Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Western Europe, Volume III

852.00/1–548

The Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Achilles) to the Chargé in Spain (Culbertson)

top secret

Washington, January 5, 1948.

Dear Pail: I will try in this letter to amplify and clarify our 903 of December 18² and to give you our general thinking on the subject of policy toward Spain:

1. We want to bring about gradual normalization of relations between Spain and the United States and, incidentally, between Spain and the other western countries.

2. While popular opinion in this country and Western Europe with respect to Spain has cooled off to a very considerable extent, complete normalization would be difficult, if not impossible, without some democratization in Spain.

3. We emphatically would not want to see the Spanish state weakened to a point at which civil disorders might ensue.

4. Changes in the form or composition of the Spanish Government are the business of Spaniards alone; we would make no suggestions more specific than the general position which this letter attempts to outline.

5. International pressure to “kick-Franco-out-now” has failed and has served only: (1) to strengthen his resistance to any liberalization under foreign pressure; (2) to increase support for him in Spain among those who would like a more democratic government but object to foreign pressure or fear renewed disorders; and (3) to give the communists everywhere one more chance to cause trouble and embarrassment.

6. The “kick-Franco-out-now” policy is over as far as we are concerned, although we are unlikely to make this public unless and until there is some evidence that Franco is willing to start on his own an evolutionary process toward democracy.

7. We had reasonable success in trying to hold down the United Nations pressure at the 1947 Assembly.³ This should be, and apparently is, evidence to Spaniards of a change in our basic attitude. However, the provisions of the 1946 resolution on isolation from agencies connected with the United Nations and the recall of Chiefs of Mission still hold and we are not at this time considering any action contrary to that. This aspect of our policy seems less well understood in Spain. We naturally attach importance to the observance of United Nations recommendations as a matter of principle. In addition, we expect that before the 1948 Assembly the USSR and its satellites will have flagrantly violated several UN recommendations and we certainly do not want condemnation of them to be complicated by charges of similar disregard against us or other democratic governments. From the Spanish angle it is going to be very difficult to obtain a two-thirds majority to get the 1946 recommendations off the UN books unless there have been substantial changes in Spain which could justify such action. This should be another good talking point for you.

8. We do not want to see the economic situation in Spain deteriorate further. Before you receive this the “E List”⁴ will have been terminated and Spain will be on the same footing as all other European countries with respect to export licenses. We will be writing you further about this shortly. Fairly substantial private credits could be obtained by Spanish importers if gold coverage were possible (one private $25,000,000 cotton deal is currently hung up on the question of a 40% gold coverage and similar loans might well follow). Satisfactory conclusion of the current gold negotiations would make this possible.⁵ This should be a powerful argument in the negotiations.

9. We are not at this time prepared to extend governmental credit (Export-Import Bank), but would be glad to consider it as and when the regime gives concrete signs that it has the intention of moving toward greater democratic and economic efficiency and that it has begun to do so. Inclusion of Spain in the European Recovery Program would be a question for the sixteen countries concerned. They would be most unlikely, judging from their attitude at the UN Assembly, to agree on inclusion of Spain in the absence of substantial political and economic changes within Spain. Should such changes be made and the Sixteen wish to include Spain, we should presumably accord similar weight to the changes made and agree to Spanish participation.

10. From the foregoing, it should be obvious that we are thinking in terms of persuading Franco to inaugurate gradual and orderly liberalization rather than trying to force him out.

11. Persuading him to adopt such a course will naturally be difficult. You should certainly talk to him shortly, preferably at his instigation if that can be arranged. We expect to telegraph you specifically to do so upon receipt of the Vatican’s reaction. If in the meantime Franco should ask to see you, you should see him. Whenever you see him, our thought would be for you to talk to him along the lines of our 903 as amplified by this letter.

12. He may well say: “That is fine. You are coming my way and will have to keep coming, whether I do anything or not. Therefore I am going to sit tight.” Your answer would be: “O.K., so are we. We would like to give you positive help, but we cannot do it unless you first show convincing signs of intention to work toward a regime which would in democratic eyes be respectable.” If he takes the opposite line and says: “That is exactly what I am doing, but Spain and I are misunderstood abroad and nobody believes me”, your line should be that in democratic eyes his record causes considerable suspicion and that if he has democratic intentions it is up to him to demonstrate them convincingly. If lie asks what we want him to do, you will say that that is his business, that no foreigner is in a position to determine what is best for Spain and that it would be highly presumptuous for us to try. We realize the stormy nature of Spanish history and the Spanish character, the political instability of Spain, the passions remaining from the Civil War, etc., and assume that the nature of the political evolution would, of course, be Spanish, take account of these factors and insure continuing stability. What we need before we give him any sympathy or material assistance is convincing evidence of his intention to undertake orderly democratization. If such evidence were produced in some fairly dramatic form it would facilitate normalization of relations not only with us but with all other western countries.

13. Assuming that you get anything short of a complete rebuff from Franco (which would make us look again at our whole policy), I think you should take substantially the same line with all other elements in Spain—Army, Church, Monarchists and the moderate left. The extreme left is seeking disorder and communism rather than democracy in Spain and we do not care what they think. Other leftist elements may well react unfavorably, possibly bitterly, but we believe with complete sincerity that there is no chance whatever of achieving a really democratic regime in Spain through the former policy of attempting international coercion and that there is a reasonable possibility of bringing it about through the new one.

14. We think Vatican cooperation along these lines would be more effective than that of either Great Britain or France. However, we expect to discuss it with the British shortly after hearing from the Vatican and with the French in due course. We will let you know when we tell either.

15. Making this policy succeed depends in a substantial measure on you. It will certainly not be easy, but it gives you an opportunity to do a bigger job than most FSOs or Chiefs of Mission ever get. Good luck!

Don’t hesitate to give us your ideas either officially or direct to me personally. We are sending a copy of this of Jeff Parsons.⁶

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Theodore C. Achilles⁷

2. Ibid., p. 1096.
3. See Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iii, pp. 1087–1095.
4. An export control list terminated by June 1, 1948, of countries for which no export licenses would be granted.
5. These negotiations involved restitution to the Netherlands of 101.6 kilograms of monetary gold taken by Germany and subsequently acquired by Spain. Documentation on the negotiations is in Department of State file 800.515. See footnote 2, page 995.
6. James G. Parsons, Foreign Service Officer at Vatican City.
7. This letter was concurred in by Outerbridge Horsey, Assistant Chief, WE; John D. Hickerson, Director, EUR; Samuel Reber. Deputy Director, EUR; Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs: and Jacques J. Reinstein, Special Assistant, E.