832.00/3–2948

The Chargé in Spain ( Culbertson ) to the Secretary of State

secret

No. 182

I have the honor to refer to recent instructions with regard to United States policy toward Spain and, for what they are worth, to submit a few comments.

It is my understanding that in general American military authorities consider continental Spanish territory to be of major importance to strategic military operations in the Mediterranean and to the keeping of operational lines open to the Middle and Near East. Certainly our military authorities have not at all times seen eye to eye with the State Department with regard to American policy toward Franco Spain, and this has been true presumably because of the value of Spain in the event of hostilities with forces in the east of Europe. Problems of political ideology and American public resentment against Franco were and are of less importance to military thinking than to diplomatic thinking, but military considerations in time of crisis may well override ideological objections and change purely political policy. It certainly looks to me as though we are in or very near a time of crisis, and I am wondering whether circumstances may not soon cause diplomatic thinking to be less concerned with ideologies of the Franco brand and we will undertake to accelerate normalization of relations between the two countries to a point where our present policy may be sort of obsolete. If we are interested in Spain for purely military reasons and we can foresee the need to use Spain and Spanish territory, it should be borne in mind that Spanish transport and her military establishments are presently so antiquated that considerable time would be required to build them up to a point of real value and usefulness.

Our present policy is designed to encourage the Spanish regime to liberalize its structure and practices to a point where we and other nations can in the light of public opinion justify acceptance of Spain into the community of nations. The Regime has no way of knowing, and we have no way of telling it, at what point of liberalization it would become acceptable in the eyes of the western nations. What may be acceptable to the United States might well fall short of what a British Labor Government would accept—and so long as Russia sits on the Security Council, what chance has Spain to become a member of the United Nations or to have membership in United Nations organizations? At the very best Spain, under our present interpretation of the 1946 General Assembly resolution, can not hope for inclusion [Page 1032] in United Nations organizations prior to sometime in 1949. The immediate incentive to Spain to adjust her policies is, therefore, not very great.

Of course, one would think that people with normal reactions would welcome a friendly hand by demonstrating through action a desire to be accepted into the community of nations—the western nations that is. Spanish reactions are not however exactly what I would call normal. Likewise, Spanish psychology is different—a psychology influenced by individualism and an inferiority complex which evidences itself in an effort to relive the greatness that was once Spain’s. Add to this their conviction that Spanish territory is strategically indispensable and that the western powers, principally the United States, will require Spain in their self-defense interest and you get a stubborn, self-righteous, injured attitude that it is up to the world to change, not Spain. Furthermore, with the iron curtain daily moving further upstage, the Regime becomes increasingly convinced of the correctness of its policies.

For ten years Spain has been kicked around internationally and kicked with vigor, although less vigorously in recent months. She has been ostracized and excluded from international cooperative effort. Small wonder, therefore, that she has a head-in-the-sand reaction to participation in the Western European Union1 or even to responsibilities concurrent with participation, if she were invited, in ERP.

Such information as filters through the Pyrenees from Paris on current Portuguese efforts to get Spain included in ERP would indicate British opposition plus general lukewarmness on the part of most of the other nations will keep the motion on the table with the resulting effect that Spain will not be invited to participate. I had hoped Spain might be incorporated into the Program on purely economic grounds. Not because Spain would be a major positive contributor to European recovery but because assistance would prop up a wobbly economy and make it possible for Spain to become more self-sufficient, a less drain on world supplies as well as to be in a position to export some commodities of some value to Europe. A busted economy in Spain certainly is not going to make European economic recovery easier and certainly is not going to be a help to political stability. The Western European Union treaty provides among other things for economic cooperation, coordination of production and development of commercial exchanges. Exclusion from that kind of cooperation under ERP where there are benefits is not likely to induce Spain to tie herself into a treaty such as that of the Western European Union, where no such benefits exist [Page 1033] and where the military side of which rests in part on a provision of the Charter of the United Nations, membership in which is barred to Spain for a long time to come even though she were to mend her political ways at once.

Normal diplomatic relations, i.e., rank of Chiefs of Mission, is a matter for the distant future for Spain. We are tied down to the 1946 U.N. resolution and will not go contrary to U.N. recommendations, in part because such action would give Soviet Russia an excuse to violate other U.N. recommendations of greater significance.

We must bear in mind that Franco, his Regime and a lot of Spaniards consider that Spain has not done and is not now doing anything wrong in the eyes of the Lord or humanity in general and, furthermore, Spain alone has carried the torch and fight against Communism and that right now is no time to tamper with any forces or individuals whose political purpose is the overthrow of the Regime.

Against that, in their estimation, we are holding out a fairly empty hand of friendship, calling for immediate action in return for which they may a year or so hence receive help and be restored to participation in world affairs. Again I say the incentive to change now is not very great, and frankly I think progress in obtaining change is going to be extremely slow.

On the other hand, the march of world events is not slow and military considerations could, the way things look from here, overtake objections to ideologies of the Franco brand, and as a result we would be confronted with the problem of further modification of policy toward Spain. If there be likelihood of this situation arising, I recommend that further moves be made now.

Basically our objections to the methods of the Franco regime will be no less in the future than they are now. Public sentiment against the Franco regime is most certainly less pronounced now than, say, a few months ago. Bevin2 and other British officials are the only official people who have recently kept the Franco issue in public view. Perhaps the British have gotten themselves in such a box with British public opinion that they have no alternative but to oppose Spain’s inclusion in the ERP. Nevertheless, your statements and those of the Congress have laid the foundation for Spain’s inclusion in ERP on purely economic grounds. A majority vote by the ERP countries to include Spain would give Bevin an out because he certainly has no veto power and could so explain in Parliament. If it is not too late I would like to see us informally and orally indicate to the ERP countries that we think that Spain should be included in the Program on economic grounds. It is the only way I can see which affords a partial bypass of the political [Page 1034] question. That would not mean we abandon our efforts to obtain political improvement in Spain. In fact, economic stability and liberalization may well bring with it political stability and liberalization. At no time should we let up on pressure to liberalize politically, and so far as the Embassy is concerned we shall continue to crack the question at every opportunity. The problem is whether liberalization shall be a condition precedent to any further move.

Respectfully yours,

Paul T. Culbertson
  1. For documentation on United States interest in the question of Western European Union, see pp. 1 ff.
  2. Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.