840.20/1–649
The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Ohly) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, 6 January,
1949.
Dear Mr. Secretary: This is with further
reference to your letter of 28 December 19481 requesting the views of the National Military
[Page 10] Establishment with respect
to the paper enclosed therewith2 covering the
current Washington talks on a possible North Atlantic Pact.
There is enclosed herewith for your information a copy of a memorandum
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated 5
January 1949, which has just come into the office. This memorandum
expresses the views of the Joint Chiefs with respect to the paper which
you forwarded in your letter of 28 December. Because of the urgency of
this matter, and because of the important points made by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, I am taking the liberty of making this copy available
to you even before it has been reviewed by Mr. Forrestal.3
In view of my understanding that you intend to discuss this general
subject at this afternoon’s meeting of the National Security Council, I
am forwarding a copy of this letter and its enclosure to Mr.
Souers.4
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the
Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
top secret
Washington, 5 January,
1949.
Subject: North Atlantic Pact.
In response to the request contained in your memorandum dated 30
December 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated the
following statement of their views on a report by the Department of
State dated 24 December 1948 entitled “Washington Security
Talks.”5
The Joint Chiefs of Staff previously forwarded to you on 22 April
1948 and 19 May 1948 their comments on National Security Council
reports which are related to the report on Washington Security
Talks. Since these National Security Council reports6 (regarding The
Position of the United States with Respect to Support for Western
Union and Other Related Free Countries) are merely the generalized
basis for development of the position regarding a North Atlantic
Pact set forth in the Washington Security Talks, the earlier
comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have only general application
to the report on Washington Security Talks.
[Page 11]
Preliminary to specific comment on that report, however, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff would like to reaffirm their belief that:
-
a.
- The idea of collective defense embodied in the proposed
North Atlantic Pact is an essential feature of a United
States policy directed toward preservation of our national
security; and
-
b.
- Consummation of the proposed pact will emphasize the need
for military strength appropriate to the world situation and
to the commitments implicit in the pact.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in general agreement with the United
States position in the report on Washington Security Talks. The
following comments on matters of military implication are intended
largely to be in confirmation of the United States position. Several
of these comments, however, offer suggestions the adoption of which
would, from the military viewpoint, improve that position:
-
a.
- The terms of the proposed pact should be such as to form
no more than a broad, general basis for later implementation
with respect to military matters. They should not contain in
themselves provisions construable as specific directives
regarding such military matters as military organization,
command relationships, strategic planning and areas of
responsibility, or military contributions to the over-all
effort. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that,
with one exception mentioned in subparagraph f. below, the terms of the pact are
well designed to meet these conditions and thus to provide
the flexibility essential in implementing military
responsibilities once the pact has become effective.
-
b.
-
While agreeing, as stated above, with the idea of
collective defense embodied in the proposed pact, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that its scope should not
be such as to result in undue disparity between our
commitments and our present and prospective strength.
For this reason it may be well to examine rather
carefully the wording of Article 4, which reads as follows:
“The Parties will consult together whenever, in
the opinion of any of them,
- (a)
- the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened; or
- (b)
- there exists any situation which constitutes
a threat to or breach of the peace.”
The word “territorial” in subparagraph (a) quoted above, since territory is “the
domain over which a sovereign state exercises
jurisdiction,”* can be construed to include the
colonies of all the signatories to the pact.
Subparagraph (b) quoted above,
since it contains no limiting term, may mean that
consultation will be involved whenever there exists any
situation anywhere which
constitutes a threat to or breach of the peace. Thus
Article 4 could constitute a very
large order indeed and one that does not appear to be
essential to the North Atlantic Pact. The scope of
Article 4 should, in its final
form, certainly be no [Page 12] broader than it is at present and,
preferably, it should be restricted. In any case there
should be clear understanding that consultation is not
in itself a commitment to military action.
-
c.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete concurrence with
that part of the wording of Article 5, paragraph (1), which agrees to “such military or
other action … as may be necessary to restore and assure the
security of the North Atlantic Area.” Wording less general
in nature might tend dangerously to affect our freedom of
planning and action with respect to global strategy, it
being manifest that direct assistance alone might well be
neither so practicable nor so effective as steps taken in
consonance with over-all strategic concepts. It is hoped
that Article 5 in its final form will
retain the excellent terminology quoted above.
-
d.
- It is noted that the initial lines of Article 5, paragraph (1), are so phrased that
mutual assistance is called for in case of any armed attack against one or more parties to
the pact. That is, the terms of Article 5 may be invoked in case of either external or
internal armed attack on any of the parties, including armed
attack by any party to the pact. From the military
viewpoint, so broad a provision is open to question in that
the intention of the pact as a whole is taken to be the
development of collective defense against external
aggression and, further, in that the limitation of mandatory
commitment, where reasonably practicable, is good business
in terms of future military contingencies. On this point, it
is recognized that political and diplomatic considerations
may be overriding.
-
e.
- Alternative A (U.S. position) is preferable to alternative
B in Article 5, paragraph (2). The
North Atlantic Area as defined in alternative A for
determination of a basis for invoking assistance in case of
attack is adequate and, correctly, avoids unduly widespread
commitments. On the other hand, alternative B, which extends
the definition to include parts of North Africa and of the
Mediterranean, unnecessarily and dangerously broadens what
is, in effect, a limitation upon the sovereign choice of the
United States in accepting or rejecting war. The area in
which this limitation upon sovereignty is to be effective
should be held within as narrow bounds as possible, not only
because of the limitation itself but because the United
States, through constitutional processes, is unlikely to
accept any broader application of Article 5 than the minimum acceptable to prospective
European partners. Further, alternative B would not only
extend the scope of the Article 5
commitment outside of Europe, North America and the North
Atlantic, but would tend, during the course of negotiations
as to terms of the pact, to extend this scope still further,
since if French colonial possessions were to be included, it
might prove impracticable to exclude the colonial
possessions of other Parties to the agreement; in addition,
thus to define the “North Atlantic Area” would be to invite
justifiable claims to membership on the part of
Mediterranean states whose adherence to the agreement has
already been determined to be undesirable.
-
f.
-
Article 8, regarding the establishment of a Council to
deal with matters concerning the implementation of the
pact, is in general satisfactory and is consistent with
the discussion in subparagraph a
above as to the essentiality of flexibility in
implementing military responsibilities. [Page 13] It could be improved by the
insertion of the word “general” in the next to the last
line, so that the last sentence would read:
“The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies
as may be necessary; in particular it shall
establish immediately a defense committee which
shall recommend general
measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.”
Otherwise, the authority of the defense committee could
be taken to extend to detailed recommendation on all
military matters associated with Articles 3 and 5.
Article 8, in its final form,
should be no more specific than, with the suggested
amendment, it is at present.
-
g.
- The primary reasons for Italy’s inclusion in either the
North Atlantic or Brussels Pact would appear to be political
in nature. There is no military necessity for Italy being
included in the North Atlantic Pact. However, from the
military point of view, it is highly desirable that Italy be
included in the Brussels Pact. It is essential that the
whole pattern of defense of Western Europe be more properly
integrated, more compactly drawn and the greatest economy of
forces obtained by Italy’s inclusion in the Brussels Pact.
It would, in fact, be unrealistic militarily for Italy to be
a member of neither. In terms of land warfare in Western
Europe, Italy is strategically important. In terms of sea
warfare, there is no question as to her critical strategic
potentiality with respect to control of the Mediterranean.
While it may be that Italy’s membership in either pact might
prove, in emergency, to be of doubtful value, it is certain
that it will be harmful from the military viewpoint for her
to be a member of neither. The foregoing comment applies
also to Spain, although the Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware
that at present it does not appear to be politically
expedient to include that country in pact membership.
-
h.
- With further reference to Annex C of the report, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with Section (V) regarding
the desirability of taking steps to assure the governments
of Greece, Turkey, and Iran that their security is a matter
of concern to the signatories of the North Atlantic
Pact.
-
i.
- With respect to Annex D of the report, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff concur in the intention to invite Iceland, Norway,
Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal to join the pact and to
inform Sweden indirectly that if she wishes to become a
party to the pact she will be welcome.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Louis Denfeld
Admiral, U.S. Navy
