Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, PPS Documents

Policy Planning Staff Paper ¹

top secret

[ Washington ,] August 25, 1949.

P.P.S. 59

U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe

the problem

To find means of improving and intensifying our efforts to reduce and eventually to cause the elimination of dominant Soviet influence in the satellite states of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

analysis

1. Since VE Day ² we have (a) checked the westward advance of Soviet power, at least for the time being, at a line running from Lübeck to Trieste and (b) made substantial strides in developing Western Europe as a counter-force to Communism. These are defensive accomplishments. The time is now ripe for us to place greater emphasis on the offensive to consider whether we cannot do more to cause the elimination or at least a reduction of predominant Soviet influence in the satellite states of Eastern Europe.

2. These states are in themselves of secondary importance on the European scene. Eventually they must play an important role in a free and integrated Europe; but in the current two-world struggle they have meaning primarily because they are in varying degrees politico-military adjuncts of Soviet power and extend that power into the heart of Europe. They are a part of the Soviet monolith.

3. It is assumed that there is general agreement that, so long as the U.S.S.R. represents the only major threat to our security and to world stability, our objective with respect to the U.S.S.R.’s European satellites must be the elimination of Soviet control from those countries and the reduction of Soviet influence to something like normal dimension.

General Comment Regarding Satellites

4. The criterion which we employ in defining a “satellite” state is amenability to Kremlin direction. Thus Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania are by this definition satellite states. Yugoslavia is not because, although it is a Communist state, it is not at present subservient to the Kremlin and an integral part of the Soviet system. Nor is Finland; because, notwithstanding the existence of a large Soviet naval base on its territory, Finland has demonstrated on the whole a greater degree of resistance to than compliance with Soviet pressure and has, in particular, been able to resist internal police domination by the MVD.

5. Certain generalizations can be made about the satellite states. For the most part, they were overrun by the Soviet Army during or after the war. Their present governments were established by Kremlin dictate or under Moscow guidance. And they are all minority governments dominated by Communists. In particular, internal police power, which is the key factor in a Communist power system, is under Moscow control.

6. Moreover, the satellite states have under Soviet compulsion reoriented their economies from the west to the east. The Kremlin forced this readjustment with the purpose of exploiting the satellites for the aggrandizement of Soviet economic-military might and preventing their contact with the West. Moreover, the satellite economies are being steadily Sovietized. The Soviet pattern of state monopoly of trade and industry and of collectivized agriculture is being rapidly forced on these countries.

7. The cultural life of the satellite peoples, too, is being steadily Sovietized. A common pattern in education, religion, science and the fine arts is being pressed on the mind and spirit of Eastern Europe.

8. These developments do not have popular support in the satellite countries. The majority of the population in these states look upon their governments and the Soviet Union as an oppressive rather than an emancipating force.

The Anatomy of Soviet Power in the Satellite States

[Here follow numbered paragraphs 9 through 34 which are identical with paragraphs 10 through 35 of document N.S.C. 58/2 (page 42), the final approved version of this paper.]

35. With the foregoing in mind, let us now consider the most evidently beneficial course which we can follow. The obvious first step, perhaps even an essential prerequisite, is the creation of circumstances bringing about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from satellite countries. The conclusion of an Austrian peace settlement would remove the most evident present justification for Soviet troops in Hungary and Rumania. Similarly, an agreement by the four powers with respect to Germany, if and when it is achieved, should include provisions assuring preferably an elimination but at least a reduction of Soviet garrisons in Germany and Poland. These developments should go a long way toward loosening the Kremlin’s hold not only on the states affected but also on adjoining satellites. There is no guarantee, of course, that such a move might not be followed by Soviet-satellite treaty arrangements or the Soviet Union’s incorporating some or all of the satellites in the U.S.S.R., thus providing a new legal basis for the retention of Soviet forces in those countries. In such an eventuality, a new situation would have been created necessitating a full reexamination of this paper.

36. A second course open before us is to attack the weaknesses in the Stalinist penetration of satellite governments and mass organizations. In the light of what has been said, this will be no easy task. The weaknesses discussed in paragraph 19 do represent, however, a vulnerable sector on this front, especially if Soviet armed forces are withdrawn behind the borders of the U.S.S.R. The basic problem would seem to be to bring about the isolation, not only in satellite society, but particularly in the Communist Parties, of the Stalinist elements, and as they are identified and isolated, to create conditions which will reduce and eventually eliminate their power. … The propensity of the revolution to devour its own, the suspicions of the Kremlin regarding its agents and the institutions of denunciation, purge and liquidation are grave defects in the Soviet system which have never been adequately exploited.

37. This course is intimately related to and partly dependent upon the third course of action open to us—an attack on the ideological front, specifically directed at the Stalinist dogma of satellite dependence upon and subservience to the U.S.S.R. This key doctrine should be unremittingly attacked all across the board in its political, economic and cultural applications. On the positive side, the reverse of the Stalinist dogma—nationalism—should be encouraged. The offensive should be maintained not only on the overt but also the covert plane.

38. The subsidiary mechanisms of Soviet control touched upon in paragraph 16 are of varying vulnerability. It is difficult to see, for example, how we can bring pressure to bear against such mechanisms as Soviet military missions in satellite states. The political and cultural fields, however, offer possibilities for the exertions of our influence. For instance, through formal diplomatic channels and within the U.N., we have some opportunity to bring pressures to bear on the political ties between the satellite governments and the U.S.S.R. And in our general ideological offensive mentioned in the preceding paragraph, we should not neglect pressing the attack, necessarily indirectly in most cases, against specific instrumentalities such as the various “popular” organizations in the satellite states.

39. But it is probably in the economic realm that we can most concretely make our influence felt. All of the Soviet economic mechanisms of control, particularly the CMEA, are affected by the policies which we follow with regard to such matters as East-West trade, purchase of gold and export controls. The potential effectiveness of our economic tactics is widespread. If we can succeed in jolting the CMEA structure, the repercussions are bound to be felt in the political, military and cultural spheres. We do not have at hand and are therefore not operating on the basis of a thorough study of all of the elements of the problem. Not until we have completed an exhaustive study of all of the economic—and political—factors involved can we mobilize this economic potential and utilize it for maximum effect. This is a tactical problem which should immediately be worked out in detail.

Factors Affecting Our Choice

40. The broad courses of action open to us are qualified by a series of other factors. They are considerations of (a) timing and tempo, (b) our long-term goals, (c) our world position, (d) our relations with the U.S.S.R. and (e) the relative vulnerability of the various satellites.

41. Although the time is now ripe for us to move to the offensive, this does not mean that we should attempt to move at a maximum pace. The tempo at which we move is necessarily qualified by the basic pragmatic approach which we have to foreign relations. The truism, sometimes ignored in the public mind, is here recognized that our pace must be accommodated to what the situation in the satellites warrants.

42. A course of encouraging schisms within the Communist world cannot be pursued without reserve because such a course is a tactical expediency which, however necessary, must never be permitted to obscure our basic long-term objectives—a non-totalitarian system in Eastern Europe. The problem is to facilitate the development of heretical Communism without at the same time seriously impairing our chances for ultimately replacing this intermediate totalitarianism with tolerant regimes congenial to the Western World. Nor must we slacken, rather we should increase, the support and refuge which we may be able to offer to leaders and groups in these countries who are western-minded.

43. Considerations of our international position, particularly with respect to the U.N., impose further limitations on our policy with respect to the satellites. We cannot, for example, come out in unqualified support of Tito or Titoism any more than we can take such a stand in favor of Franco and Fascism. Furthermore, we cannot pursue a wholly unilateral course because we have committed ourselves to the collective idea, because our western allies have far-reaching legitimate interests in Eastern Europe and because the full effectiveness of our operations depends upon their cooperation.

44. Our relations with the U.S.S.R. are another consideration which must be taken into account. The satellite question is a function of our main problem—relations with the U.S.S.R. No examination of a proposed course of action toward the satellites is complete without thorough consideration of the probable effects it might have on the U.S.S.R. Proposed operations directed at the satellites must consequently be measured against the kind and degree of retaliation which they are likely to provoke from the Kremlin. They must not exceed in provocative effect what is calculated suitable in the given situation.

45. Finally, considerations of the relative vulnerability of the various satellites must enter into our calculations. No one course of action can be applied alike to all satellites. Obviously our policy both with regard to methods and tempo must differ among the several orbit countries. These are tactical problems which must be flexibly worked out by the operating elements within this Government.

conclusions

46. Our overall aim with respect to the satellite states should be the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power from Eastern Europe without resort to war.

47. We should, as the only practical immediate expedient, seek to achieve this objective through fostering Communist heresy among the satellite states, encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes as temporary administrations, even though they be Communist in nature.

48. It must, however, be our fixed aim that eventually these regimes must be replaced by non-totalitarian governments desirous of participating with good faith in the free world community.

49. More specifically, bearing in mind all of the qualifications set forth in the analysis of this paper, we should:

a. seek to bring about a retraction of Soviet military forces behind the borders of the U.S.S.R.;

b. endeavor to cause an increasing isolation of the confirmed Stalinists from the nationalist elements of the party and from popular support in the satellite states toward the end that their power be reduced;

c. attack the Stalinist dogma of satellite subservience to the U.S.S.R. and encourage nationalism;

d. bring fully to bear on the Soviet-satellite relationship the economic forces which we control or influence.

50. The operating elements within this Government should forthwith begin tactical planning and implementation of such plans in conformity with the strategic concept set forth in this paper. In connection with economic planning, it will be necessary first to undertake the study mentioned in paragraph 39.³

1. The preparation of this, paper was discussed at the Policy Planning Staff meetings of March 1 and April 1 (see pp. 9 and 10). A first draft was prepared in late May and was considered by the Staff at its meeting on June 2. The final draft was discussed and agreed upon by the Staff at its meeting on August 24. This text was submitted to the Department of State Executive Secretariat on August 26 with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the National Security Council for information following consideration by the Under Secretary’s Meeting. This paper, designated document UM D–56, August 29, was considered at the Under Secretary’s Meeting of August 31. At the request of Under Secretary of State Webb the paper was circulated for information to the National Security Council as document NSC 58, September 14. NSC 58 was considered and its conclusions endorsed at the London Conference of U.S. Chiefs of Mission to the Satellite States, October 24–26; see the conclusions and recommendations of the Conference, undated, p. 28, and the memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State Perkins to the Secretary of State, November 7, p. 36. For the final version of this paper as subsequently revised and agreed upon by the National Security Council and approved by President Truman, see NSC 58/2, December 8, p. 42.
2. May 7, 1945.
3. A portion of the Under Secretary’s Meeting of August 31, 1949 was devoted to a consideration of PPS 59. In the course of the discussion, Policy Planning Staff Director Kennan emphasized that the paper did not call for any program of action hut simply defined American interests in Eastern Europe. He also observed that the main point of the paper was that the United States should favor the development of nationalist communist leaderships in the Eastern European countries. (Under Secretary’s Meetings, Lot 53 D 250.) Regarding the establishment, responsibilities, and composition of the Under Secretary’s Meetings, see the minutes of the Under Secretary’s Meeting of February 14, p. 863.