840.00/1–2148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

top secret
Participants: The British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel
Mr. Denis Allen, Counselor, British Embassy
Mr. Hickerson
Mr. Reber1

The British Ambassador came in to see Mr. Hickerson at 11 o’clock this morning by an appointment made at his request. He expressed his appreciation of a letter dated January 20, 1948, from the Secretary of State to him commenting on Mr. Bevin’s proposals looking to the formation of a union of the free countries of Western Europe. He recalled that he had discussed this with Mr. Hickerson after leaving the Secretary’s office the day before yesterday2 and he added that he was anxious to continue the discussion and to obtain some working level views in the Department concerning this matter.

Mr. Hickerson said that he thought the best way of letting Lord Inverchapel know the ideas which were being considered on the pick and shovel level in the Department would be to read him informally a memorandum which summarized them as follows:

The Ambassador’s letter of January 13 stated that as a first step toward the realization of this wide project Mr. Bevin proposes, if M. Bidault agrees, that the United Kindom and the French Governments make a joint offer of a treaty to Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg along the lines of the Treaty of Dunkirk which is directed against a threat of renewed German aggression. While recognizing that this is intended only as a first step, there are some doubts [Page 10] in our minds as to whether in the present circumstances it is an adequate one.

It seems that any adequate regional defense system for western European countries should envisage defense measures to be taken in the event of aggression or attack from any source, even if one member of the group should attack another member. This is the underlying strength of the recent Inter-American Defense Treaty signed last year at Rio de Janeiro. There is full agreement with Mr. Bevin that the role of Germany in the union he proposes will eventually be of prime importance. Therefore there is some question whether the general adoption of a mutual assistance pact based solely on defense against Germany will facilitate eventual entry of Germany into this concept.

Mr. Bevin’s memorandum refers to a western democratic system with the backing of the Americas and the Dominions. As he is aware, this country is thoroughly in sympathy with proposals looking toward, closer cooperation between the free countries of the west. This country will heartily welcome any initiative looking toward the mobilization of moral and material forces strong enough to create on the one hand confidence and energy and on the other respect for the determination of the free peoples of the west to maintain their moral and physical independence.

It is not clear whether Mr. Bevin envisages the direct participation of the United States in the security treaty arrangements. The United States is prepared to carry out the obligations which it assumed under the Charter of the United Nations. The United States initiated the proposals contained in the Four-Power disarmament and demilitarization treaty for Germany. It is clear that this latter no longer corresponds to the present situation and that other means must be found to achieve its objectives, in which the United States is prepared to play its part. In addition, if it should be felt in western Europe that the direct participation of the United States in a defense arrangement, established in full harmony with the Charter of the United Nations, would be necessary to its success, the United States Government would be no doubt prepared, very carefully to consider this question. If the peoples of Europe are prepared to develop a concept of spiritual and material unity and to make this work, there will be no real question as to the long-term relationship of the United States with it. Mr. Bevin will appreciate, that without further knowledge of the plans of the European nations in this respect which will require careful study and consultation between the President and our Congressional leaders, there is little more which can be said at this time.

The defense aspects, although of vital importance in the question of a Western European Union, are in a sense negative aspects, and only part of a political, economic and spiritual union. It would be most interesting to receive in due course an elaboration of Mr. Bevin’s vews on the positive steps which can be taken to promote closer political and economic union of the free countries of the west, and careful consideration would of course be given to the ways in which he feels that this government could assist in bringing this about.

[Page 11]

Mr. Hickerson went on to stress the real importance which was attached to Mr. Bevin’s proposal and to his initiative in this respect and wished to make it clear that in presenting these observations informally they were in no sense intended to detract from the hearty support we wished to give. This initiative in endeavoring to bring about a closer cooperation politically, economically, and spiritually between the European peoples was heartily condoned by all of us. Mr. Hickerson was confident that Mr. Bevin had no doubt taken some of these considerations into account in making his proposal but it seemed to us that unless the proposed scheme following the lines of the Dunkirk agreement was being made use of as a screen to provide defense against Soviet aggression as well as against revived German aggression, it would fall short of its real objective. Therefore, this approach might well not be adequate or desirable.

Mr. Hickerson then pointed out that the real strength in the Inter-American Defense Act to which reference had been made in the memorandum lay in the fact that automatic action against aggression whether from without or within was provided. He felt that conceived in these terms the European defense system would not seem specifically directed against the Soviets and might make it easier of acceptance by states whose geographical position rendered them more vulnerable to Soviet pressure, such as Sweden. Conceived in these terms it would be even possible for the Soviet Union to join the arrangement without detracting from the protection which it would give to its other members.

As to the role of the United States in such a defense scheme Mr. Hickerson said that there were arguments on both sides with respect to direct participation by the United States. He had envisaged the creation of a third force which was not merely the extension of US influence but a real European organization strong enough to say “no” both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, if our actions should seem so to require. We would be willing to take our chance in dealing with any such organization of freedom-loving nations confident that we could settle any differences with them. Should, however, European nations decide that no regional defense organization could be completed without the United States and that this would give, as Lord Inverchapel had suggested, more assurance to the smaller nations, we felt that this country would be sympathetically disposed and would at least give it very careful consideration. If it were closely associated with the Charter of the United Nations, it might receive a favorable reception. The important aspect of this question was, however, that any such concept should be and should give the impression that it is based primarily on European initiative. If the European nations [Page 12] created such an organization and made it work, there would be no difficulties in settling our long range relationship with it.

Lord Inverchapel said with respect to the participation of the United States he had felt that certainly this should be at the second stage rather than during the initial phases of the scheme. He said he had gained the impression from his conversation with the Secretary that General Marshall did not preclude direct participation during the second stage. Lord Inverchapel and Mr. Allen were in agreement that there would be no question about the long range relationship of the United States if the plan were worked out but did not know the extent to which direct US participation might be required. Lord Inverchapel then said he appreciated that this expression of views was further indication of the sympathetic attitude which the United States was demonstrating in regard to this proposal and he was grateful for this opportunity to ascertain our views on a working level. He would communicate them with this understanding to London and felt it would be possible usefully to continue the conversation at some later date.

J. D. H[ickerson]
  1. Samuel Reber, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.
  2. Record of these conversations of January 19 not found in Department of State files.