be reconsidered so that industrial recovery and reasonable measures of employment for the German people may be facilitated. The scale for German economic activity under the Potsdam Agreement should immediately be reviewed and improved.

Such conditions should be established in Germany as to make it possible to reduce Allied responsibility for the German economy to a minimum and to place the German economy largely under German control.

Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Government considers that the level of industry agreed to in the plan of March, 1946, should be maintained.

Yugoslavia.

“The common policy of the occupation authorities is to be based on the economic unity of Germany according to the Postdam Decisions. The Yugoslav Government insists on the acceptance of a clear and definite policy as regards the level of German industry”.

Reparations and Restitution

Australia.

Australia considers that the exaction of reparations is just, but urges that they shall not go beyond reasonable limits. The Australian Government stresses, in particular, the objections to the transfer of industrial equipment because the difficulties in dismantling and transporting plants involve considerable delays and thereby lessen their value.

Belgium

The Belgian Government considers that the question of reparations has already been dealt with and settled in respect of the share of the various countries entitled to reparations and in respect of such property as may be allocated as reparations. (Potsdam Agreement of 2nd August, 1945, and Paris Agreement on Reparations of 14th January, 1946.)

Belgium does not consider the present position in regard to payment of reparations satisfactory. The Allies will not receive adequate compensation under the existing procedure whereby only capital installations are allocated for reparations. Germany’s economic potential should not be lowered to such an extent that she is unable to furnish in the future raw materials and certain finished goods as reparations.

“If certain States were to annex German territories or obtain possession of certain German resources, it should be understood that the obligation be maintained to provide reparations, either from such territories, or from such resources and that Belgium should receive equitable compensation.”

Brazil.

No comments.

Byelorussia.

Byelorussia recalls the decisions of Potsdam and Yalta which stress the responsibility of Germany to make good the damage and losses inflicted on the United Nations.

Canada.

Existing agreements regarding reparations should be reviewed in the light of the level of economy to be permitted to Germany, in order to prevent Germany continuing to constitute a centre of economic depression in Europe. Reparations deliveries agreed upon should then be implemented as quickly as possible, leaving the Germans free to improve their own living conditions through their own efforts.

Czechoslovakia.

The Czechoslovak Government considers that the reconstruction of Germany should not precede the reconstruction of countries devastated by her, and that Germany should, by means of reparations contribute to the economic reconstruction of these countries. Deliveries of raw materials and goods from current production and services should be included in Germany’s reparation obligations.

The quota of reparations for each country should be defined in terms of value.

Denmark.

The Danish Government express the hope that they may receive reparations from current German production.

In addition, they consider it reasonable that Germany should pay compensation for the forced labour which prisoners from the occupied countries were made to perform in Germany.

Greece.

“The amount of Germany’s liability should be fixed at the highest possible level.”

“Reparation should be made also in terms of current production.”

Specialized technical personnel should be made available by the Germans as reparations.

“Reparations should be made in the shortest possible period of time” in order that they may be available as soon as possible to aid in reconstruction.

If some countries receive territorial or other concessions, this would be a reason for increasing the share in reparations of those countries which do not.

The occupying powers have “obtained various secret processes of German industry, war material, merchant vessels and merchandise.” These should be charged to their reparations accounts.

“Germany should make necessary repairs and additions, at her own expense, to installations used as reparations.”

All restitution items should be charged against the reparations account. Immediate restitution of “war material, railway material, and antiquities” should be made. Restitution of goods removed should be made even if payment was made by the Germans in occupation currency.

Luxembourg.

Coal and steel produced in the Ruhr in excess of German requirements should be allotted in the first place, as reparations and exports, to the countries that have suffered from German aggression and to former customers of the Ruhr.

Netherlands.

Reparations in the form of dismantling and removal of industrial installations will have to be applied with caution. In principle, they should be limited to factories exclusively engaged in the production of war materials, in so far as these are not listed for complete demolition. Removal of other factories should be restricted to exceptional cases, and then only in so far as the employment of German labour is not materially reduced and no unemployment results that cannot be adjusted in some other way.

Germany must also pay reparations from current production, but only when its exports have reached a level ensuring a satisfactory standard of living.

New Zealand.

No comments.

Norway.

Germany’s obligation to pay reparations should be expressly laid down in the Peace Treaty.

In spite of the Potsdam Agreement that the quantity of industrial equipment to be removed from the Western Zones should be determined within six months, that deliveries should be complete within a further two years, and that advance deliveries should begin immediately, the volume to be removed has not yet been determined. Norway supports the resolution of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency created by the Paris Conference (8th October, 1946) drawing attention to this.

As regards current production, allocations of assets must be sufficiently varied.

As soon as German economy permits surplus products must be used for reparations.

In accordance with her reparations obligations Germany must renounce her claim to German assets outside German territory.

If the question arises of making Germany pay for war damage to Allied property in Germany the method of payment must not impair Germany’s ability to meet her main reparation debts.

Poland.

The Polish Government considers that payment of reparations out of Germany’s economic capital and out of her current production is one of the most important means of removing, at least partly, those disproportions which have arisen in Europe as a result of Germany’s economic policy after 1930.

Poland attributes the greatest importance to reparations out of capital equipment which can even out those inequalities more quickly, especially where Germany not only destroyed the national economy, but also, by means of force, changed the economic structure of an occupied country.

Ukraine.

Deliveries of capital equipment and deliveries from current production so far received are negligible.

Union of South Africa.

No comments.

Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government considers as correct the decisions of the Potsdam Conference which link the disarmament of Germany with the question of reparations. The level of German industry should be lowered in accordance with the Allied Control Council’s plan, and those industrial installations which are unnecessary to the economy of a peaceful Germany be either destroyed or given as reparations to the peoples who have suffered damage.

The extent of industry available for reparations should be determined and the handing over of complete German factories should begin forthwith. Units of the German Merchant Navy and river fleet should be made available for reparations.

“The urgent needs of claimants for reparations should be met in accordance with Resolution No. 2 of the Annex to the Paris Agreement on reparations from German current production and services … German property in the Western Zone of Occupation of Austria should be utilized for reparations.”

Germany must return bullion and precious metals which she stole from Allied countries. “The Allied Control Council should help the interested states in the search for objects of cultural, historic, artistic and economic value removed by the Germans during the occupation, and hasten their restitution.

And enquiry should be made into the state of liquidation of German assets in neutral countries.”

Economic Controls

Australia.

No comments.

Belgium.

See under Special areas (IIa 2) and under Disarmament and Demilitarization (IIa 1).

Any policy for the control of Germany should reserve an important place for commercial policy. (See under Economic Principles IIa 4.)

Brazil.

No comments.

Byelorussia.

The main responsibility for controlling the German economy rests with the four Powers. (See above Political Controls.)

Canada.

See under a 2. Control of Special areas.

Czechoslovakia.

The planned economic disarmament of Germany, which should be co-ordinated with the fulfilment by Germany of her reparation obligations, is guaranteed, as was stated above, by a system of control shared by all four Powers, which will apply to the whole of Germany.

Denmark.

No comments.

Greece.

No comments.

Luxembourg.

See Item IIa 2 above in respect of the system of control provided for the allotment and utilization of coal and steel from the Ruhr.

Netherlands.

A long term policy of control must be applied to the German economy, which should be initially under close Allied supervision. States neighbouring on Germany must be represented on the bodies established to apply such controls.

German trade policy must be fitted into the framework of European economic policy. The principle of non-discrimination should apply to imports, exports, customs, tariffs and quotas.

New Zealand.

No comments.

Norway.

The inter-dependence of the various branches of industry is such that, rather than eliminate whole branches, certain key industries whose products are essential to war industry should be eliminated, thus making Germany dependent on foreign supplies of such products.

“Even a considerable reduction of Germany’s industrial capacity will not produce the necessary security unless Allied control of industry is effective”.

Experience has shown that discriminatory trade practices, etc., can constitute a powerful weapon of aggressive policy. Effective control of Germany’s economic agreements should be established and entrusted to international organs.

Poland.

After the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, Germany should remain under the economic control of the four Allied Powers. In this control Poland must, both before and after the entry into force of the Treaty, have the means of presenting her point of view on the German question and upon other questions which concern her directly.

Ukraine.

In the interests of security, Germany must be deprived of her military and economic potential by liquidating her war industry, and by the establishment, for a prolonged period, of joint Allied Control over that part of heavy industry which will be left to Germany for the satisfaction of her vital needs.

Union of South Africa.

No comments.

Yugoslavia.

No comments.

5.—miscellaneous

Denmark.

Kiel Canal

The Danish Government are interested in this waterway being kept open in all circumstances to the ships of all nations. They propose that the administration and use of the canal should be superintended and controlled by an international body.

Norway.

(a) Germany must be obliged to give such assistance as may be required in dealing with war criminals: this to include extradition of Allied nationals as demanded.

(b) Germany must renounce all privileges enjoyed outside Germany under treaties or agreements. Multi-lateral conventions which the Allies wish to remain in force should be mentioned in the Treaty. As regards bi-lateral treaties, the Allied country concerned should decide whether these are to remain in force or not.

Yugoslavia.

The Government of Yugoslavia draws your attention to the fact that the Lusatian Serbs inhabiting the territories between the Elbe and the Oder should be granted basic national rights.

The problem of German minorities in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe should be taken in hand.

B.—Individual Territorial, Economic and Other Claims by the Allied States

1.—territorial and political claims

Australia.

No comments.

Belgium.

The whole of territories claimed by Belgium cover a total area of about 12 square miles and contain an estimated population of 3,850 inhabitants.

Belgium reserves the right to make further claims “in the event of other Allied States obtaining territorial advantages at the expense of Germany or correlative economic advantages”.

Brazil.

No comments.

Byelorussian S.S.R.

No comments.

Canada.

No comments.

Czechoslovakia.

Czechoslovakia demands that the Munich Agreement, as well as all acts connected with that Agreement or issuing therefrom, shall be declared as null and void in the Peace Treaty for Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government demands that the Czechoslovak/German frontiers which existed on 1st September, 1938, together with such changes as shall be recognised in favour of Czechoslovakia on the basis of territorial claims, should be confirmed.

The Czechoslovak Government demands rectification of its German frontiers. Rectifications comprise territory of an area of 819.75 square kilometres with a population of 25,052.

The Czechoslovak Government demands that former Czechoslovak subjects of German race and language, transferred from Czechoslovakia, should remain in Germany enjoying full equality of rights with German citizens; that no discrimination, political or economic, should be made in favour of or against these persons; Germany should prohibit the organization of special unions and political parties, consisting exclusively of former Czechoslovak citizens, and the formation of any possible irredentist movement directed against Czechoslovakia.

In the event of countries other than the four occupying Powers being invited to participate in the control of Germany, the Czechoslovak Government demands such a right for itself. In any case Czechoslovakia demands a share in the control on all questions in which she has a direct interest.

Denmark.

No territorial claim is made. The Danish Government “do not intend to propose any alteration in the status of national allegiance of South Schleswig”.

(a) Danish interests in South Schleswig.

“For Denmark it is especially important that necessary regard be given to such Danish national interests as are attached to the future settlement of conditions in South Schleswig.” After describing briefly the history of the South Schleswig question, the Danish Government state that since the German collapse in 1945 there has been “growing ferment and national unrest” in South Schleswig. The desire to get away from German rule has found considerable support. The position, however, is not yet clarified and it cannot yet be said whether the apparent change of mind undergone by many inhabitants of South Schleswig is of a permanent nature. Whether the population of South Schleswig wish to exercise their right to self-determination must be for themselves to decide. Meanwhile the “national competition of Danish and German in South Schleswig” should be allowed to develop freely.

(b) Administrative Separation of Schleswig from Holstein.

The Danish Government maintain that whereas within the province of South Schleswig the Danish element has a chance of “maintaining itself politically in relation to the remaining population,” in a unified Schleswig-Holstein it would have to face a compact German majority. Holstein was “the breeding-ground of the anti-Danish movement” in Germany, and the Danish Government therefore emphasize “the desirability of no common German bodies for South Schleswig and Holstein being created or maintained and of no German authority in Holstein having influence upon the administration of South Schleswig”.

(c) Removal of refugees from South Schleswig.

The Danish Government represent that the German refugees who entered South Schleswig shortly before and after the German collapse, by increasing “the German-minded part of the population,” constitute a pressure on Denmark’s frontier which is a danger to her future security. In the view of the Danish Government therefore “the residence of the great refugee masses can only be regarded as temporary.” They urge that arrangements be made “to safeguard the rightful interests of the indigenous population and especially that in elections to municipal and provincial councils and bodies, they be given decisive influence upon the affairs of their native soil”.

(d) Removal from Denmark of German civilian refugees.

The Danish Government stress the importance of the early removal from Denmark of the German civilian refugees still remaining there. Some 200,000 of these have taken refuge in Denmark; they represent about 5 per cent, of Denmark’s population and constitute a very heavy financial burden for the Danish Government, who consequently wish their evacuation to proceed at an increased rate and to be completed as soon as possible, without regard to other aspects of the peace settlement.

Greece.

No comments.

Luxembourg.

(a) Luxembourg territorial claims affect a total area of 521 square km. and a population of 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants. They extend along the whole of the 90 km. of the German-Luxembourg frontier, to a depth of 1 to 5 km. along the Moselle and the Sure, and to a depth of 5 to 10 km. along the Our. The territory claimed does not include any village of more than 1,500 inhabitants.

(b) The desiderata of the Luxembourg Government have been framed with the following objects:

To obtain possession of the three rivers Our, Sure and Moselle, forming the frontier between Luxembourg and Germany, and of bordering German territories, and thus prevent Germany from establishing strategic constructions which right up to this last war constituted a permanent threat and have given rise to numerous incidents.

To acquire and operate the railway line on the German bank of the Moselle with full possession of the German villages along this line, to have constructed at German expense a dam and hydro-electric power plant on the Our.

(c) From an historical point of view, the Government of the Grand Duchy points out that these territories represent about one-fifth only of the Luxembourg territories taken from Luxembourg by the 1815 treaties to be given to Prussia. The population speaks the Luxembourg language and the large majority would be desirous of being attached to the Grand Duchy.

(d) The Luxembourg Government would be willing to accept the principle of a referendum.

Netherlands.

(a) The Netherlands territorial claims represent a total area of 1,750 square km. and a population of 119,000 inhabitants (statistical data of 1939). The rectifications indicated would reduce the frontier line between the Netherlands and Germany from 525 km. to 340 km. These rectifications concern the following districts:

1. The Ems estuary.

2. The Bourtange peat moors.

3. The territory of the county of Bentheim.

4. The pockets of Vreden and Anhalt.

5. The southern part of the frontier, along the German Rhine Provinces (the Cleves and Emmerich, the Roermond and Sittard, and the Hertogenrade and Aachen districts).

(b) Considerations which guided the Netherlands Government in laying down their views on the frontier rectifications:

1. Shortening of the frontier line.

2. Improvement of local communications.

3. Local improvement of canal and waterworks.

4. Improvements from the social and economic point of view.

5. Redress of local anomalies.

(c) In addition, in its supplementary memorandum of the 26th January, the Netherlands Government submitted historical justification for its principal claims.

New Zealand.

No comments.

Norway.

Norway supports Danish demand for the return to Germany of non-military refugees.

Poland.

Poland expects from the Peace Conference “a final definition of the Western frontier laid down at Potsdam” and an equitable demarcation of frontiers, and reserves for herself the right to present a detailed project concerning delimitation of the German frontier on a line from the Baltic Sea immediately West to Swinemunde and thence along the River Oder to the confluence of the Western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier.

In the territories to the East of the above line there were on 1st November, 1946, 4,375,000 Poles who constituted 85 per cent, of the population. There were 698,000 Germans.

Both before and after the entry into force of the Peace Treaty, Poland should be allowed to present her point of view on the Polish/German and other questions which directly concern her, to the organs of political control.

Ukraine.

It is necessary to forbid the existence on German territory of any organizations composed of persons of Ukrainian origin whose activities are directed against the freedom, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Ukraine.

Union of South Africa.

No comments.

Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government desires that the German minorities called “Volksdeutsche” (100,000 persons) should be transferred from Yugoslavia to Germany in accordance with the Potsdam Decisions on German minorities.

2.—reparations and restitution

Australia.

No comments.

Belgium.

The Belgian Government desires to be given satisfactory assurances of delivery. It proposes various methods to that end: “either a transfer of ownership of plants and workings, or a concession on such plants and workings, or an undertaking by the Authorities concerned, or any other similar method.

“Should the compensation received by Belgium from Germany not prove sufficient in regard to advantages received by other States, Belgium reserves the right to claim corresponding advantages, either from the States receiving advantages from Germany, or from those conceding them.”

As compensation for works of art destroyed, Belgium claims certain works of art to be taken from the German state.

“Belgium also claims certain historical documents which are of special interest to the country.”

Brazil.

The Brazilian Government declares that the indemnification offered her as reparations from Germany in the form of the product of the sales or the incorporation of German assets situated on territory under her jurisdiction covered only a small percentage of the losses suffered by the Brazilians. The Brazilian Government declares that the states which were admitted to participate in the Paris Conference on war reparations have considered that not only the loss of profit of properties lost or damaged by enemy action, but also other elements which in consequence of enemy aggression determined a reduction in Brazil’s economic potential are susceptible of reparations. The Brazilian Government declares that this broad conception of reparations having been accepted, Brazil cannot obtain satisfaction except to an extremely limited extent by making use only of the German assets liable to liquidation according to her internal law. Brazil therefore pleads to the Council for the right to participate in adequate proportion and without prejudice to the liquidation of German assets located on territory under her jurisdiction, in the sharing of the assets situated in Germany and liable to transfer as reparations.

Byelorussia.

The Government of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic demands that Germany should pay reparations in kind to the Byelorussian Republic to the extent of 1,500 million American dollars; this amount would represent only 10 per cent. of the damage inflicted in the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic by Germany as a consequence of the war and occupation, which has been assessed by an investigation Commission at 15,000 million American dollars, exclusive of indirect damage (for instance the 350,000 citizens of Byelorussia deported to Germany for slave labour).

Canada.

No comments.

Czechoslovakia.

Germany to grant Czechoslovakia, as part of her reparations, the use of the German railways for transit to and from the sea, in accordance with tariff conditions existing in 1937, and based on the Agreement of 1929. Czechoslovakia claims the right to use the telecommunication links leading through Germany also as part of her reparations, and on customary tariff terms.

The Czechoslovak Government demands that the principles of restitution be applied to property acquired by Germany as a direct or indirect result of the Munich Agreement.

Denmark.

Reparations.

The Danish Government express the hope that it may be possible to obtain from current German production compensation for the losses suffered by the Danish economy during the war. If special privileges in the form of concessions, etc., are granted to individual countries, the Danish Government reserve the right to set forth their wishes in that respect. The Danish Government consider that an obligation should be imposed on Germany to provide compensation for damage sustained by Danish property in Germany during the war.

Restitution.

See under “Other Economic Claims.”

Greece.

The Greek Government claims that Greece has suffered treatment which has no parallel in any other occupied country. The total loss and damage is estimated at $16,000,000,000, of which $8,500,000,000 represents positive loss and damage. It is therefore entitled to special treatment as respects both the scale of reparations and the speed with which payment is made. The Greek Government does not consider its present share of reparations from Germany to be fair and requests that it be given an equal share with Yugoslavia.

(a) Reparations should be made in current production, including coal at the rate of 500,000 tons annually.

(b) The Greek Government desires that Germany be “obliged to send specialized technical personnel for specific tasks to Greece.”

(c) The Greek Government wishes to share in German property in Italy and Austria.

(d) The Greek Government points out that it has so far received from Germany only merchant ships of a gross registered tonnage of 42,354 tons, valued at £506,400, and isolated items of industrial equipment to a total value of 4,466,300 mks.

(e) The Greek Government has so far received nothing in the way of restitution. It wishes immediate restitution of war material, railway material and antiquities. It desires that Germany provide equivalent art treasures for items destroyed by the Germans in Greece or lost during or after looting by the Germans, through the carrying out of an obligation similar to that contemplated for Italy in the treaty of peace with Italy.

Luxembourg.

The Government of the Grand Duchy points out that as a result of German aggression, Luxembourg has suffered damage assessed at more than 600 million dollars, affecting a population of 300,000 inhabitants.

It therefore demands as reparations:

(a) The supply by Germany of 3,500,000 tons of fuel per annum, to include three million tons of coke and 500,000 tons of coal and lignite, for a period of 40 years.

(b) The supply of 175,000,000 Kw. per annum of electric power.

(c) Certain supplies to ensure the operation of the mines and the working of the metallurgical industry, and a quantity of fertilizers.

There is justification for such supplies being furnished free of charge. But the Luxembourg Government would consider, as a subsidiary measure, that they be made against payment, and particularly against certain commodities to be supplied by Luxembourg (see below, 3 (c)).

(d) Certain works of art and archives of special historical value to the Grand Duchy.

(e) The transfer of a section of the German railway line along the Moselle.

The construction of a dam on the Our.

Transfer of ownership and work in connection with frontier rectifications (see below, 3 (c) and (d)).

Netherlands.

No special desiderata are put forward in this respect by the Netherlands Government, although its economic desiderata (see 3 below) are in great part presented to compensate war damages.

New Zealand.

No comments.

Norway.

Norway’s claim for reparations is approximately 3 billion dollars.

Norway requests that capital equipment be made available without delay.

Poland.

The speedy receipt of just reparations from capital equipment and from the current production of Germany, above all, from the first of these sources, in so far as industrial equipment has special value in the eyes of Poland, which has been destroyed by Germany, and is Germany’s neighbour. Reparations of this kind give Poland the opportunity to restore her economic life more speedily and to prevent the intensification of an economic disproportion between Germany and Poland which would be to Poland’s disadvantage.

Damage and losses in the realm of culture and science should be replaced by German equipment of equal value, and all property which was compulsorily removed from Poland into Germany during the war should be restored.

Union of South Africa.

No comments.

Ukraine.

Damage caused to property by the German-Fascist plunderers to the citizens and national economy of the Ukraine total 285 milliard roubles according to state prices of 1941. Therefore, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimean and Berlin Conferences regarding reparations from Germany, Germany should make compensation to the greatest possible extent for the damage sustained by the Ukraine. This repayment should be made in kind by means of the removal of industrial equipment from German industry, including its removal from the Western Zones of Occupied Germany.

Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav Government insists that fully equipped factories should be transferred to Yugoslavia from the Western Zones as reparations. (Statement by Ivekovic.)

The Yugoslav Government insists that its claims for reparations from the Western Zone of occupation, as stated in Resolution No. 2 of the Annex to the Paris Treaty, should be fully and rapidly satisfied.

For restitution see Part IIa Section 4 “Reparations and Restitutions”.

3.—other economic claims (commercial, industrial, transport, concessions and others)

Australia.

No comments.

Belgium.

Among other economic claims contained in its memorandum, Belgium claims from Germany as reparations, or if this is impossible, for the time being, subject to payment on terms to be freely agreed with the occupying powers:

(a) 6.6 million tons of coal per annum for a period of 40 years. Rights of ownership to the Haus Adena, Haus-Aden-Fortsetzung and Monopol Grimberg.

(b) The placing at her disposal of 150,000 kw. electric power, corresponding to a supply of 750,000,000 kw. h. per annum. Certain specified power stations to be handed over to Belgian ownership.

(c) Deliveries of 1,000,000 tons lignite, 300,000 of industrial salt and 80,000 tons of cooking salt, 100,000 tons of potash, 27,000 tons of barium sulphate and 500,000 cubic metres of timber per annum.

Belgium also claims: the re-establishment of conditions of freedom and equality on the Rhine; diversion of traffic towards German ports to be forbidden; restriction of German shipping on the Rhine; the restoration of the Belgian Rhine fleet and the immediate delivery of 187,000 tons of German barges and tugs; concessions of dredging for sand and gravel from the Rhine; the construction of Rhine-Danube canal; the construction of Rhine-Antwerp-Scheldt canal.

Failing the return of the Belgian rolling stock still in Germany, Belgium claims an equivalent amount of German equipment.

Belgium also claims the supply of 500 motor buses and 500 motor coaches; the construction of a tunnel to bring the water supply from the Lake of Heimbach and abutting on the Vesdre, etc.

Brazil.

No comments.

Byelorussian S.S.R.

No comments.

Canada.

No comments.

Czechoslovakia.

The Peace Treaty with Germany should:

(a) Contain a definition of German property which will exclude the property of former Czechoslovak nationals of German race.

(b) Include a provision for the right of free zones in the ports of Hamburg and Bremen on terms not less favourable than those contained in the Czechoslovak/German Agreement of 1929 concerning the free zone at Hamburg.

(c) Contain a clause ensuring the free passage of Czechoslovak craft on the Elbe, Rhine and on the German sector of the Danube. Czechoslovakia should be afforded free zones on the above-mentioned rivers at certain inland ports to be specified later. Germany should be bound to maintain the navigability of the River Labe (Elbe).

(d) Confirm transit agreements with German Reichsbahn of 1929.

Denmark.

The Danish Government show in detail the extent to which the Danish economy was related to, and dependent upon the German economy, particularly as regards the supply by Germany of certain raw materials and specialized products and the market afforded by Germany for certain Danish products not easily marketable elsewhere. Denmark, while prepared to accept her share of the burden resulting from the limitations to be imposed on the German economy for security purposes, nevertheless hopes that Danish interests will be taken into account and that where possible the manufacture in Germany of those products for which Denmark is dependent on Germany may be allowed to continue. Spare parts for machinery of German origin are a case in point.

Germany should be made to surrender to Denmark such archives, museum pieces and historical monuments of North Schleswig origin as are in German possession, as well as any other archives relating to the German administration in North Schleswig between 1864 and 1920, and to the German occupation of Denmark from 1940–45.

Greece.

(a) The Greek Government wishes special provision in the treaty with a view to the preferential importation into Germany from Greece for twenty years of one-third of the German annual tobacco consumption. Similar treatment is also requested for Greek exports of currants, sultanas and figs.

(b) In general, the Greek Government wants “most favoured nation” treatment from Germany and “a share in her [German] import trade” equal to that which Greece had in the years 1935 through 1939.

(c) Property.—The Greek Government requests that no restrictive measures be placed upon Greek property in Germany and that all such property be fully repaired.

(d) Debts.—The Greek Government wishes it recognized that debts of Germans resulting “from contracts concluded during the war should continue to be binding.” In addition, goods contracted for in Germany should be delivered.

(e) War Material.—The Greek Government wishes the return of either of its own or equivalent amounts of naval vessels, air force material, army material and 30,000 head of livestock—preferably horses.

(f) Advances made to German occupation authorities. The Greek Government wishes these to be repaid.

Private property administered by Germans during occupation. The Greek Government wishes profits to be repaid.

Insurance contributions in favour of Greek nationals. The Greek Government requests that the Germans be forced to pay into insurance funds contributions for workers employed by the Germans during the war.

(g) In addition, the Greeks wish correction of German war-time decisions regarding war booty; that Germany should pay eight million pounds sterling for clearance of mines and that Germany should pay for repatriating Greeks.

(h) In order to settle future differences concerning implementation of economic clauses in the treaty, the Greek Government suggests the establishment of a “special court of arbitration” for the use of Germans and Allied Nations.

Luxembourg.

(a) Eschweiler coal mines.

The Government of the Grand Duchy demands that the working and production of the mines of the Eschweiler-Bergwerks-Verein, north of Aachen, 95.6 per cent. of the capital of which is held by the Luxembourg company Arbed, shall be placed at the disposal of the Grand Duchy, as Luxembourg property, with the right to act in all respects as though the products originated from mines situated in Luxembourg property. The output of these mines is estimated at 5 millions tons of coal and 1,200,000 tons of coke.

The working of the Eschweiler coal mines for the benefit of Luxembourg in the conditions set out above is distinct from the demand for the supply of coal to Luxembourg economy, which Germany should have to provide as reparations, and which amounts to a total of 3,500,000 tons.

(b) The Nordstern concession.

The Luxembourg Government claims the concession and temporary working of the Nordstern mining concession (5 km2) which constitutes an enclave in the Eschweiler concessions.

(c) The railway line on the German bank of the Moselle.

The Luxembourg Government demands the cession of a 25 km. section, running along the frontier, of the railway line joining the Lorraine mining district to the Ruhr district, following the German bank of the Moselle.

(d) The Our dam.

The construction of a dam and a hydro-electric power plant, in accordance with a scheme worked out by a consortium of German companies in 1926. Whilst supplying the Grand Duchy with electricity, this dam would also serve as a regulating plant for the big networks in Belgium, France and the Rhineland.

Germany should bear the cost of construction which is estimated at one thousand five hundred to two thousand million francs.

(e) Germany to be compelled to exchange certain commodities with Luxembourg.

The Luxembourg Government demands that Germany be compelled to exchange coal and particularly coking coal, for certain commodities listed in its memorandum, particularly metal ore and metallurgical products. Such exchanges would promote German finishing industry and enable the Allies to keep a check on it and would thus constitute an additional guarantee of security.

The Luxembourg Government bases its claims on a similar clause in the Treaty of Versailles (Art. 268) and on the fact that before the war there was free exchange of these commodities for coal from the Ruhr.

These purchases would be independent of any that might be the subject of trade agreements between Luxembourg and Germany and could not be subject to revision.

(f) Miscellaneous desiderata.

The property, interests and rights of Luxembourg natural and juridical persons to be guaranteed against all discriminatory measures or measures of confiscation; in particular, the free transfer of any profit deriving from Luxembourg participation in business or industrial concerns in Germany:

Foreign concerns have priority in measures of reconstruction in Germany.

Luxembourg property, interests and rights in Germany, not to be affected by decartelization, socialization, nationalization measures; at all events, not without adequate compensation.

Netherlands.

The Netherlands Government makes a distinction between desiderata of a general economic character and demands of a more specific nature.

(a) Desiderata of a general economic character:

Measures to prevent unfair discrimination by Germany against Netherlands ports.

Germany to be prohibited from constructing new canals tending to divert Rhine traffic into other than its natural channels.

German monetary policy to be conducted in a manner that will leave the vital interests of the Netherlands unaffected (no discriminating currency regulation).

Free access of the Netherlands to their natural hinterland.

The Netherlands therefore demand the free use of the Rhine (not only in a technical sense, but also as regards tariffs and measures of monetary and commercial policy); as well as a due place in international traffics for their railways and road traffic; transit-traffic through Germany in both directions shall be open to them without discrimination.

(b) In their specific demands, the Netherlands are desirous to obtain for a period of 40 to 50 years a number of German mining concessions mainly on the left bank of the Rhine (coal and potassium).

Furthermore, the Netherlands Government demands that the mines conceded shall be worked within the Netherlands economic system and should, for example, part of this production be made available for any part of Germany, this will have to be regarded as export from the Netherlands.

(c) Among the economic demands of a specific character those concerning endiking and drainage work, which are to a certain extent bound up with demands for frontier rectifications, come in for special attention.

The most important is concerned with the work of improvement of the mouth of the Ems, the cost of which should be borne by Germany.

In certain cases the Netherlands Government demands that the Germans shall be compelled to ensure the maintenance of the rivers.

In other cases it is recommended that German and Netherlands experts shall investigate on the spot to ascertain the extent to which each country shall meet the cost of work carried out in the common interests.

New Zealand.

No comments.

Norway.

Germany must be prohibited from equipping or participating in any whaling expeditions.

Restrictions must be placed on German trawling off the coast of Norway.

Germany must submit to regulations regarding the conservation of the stock of fish off the Northern Norwegian coast and in the Arctic Sea.

Poland.

With respect to Germany, Poland is interested in the regularization of questions of transport, of ownership of communications and cables, leading out of Polish territory; in the question of the claims of Polish citizens in connection with forced labour done by them in Germany, of German patents, etc., and also all copyrights and of free access to German archives, etc.

Union of South Africa.

No comments.

Ukraine.

No comments.

Yugoslavia.

No comments.

69. At their 3rd Meeting, January 16, 1947, the Deputies for Germany agreed to establish a Drafting Committee to prepare a report to the Council of Foreign Ministers. As subsequently agreed upon by the Deputies, the Drafting Committee consisted of: U.S.–Heath, U.K.–Young, U.S.S.R.–Filippov and Saksin, France–de Courcel. The method for drafting the Report was decided upon by the Deputies at their 18th Meeting, February 11, 1947; see the report on this meeting in telegram 957, Delsec 1222, February 12, 1947, from London, p. 26. The Report submitted by the Drafting Committee was considered and approved by the Deputies for Germany at their 29th Meeting, February 24, 1947, subject to a number of textual amendments and modifications of presentation which were incorporated in the text signed by the Deputies on February 25, 1947, and printed here.

    Texts of the memoranda and statements by the Allied States referred to in this Report and copies of the relevant maps were contained in Annexes I and II, respectively. These Annexes are not reproduced here.

70. Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. ii, p. 1557.
71. Ante, p. 1.
72. In a note circulated to the Deputies for Germany as document CFM(D) (47) (G)16, January 16, 1947, and published in the Brazilian press on January 16, the Brazilian Chargé in London Hugo Goulthier stated that the Brazilian Government felt strongly regarding the right of all countries at the meeting of the Deputies for Germany to discuss not only their own views regarding a German settlement but also the views of the great powers. In telegram 412, Delsec 1129, January 20, 1947, from London, not printed, Murphy reported that Chargé Goulthier had called on him to voice an informal protest regarding the stricture placed on countries in presenting their views on Germany to the Deputies. Goulthier said his government was considering refusing to present its views on the ground that the limited opportunity was inadequate (740.00119 Council/1–2047).
73. Dots appear in the source text.