852.00/9–148
Policy Statement by the Department of State on Spain
A. Objectives
The primary objective of United States policy toward Spain at this time is the reintegration of Spain, politically, economically and militarily, into the free western European community of nations through the progressive normalization of Spanish relations with those countries and with the US.
B. Policy Issues
Although public opinion in Europe and the United States concerning Spain has moderated markedly in the past two years, full realization of our objective toward Spain will be difficult if not impossible without at least some political and economic changes within Spain.
Such changes in Spain can be brought about only by the Spanish people themselves, not by interference from abroad. The primary desire of the Spanish people, other than extreme leftists, is unquestionably for stability and the avoidance of a recurrence of civil strife. We emphatically do not desire to see the Spanish state weakened to a point at which disorder and civil strife might ensue. However, the indefinite prolongation of the present conditions of oppression and corruption within Spain can only lead to an explosive political situation unless relieved in a gradual and orderly manner. For these reasons we are attempting to persuade the Spanish Government that its own interest in regaining reacceptance into the international community and in future order in Spain require some moderate evolutionary steps. We fully realize that a broadly free and democratic regime is both almost unknown in Spanish history and impossible of attainment at any time in the near future.
1. political
In line with this policy, the US discouraged further international pressure upon Spain at the 1917 session of the UN General Assembly. The majority of UN members, other than the Soviet bloc, appeared to share our view that real improvement in the Spanish regime could not be brought about through pressure from abroad. The US delegation successfully opposed reaffirmation of the 1946 General Assembly resolution on Spain, but this resolution has not yet been repealed, and our policy must take it into account. Because of the importance attached by this government to the principle of compliance with UN [Page 1042] recommendations, we should take no action contrary to the 1946 Resolution on Spain until it is rescinded or modified.
In seeking to encourage political and economic changes in Spain, we are offering no direct suggestions as to the form or composition of the Spanish Government, taking the position that whether that government be monarchial or republican or whether or not it includes Franco or any other individual are matters for determination by Spaniards alone. We believe that friendly emphasis on the advantages to Spain of evolution, in contrast to Soviet-inspired pressure for a complete overthrow of the government, can exert a powerful effect both upon the government itself and upon many groups in Spain who desire social and economic changes based on a more representative form of government, but who fear chaos and disorder should the present regime be overthrown suddenly. At the same time, we are of course mindful of the difficulties impeding evolution, including the obstinacy of Franco and his close supporters, passions remaining from the Civil War, the inherent instability of Spanish politics, the complacency and support of the present regime by various rightist groups and the present repression of political expression in Spain.
Insofar as the US attitude can have influence within Spain, we hope to convince rightist elements now supporting the regime, particularly the Army and the Church, that we do not favor foreign intervention in Spain and are not seeking to reverse the outcome of the Civil War, but we do hope to see orderly evolution toward a more broadly based government, under which their legitimate interests would not suffer and which would restore Spain to its full political and economic place in the international community. We hope the center and non-Communist left will recognize that such evolution will afford a better chance for genuine attainment of their objectives than revolution.
2. economic
In the economic field we contemplate gradual and unobtrusive relaxation of existing trade restrictions. The shortage of dollars and the corrupt and inefficient control of economic affairs in Spain by the regime are, however, the chief obstacles at present to an increase in private US-Spanish trade. Without gold as collateral private US banks have been unwilling to extend loans to the Spanish Government or to private Spanish firms. The Department, when consulted about private trade credits, has stated that there is no objection on political grounds to such loans, but leaves the question of the economic risk involved to the judgment of the bank. The satisfactory conclusion of the looted gold negotiations on May 4, 1948 should, however, relieve this situation and facilitate the extension of private American credits since the Spaniards are now able to use gold as collateral. While private [Page 1043] loans will serve as a certain stimulation to private trade, a real improvement in Spanish internal economic conditions, particularly as they apply to foreign trade, will probably be a necessary prerequisite on purely commercial grounds before US firms will feel inclined to trade with Spain in any substantially increased volume.
We do not now contemplate either direct governmental financial assistance to Spain or indirect financial assistance, such as US Government participation in credits extended by private US firms to Spanish firms or to the Spanish Government. Positive economic assistance from this government should await, and serve as an inducement for, the taking of concrete steps toward liberalization in Spain. We expect to coordinate our economic assistance with political developments in Spain and to utilize it to encourage evolution.
The inclusion of Spain in the European Recovery Program will also probably depend upon the degree of international “respectability” which Spain is willing and able to attain. The question of Spain is still a domestic political issue in many of the western European countries. The United States has taken the position from the beginning that the initiative for inviting Spain to participate in the ERP lies with the participating nations. We have not suggested and have no intention of suggesting to these nations that Spain be included. Whether these nations do in fact eventually invite Spain to participate will undoubtedly depend upon steps which the Spanish Government is willing to take to improve its international reputation and thus make it politically possible for a majority of the ERP countries to invite Spain to participate. If these nations should decide at some future time that conditions have changed and they wish to propose the inclusion of Spain, we have indicated publicly that we will consider that new situation on its merits.
C. Relations With Other States
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D. Policy Evaluation
The necessity for political and economic changes within Spain to bring about full normalization of relations between Spain and the western nations springs from the situation which now prevails in Europe. This situation is still primarily political, not military, and as such must be dealt with by the US in political terms.
Politically and militarily our two principal Allies in Europe are Great Britain and France. Their strategic interest in Spain is greater than ours. While at least the military in both countries favor the earliest practicable integration of Spain into the western strategic pattern, both governments consider public acceptance of Spain into the international community politically impossible at this time or until there [Page 1044] has been some evolution within Spain. In the implementation of our policy toward Spain, therefore, we must have due regard for the political effect our actions in Spain have on the problems which confront US policy in the rest of Europe. At the same time, we wish to promote those projects in Spain in which US military authorities are interested, insofar as that is possible within the limits of our policy.
Since 1946 Spain has been a widely publicized and highly emotional issue in a great many countries of the world. In particular the Socialists, who either control or hold the balance of power in almost every western European government, have an emotional repugnance for Franco nearly as strong as, and in some cases stronger, than their repugnance for Communism. The repercussions caused by the recent vote in the House of Representatives concerning Spain has indicated the political proportions of the Spanish issue abroad as well as the objection to the Franco regime which still exists in this country. Overly precipitate action on our part in normalizing relations with Spain at this time would encounter public criticism in the US, dilute our prestige in many western European countries and embarrass our efforts to encourage closer economic and political collaboration between those countries.
The military problem with respect to Spain is based on the strategic value of Spain’s geographic location and the importance of preventing Spain from coming under the control of a Communist, or Communist dominated, government. In this connection, our military authorities believe it is important, as we do, to assist Spain in the rehabilitation of its economy. This is, of course, one of the important considerations which impel the US to encourage economic and political changes in Spain which will make it politically feasible for the US and the western European nations to assist Spain in restoring its economy and in regaining its place in the international community.
Up to the present time the Spanish Government has been completely unresponsive to the Statements of US policy which have been made to Spanish officials. Spanish fear of Communism and the imminence of another war have increased the strength and support of the regime, including the support of many sections of the population who are basically opposed to the Franco regime but who have felt that the time was not propitious to experiment with measures designed to produce political or economic modifications. Also, the Franco regime has been confident that Spain’s strategic geographic location is so important to the Western nations, and particularly to the US, that it would not only be unreservedly accepted by these nations but would also receive economic and military aid. This conviction became more pronounced as, in Franco’s view, tension between the US and the USSR increased as a result of Soviet encroachments and aggressive tactics in Europe.
The Communist set-back in Italy, the gradual improvement in the [Page 1045] situation of democratic forces in western Europe, the relative political calm prevailing in Europe and the favorable progress of ERP have now come apparently as a sudden and unsettling surprise to the Spanish Government. These developments are also beginning to cause moderate Spanish opponents of Franco’s regime, as well as his more objectively minded supporters, to consider the advantages of possible modifications of the regime in order that aid now essential to Spain may be received from abroad either directly from the US or through ERP. As this internal discontent counts, as ERP moves forward and as Franco sees that the west is not so desperately in need of Spain strategically as he had thought, it is possible that he may be forced to accept some degree of political and economic liberalization—provided, of course, that no external issue is made of his regime which would enable him again to whip up nationalistic feelings and rally the nation to his support. The possibility of any liberalization will also depend on how serious the Army, the Church and the other principal supporters of the regime consider the economic situation and the need for aid to be. While a recent loan from Argentina and the new commercial agreements with France and the UK will undoubtedly partially relieve Spain’s economic problems, and may even assist Franco in postponing any measures of change, capital equipment and long term loans are still required in the rehabilitation of Spain’s economy. These are matters in which assistance is required primarily from the US, a fact which is expected to act as an incentive in encouraging action in Spain along lines desired by the US.
We believe, therefore, that the most desirable course of action for the present is to avoid international pressure on Spain and to continue our efforts to emphasize the need for political liberalization, disabusing Spanish minds of the conviction that US public opinion will eventually force us to accept Franco on his own terms. We can concurrently encourage private trade with Spain and private investment on a purely business basis, and we can develop informal contact between Spanish and US military authorities, provided in all cases our political line is made clear.