I have few comments to make other than that I concur with Messrs. Bidault
and Teitgen that there is a widespread fear psychosis in Western Europe
and particularly in France, that in the event of Russian aggression the
United States does not plan to defend Western Europe and therefore it
will be occupied by the Russians. Also it is my personal conviction that
any future French Government with which we may have to deal, a Communist
Government naturally excepted, will share very fully the opinion of
Messrs. Bidault and Teitgen regarding the absolute necessity for a
defense plan designed to defend Western Europe from Soviet
occupation.4
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the First Secretary
of Embassy in France (MacArthur)5
top secret
Paris
, January 29,
1948.
In the course of a conversation last evening at which were present:
- M. Georges Bidault, French Minister of Foreign
Affairs,
- M. Pierre Henri Teitgen, French Minister of Armed
Forces,
- Ambassador Caffery,
- Major General Harold R. Bull,
- Brigadier General F. J. Tate, Military Attaché,
- Mr. James C. H. Bonbright, Counselor of Embassy,
- Mr. Douglas MacArthur 2d, Secretary of Embassy,
M. Bidault and M. Teitgen expressed the following
views in connection with the French national defense:
There is a very strong and widespread belief throughout France and
the other countries of Western Europe (they mentioned Holland,
Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and even England) that in the event of
war with Soviet Russia the United States does not plan to defend
Western Europe but will abandon this area to the Soviets and base
its defense lines possibly on the Pyrenees, but chiefly on North
Africa. The French believe that in the event of war the United
States military [Page 618] planners
are thinking in terms of three main war theaters: 1) the Far East;
2) the Middle East (with its vital oil fields); 3) Western Europe.
They believe that the United States attaches far more importance to
the Far Eastern and Middle Eastern theaters than to the Western
European theater. In particular they believe that the United States
does not consider the war potential of Western Europe is sufficient
or that the social and political situation (particularly in France)
in Western Europe is stable enough to justify the risk involved in
endeavoring to defend Western Europe.
Bidault and Teitgen said that while there might have been some
justification for the United States holding such views six months
ago, there had been developments in the intervening period which in
their opinion tended to establish the fact that the United States in
its own interest should re-examine its strategic concept with a view
to including Western Europe within the area which should be defended
militarily against Soviet Russia. For example, France in its
international relations has made its final choice between Soviet
Russia and the United States and has aligned itself irrevocably and
solidly with the latter (as proof they cited the position taken by
France at the last Foreign Ministers Conference in London, etc.).
Similarly, in the internal sphere the French people have
definitively chosen against Communism. Teitgen and Bidault said that
prior to the strikes of last November and December doubts on the
part of the United States of the ability as well as the will of the
French Government and people to prevent the Communists from taking
over France were understandable. As a result of the events of last
November and December, however, it should now be clear to us that
the overwhelming majority of the French people are opposed to
Communism, are willing to fight it and that the Government itself
has sufficient strength and authority to suppress any Communist
attempt at insurrection. Thus, France’s position and action—both
international and internal—justified and even required the United
States to give the most serious consideration to an over-all plan
looking to the defense of Western Europe. Teitgen and Bidault both
emphasized that despite the present governmental crisis and even if
they “were not in the Government tomorrow” they were fully justified
in exposing the foregoing situation to General Bull, because they
could state positively that any French Government, from de Gaulle to
the Socialists (the Communists naturally excepted) would take
exactly the same position that they were taking and would insist on
the necessity for an over-all strategic military plan looking to the
defence of Western Europe.
General Bull then asked whether in the event of war the French
Government could maintain internal order in the face of a Communist
[Page 619] uprising. Teitgen and
Bidault both replied that if the front were “as far to the East as
possible” in Germany and if the front were not broken by the Soviets
the French could guarantee that order would be maintained, although
the Communists would certainly be able to commit some sabotage
behind the lines. “Under such circumstances, however, the Communists
would not be able to stage a successful uprising and the French
people would be united in their efforts to crush them.”
As proof of the state of mind of the majority of French people when
faced with a grave Communist threat, Teitgen cited the fact that in
the disorders last November and December the French Government
originally had only 27,000 combat troops at its disposal in
metropolitan France. It had mobilized 290,000 men, Teitgen said, “in
perfect order and discipline and there was not one single case of a
mobilized individual having to be brought before a military
tribunal”—this despite the fact that food, uniforms and general
living conditions for the conscripts were very unsatisfactory. He
added that in southern France, where the Communists are strong (he
mentioned the area from Nice through Marseille to Montpelier and
Nîmes) there had been a complete stoppage of all rail traffic as a
result of the strikes. Nonetheless when the conscripts received the
announcement of their mobilization 87% of them reported on time,
despite the fact that they had often to proceed distances of well
over 60 kilometers on foot or on bicycle, and despite the fact that
in view of the paralysis of transportation they had legal grounds
for not reporting on time. This spirit, Teitgen reiterated,
reinforced his conviction that in the event of war if an unbroken
front could be established in Germany as far to the East as
possible, the French would be able to cope with any Communist
insurrectionary actions in the rear.
On the other hand Teitgen and Bidault both stated that if the front
were penetrated by the Soviets or if it were established well inside
the French frontiers, the French people who have been invaded and
occupied three times in seventy years would believe that a Soviet
occupation was imminent and inevitable. This psychological outlook
would so sap their will to resist the Communists (because the
population would wish to take no serious anti-Communist action which
would invite hideous reprisals when Soviet occupation occurred) that
the Government in all probability would not be able to maintain
order.
In connection with the present Communist efforts to take over Western
Europe, Communists were counting heavily on two major factors.
The first of these factors is misery. Misery resulting from a
deterioration of the Western European economic situation was
necessary [Page 620] from Communist
viewpoint to create a situation involving increased suffering and
hardship for the masses which the Communists would exploit to
“capture” a demoralized and disaffected population. The Communists’
hopes to create “misery” had been dealt a severe blow by the
Marshall Plan, which the two Cabinet Ministers believe will prevent
the economic deterioration on which the Communists had been
counting.
The second great factor is fear. They said that in addition to
preventing misery, it is equally or more important to eliminate the
fear psychosis which is weighing so heavily on Western Europe, and
which in fact saps not only the will to resist the Communist
offensive but the very strength of the Western European peoples. The
fear complex stems from the belief that should war break out, the
United States will abandon Western Europe to the Soviets; that the
Russian hordes will occupy the area, raping women and deporting the
male population for slave labor in the Soviet Union; that France and
Western Europe will be occupied and devastated by the Soviet hordes
and atomized by the United States. They said that as long as such
fears exist it is virtually impossible to envisage a strong Western
Europe. Furthermore, serious military cooperation between the
Western European countries looking to their own defense is to all
intents and purposes purely theoretical unless the countries believe
that there is a reasonable possibility of successfully defending
themselves. They will only feel that there is such a reasonable
possibility if they have the encouragement and backing of the United
States and believe that the United States plans to try to defend
Western Europe.
As additional argument why Western Europe should be included in the
area which the United States will endeavor to defend Bidault and
Teitgen said that in the event of war with Soviet Russia they had
not the slightest doubt of the ultimate victory of the United
States, although it would unquestionably be a long, bitter and
hideously costly struggle. However, if Western Europe were not
defended the United States would find after the struggle that this
area, as a result of Soviet occupation and atomic warfare, would be
completely devastated and depopulated. There would be no Western
European civilization or population to share with the United States
the task of reconstruction. In other words, the United States after
its victory would have only Asiatics and African and Colonial
natives with whom to cooperate in the task of world
reconstruction.
For the foregoing reasons both Bidault and Teitgen expressed the
conviction that American strategic planning should be based on a
defense of Western Europe. They pointed out that Western Europe
would not be coming empty-handed and could make a solid
contribution, [Page 621] particularly
in the form of manpower and also light equipment, etc. France, for
example, could furnish between one and two million men with light
arms, equipment, etc., and might even eventually be able to furnish
some items of light equipment to other Western European countries
which were a party to the coordinated defense plan, if they could
count on obtaining certain heavy equipment, that the French were
unable to manufacture in reasonable quantity or quality, from the
United States.
Teitgen then said that while he realized General Bull was in Paris in
a purely unofficial capacity, and was not authorized to do other
than listen unofficialy to the French point of view, it is urgent
that France have an indication of what the United States could do to
help. He made it clear that he was thinking of the establishment of
coordinated general defense plans for Europe in terms of the
immediate future (he mentioned within the next year or fifteen
months) and that he would be interested in receiving the answers to
such questions as:
- 1)
- Does the United States really want and will it encourage
and back military talks and understandings between the
countries of Western Europe looking to a definite plan to
defend Western Europe?
- 2)
- Given the serious condition of French economy the French
Army is faced with a grave problem trying to maintain the
equipment for its forces now under arms. For example,
insofar as heavy material is concerned the French are
producing a few tanks, airplanes, self-propelled weapons,
etc., but at terrific effort and waste of their limited
resources. If the French could concentrate largely on
producing certain items (particularly light arms and
equipment, etc.) and could depend on us for certain
categories of heavy equipment they would be able to obtain
from their resources maximum utility and could arm and equip
a very considerable number of divisions. With this in mind
the French would like to know what we can do to furnish them
such heavy equipment on a basis of equipping perhaps
somewhere between twenty and forty divisions. If we could
help, in addition to equipping themselves they might also
eventually be able to assist other Western European
countries.
General Bull said that as he had made clear from the very beginning
and as M. Teitgen correctly understood, he was not, of course, in a
position to even try to answer the questions put forward by M.
Teitgen. His sole mission was to try to get as clear a picture as
possible of what the French had in mind. He understood the critical
problem with which the French were faced but hoped that M. Teitgen
would understand that we also had supply problems. If French
requirements could be met from surpluses it would be one thing, but
from existing surplus he did not think that more than one percent
would be suitable. Heavy items, such as motor transport (which in
reply to General Bull’s question Teitgen had indicated were a
critical item) [Page 622] which the
French needed so badly were also in short supply with our own
military establishment. Therefore if we were to furnish them to the
French they would have to be manufactured, which in turn would
require the voting of credits for such a purpose, etc. This was a
political and governmental question and not one which could possibly
be treated on a military level, either officially or
unofficially.
General Bull said that nonetheless he appreciated very much the
opportunity which had been given to him to listen to the French
exposé and that if the French, quite informally and completely
unofficially, wished to give him an indication, perhaps in
memorandum form, which would clarify the French thinking and what
they were in a position to do themselves, it would be helpful to him
in getting the over-all French picture.
Teitgen agreed and indicated that he would cause an informal paper to
be prepared for him—but that it would probably take a minimum of 8
or 10 days.
