865.00/2–1848
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour)
| Participants: | Assistant Secretary Armour |
| Ambassador Tarchiani | |
| W. C. Dowling, SE |
The Italian Ambassador called at his request this afternoon to discuss several matters—all of which, he said, were of particular significance in connection with the April elections.
Tarchiani said first that he wanted to leave with me a note regarding the possibility of speeding up wheat shipments to Italy during March.1 He reminded me that Italian grain stocks were being reduced each month, and said that the Italian Government was most anxious that any delay in wheat shipments should not endanger maintenance of the bread ration in the electoral period. He added, however, that imports from Argentina would also have to be maintained if difficulties were not to arise.
I said we would give most sympathetic consideration to this request.
The Ambassador then mentioned the possible purchase by Italy of a number of small vessels, which he had discussed with Assistant Secretary Thorp several days ago, and said he hoped favorable action could be taken at an early date, as this assistance would surely receive most favorable publicity in Italy in the electoral period, providing yet another contrast between the tangible aid received from the US and the flow of propaganda from the east.
I told the Ambassador that I was not familiar with this matter, but promised to look into it.
Turning then to the general question of propaganda and its influence on the Italian elections, Tarchiani referred to the recent Soviet broadcast of its note to the Italian Government reiterating Soviet support [Page 831] of Italian trusteeship for the former colonies.2 He said this announcement was obviously intended to serve Soviet political aims, but that it would nevertheless have a favorable effect in Italy. The Italian Government was constrained, of course, to welcome the announcement officially, and it was to be expected that this would raise in the minds of the Italian people the question of the attitude of the other powers. The Foreign Office had therefore taken the responsibility of permitting the Italian press to infer that the US, UK and France might not be too unfavorable to Italian trusteeship, and that there was at least a possibility of further announcements in this regard.
I reminded Tarchiani that the Soviet announcement had been made at a time when the Commission of Investigation was still at work in Somaliland, and that it would seem most improper for us to indicate a final decision until the Commission’s reports on the wishes of the inhabitants had been studied and we had heard the views of the other interested goverenments. I feared therefore it might be unwise for the Italian Government to give an impression that an announcement of our decision might be expected. I added that I felt sure the Italian Government would want to take discreet action to insure that the Italian people understood the political implications of the Soviet move.
Tarchiani replied that he thought the majority of the Italian people understood the Soviet statement was an “election promise”, but that it would nevertheless have an effect, since it was the kind of news the Italians like to hear.
In this connection, he referred to the general attitude towards Italy of France and the UK, and especially the latter, which he felt could be handled more wisely. Actually, he said, Italy’s relations with both France and the UK were progressing extremely well, and the Italian Government was gratified by the increasing friendliness of the British and French as evidenced in official contacts and discussions. On the other hand, the public attitude of the British Government was still something less than friendly to Italy, while the French attitude also was frequently unfavorable; this had created an atmosphere in which Soviet propaganda was having a greater influence than need be the case if all of the Western powers were to demonstrate friendship for Italy.
Here follows a discussion of specific issues between the Italian Government and other governments.
Tarchiani said that he had brought up the foregoing only because in the Italian mind the UK, and the West generally, was so closely associated with the US. Any unfriendly attitude on the part of either [Page 832] the UK or France could therefore only detract from the effectiveness of the friendship and assistance which the US had so consistently displayed towards Italy. He added that Latins were always quick to take offense at being slighted, and in their present circumstances the Italians were inordinately anxious for indications that they were regarded as equals.
In conclusion, Tarchiani reverted to the question of the Soviet declaration, saying he hoped the British at least might find it possible to indicate that, subject to the findings of the Commission, they were prepared to give favorable consideration to Italian trusteeship.
I reiterated to the Ambassador our position regarding any statement on the former colonies at this time, but suggested that if the Italian Government felt a need further to counteract the Soviet declaration, it might wish to consider the possibility of issuing a statement recalling the economic assistance and political support given Italy in the past by the US, as well as the UK and France, pointing out that a Commission of Investigation was now in the former colonies so that the Council of Foreign Ministers might have additional data on which to base their decisions, and expressing the Italian Government’s confidence that the ultimate decisions would be favorable to Italy.