Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

865.00/1–1248: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State

secret

Rome, January 12, 1948—11 p. m.

140. With national elections three months off, tempo of party politics in Italy has been noticeably increasing. As the various parties are meeting to perfect their organizations and platforms, it is possible to make a preliminary survey.

Christian Democrat and Liberal Party Congresses have already taken place. Following Communist Congress now in progress at Milan, Republican Party will meet at Naples January 16, Nenni Socialists at Rome January 18, and PSLI at Naples February 1. (PSLI meeting originally scheduled for January, but Party member tells us that preparation of basic “political report” has lagged and therefore Congress had to be postponed despite knowledge that delay cuts into time [left for election campaigning). UQ and]² Liberal directorates will also meet during January.

One of principal tactical problems which will be discussed at these meetings is that of formation of electoral blocs, tendency toward which has been increasing. On extreme left, Communists have conducted series of “Congresses” clearly designed to provide foci for attracting through their front organizations voters in various walks of life. PSI Congress will be faced by decision whether to confirm alliance with Communists in “Blocco del Popolo” despite opposition of prominent party members (Lombardo, Morandi and Romita).³

Both the Republican and PSLI meetings will undoubtedly attempt to take a stand on proposed “Democratic League”, (remytel 79, January 8)⁴ which would be bloc comprising these two parties, former Actionists who are still unaffiliated, disaffected Liberals, as well as Leftists from other parties individually discontented with their present association. There is certainly no unanimity of view in either Republican] or PSLI Parties re a bloc, but two factors will bear considerably in the discussion: 1) fact that both will have to find some way to campaign for votes without doing damage to [participation with] Christian Democrats in government which involves both prestige and much advertised pledges of loyal collaboration; 2) the somewhat intangible factor inherent in the preoccupation of the Italian mentality with bella figura (which is not really translatable but roughly means making a good showing). In its political application this factor means wariness [of alliances] and attempts by politicians of similar persuasion to upstage rather than cooperate with each other.

The Christian Democrats will stand by themselves in the campaign and are strong and homogeneous enough not to need or benefit from alliance with any other party.

On the right, the negotiations between Giannini⁵ of the UQ, Lucifero⁶ of the Liberals, and Nitti,⁷ for the formation of a professedly Centrist National Bloc have been accompanied by much sound, some fury (Cattani⁸ has been only Liberal to resign from his party, but others are plainly unhappy; and with signature of agreement January 11, former UQ Secretary Tieri⁹ resigned from party with several other UQ members who had publicly complained at Giannini’s allegedly single-handed part in the negotiations), and very little substance (the text of the Bloc’s agreement and program will be published as and when ratified by parties concerned). The principal stumbling bloc has apparently been, and will continue to be, the personalities of the men concerned and their preoccupation with the bella figura. It is hard to conceive of Giannini and Nitti, both of whom are personalities rather than heads of parties, maintaining a really effective political alliance.

In the campaigning thus far, the Left has taken and is holding an initiative in most of the issues. It may be expected that as the campaign progresses, these issues will, in general terms, be:

(1) National independence;

(2) the essentially economic and social “problem of the South”;

(3) the politico-economic “class struggle”;

(4) the Catholic Church;

(5) good old-fashioned mud slinging;

(6) the maintenance of peace and order in the country.

Re (1), it is interesting to note that Interior Minister Scelba has been replaced by Foreign Minister Sforza¹⁰ as the Leftists’ target of the day, for his alleged failure to protect Italy’s independence from the American imperialists. In campaign appeals to nationalism the name of the United States has been and will be dragged about in some astonishing ways.

Re (2), The problem of the South is two-fold; in terms of national unity, and of amelioration of the lot of the peasant. Both these aspects have already emerged, and contest during campaign will be between professed champions of both aspects. It is no accident that so many Party Congresses are being held at Naples.

Re (3), obvious and seemingly inevitable social-economic disparity between large number of Italian people, both industrial worker [labor] and peasant, on one hand and privileged aristocracy on other lends itself to Leftist demagogy which government finds hard to counter with details of effective but highly technical fiscal amelioratives. Energy and publicity which Government parties have devoted to current campaign for winter aid to unemployed (idea for which originally came from CGIL) have helped their electoral cause temporarily (remytel 129, January 12),¹¹ but past experience indicates they will have difficulty finding and exploiting similar opportunities in coming months. On the labor front, it is significant that neither social-Communists on one hand nor Christian Democrats (with Republicans and PSLI) on the other were willing to precipitate a final break in façade of unity during recent discussions in CGIL executive council.

Re (4), the importance of the Catholic Church as a campaign issue derives from the historic Italian distrust of “clericalism” in government, existing from the days when the Popes exercised temporal power. The current Communist attack on the Vatican and its “agents”, the Christian Democrats, is linked demagogically with both “independence” and “the class struggle” against reaction, thus cleverly combining immediate, tangible issues with latent sentiments. The opponents have few weapons on this plane, and must perforce fall back on irrelevant dogmatic condemnation of Communism.

Nitti’s National Bloc is also a reflection of the Church issue; one objective of the bloc is admittedly to provide a rallying point for those of the middle classes who are anti-Marxist and anti-clerical and who distrust or fail to comprehend the anti-Communism and anti-clericalism of the Republicans and PSLI. The Liberal Party is qualified by tradition for membership in such a bloc, and UQ membership was possible after the withdrawal from the party of Patrissi and the expulsion of Selvaggi,¹² with their far-right, monarchist associates, who remain alone on the extreme right.

Re (5), the Left is apparently prepared to stop at nothing in its attacks on members of the government, especially the Christian Democrats; the latter are not especially effective at mud-slinging, nor inclined to start it.

Although, as suggested above re (6), question of public order is for the moment not preeminent in the campaign, it is to be expected that more will be heard and familiar Communist attempts to disturb and subvert will continue. Possibility of a Communist grab for power of course exists; on the other hand, a Republican source has opined to us that Communists will maintain a degree of ferment sufficient either to force government to postpone elections or, if elections are held, to aver after votes are counted that they were not free. The Communists have apparently decided to drop the question of police and the Ministry of Interior as unrewarding to their cause but the solicitude they have shown for army class being kept under arms, together with bitter attacks on alleged war criminal General Orlando¹³ (Secretary General of Ministry of the Army) may be stepped up to include attacks on Pacciardi¹⁴ and Facchinetti¹⁵ and on the whole military structure. This is one issue, of course, in which it is difficult for government to take campaign initiative, or even, for reasons of security, to defend itself in public.

Sent Dept 140, repeated Paris 22.

Dunn

2. The portions of the text enclosed in brackets have been supplied from the copy in the Rome Embassy files, File 800–Italy, Elections, Rome Lot file 56 F 78, now FRC–ACC 59 A 543, Part 8 (Box 2619).
3. Ivan Matteo Lombardo, head of the technical mission to the U.S. to discuss financial and economic matters.

   Rodolfo Morandi, Minister of Industry and Commerce in the second De Gasperi cabinet.

   Giuseppe Romita; an active member of the P.S.I. since 1924.

4. Not printed.
5. Guglielmo Giannini, journalist, playwright, and politician; founder of the Uomo Qualunque movement and of the newspaper of the same name.
6. Roberto Lucifero di Aprigliano, Secretary of the Liberal Party.
7. Francesco Saverio Nitti, Prime Minister of Italy, 1919–1920.
8. Leone Cattani, former Secretary of the Liberal Party.
9. Vincenzo Tieri
10. Mario Scelba; Carlo Sforza.
11. Not printed.
12. Emilio Patrissi, editor of the daily L’Ora d’Italia; Vincenzo Selvaggi, editor of the daily Italia Nuova.
13. Gen. Taddeo Orlando. He had been captured in North Africa in May 1943.
14. Randolfo Pacciardi, Vice President of the Council of Ministers in 1947; Minister of Defense 1948–1953; a member of the Republican Party of Italy.
15. Cipriano Facchinetti, Minister of Defense in the fourth De Gasperi cabinet (May 1947–May 1948) for the period after December 15, 1947.