874.00/3–2449

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Roy M. Melbourne, Division of Southern European Affairs

top secret

Dr. Dimitrov1 called by appointment to review the situation of the Bulgarian National Committee and to recount his activities in the [Page 280] sessions at Brussels for a United Europe,2 which he attended in his capacity as head of the Bulgarian section for the movement and as a general representative of the International Peasant Union. He asserted that a happy compromise had been evolved in the course of the Brussels conference which permitted representatives of the peasant movements in Southeast Europe to participate in the proceedings with the same status as parliamentary groups in Western Europe. However, the right to vote, which would be given to them technically, would not be exercised by these peasant representatives until they had formal and free governments in their countries in a position to give practical weight to the measures proposed by the United Europe Organization.

As for the activities of the Bulgarian National Committee in Europe, Dr. Dimitrov asserted that they were continuing in the same limited scope as outlined in previous memoranda,3 and that the chief deterrent to increased activity was the lack of funds and material assistance, for which he was hoping the US could supply the remedy in the near future.

While no answer could be given to him, Dr. Dimitrov was asked on a purely hypothetical basis to elaborate his plan of operations, extending beyond the intelligence activities he so fully described in a previous conversation (see memo of conversation January 5, 1949). He responded by affirming that the first step was to establish frequent and regular communication between his organization outside and the potential Bulgarian resistance forces within. This indispensable first step would entail the training of about fifty men for courier and organization service. He asserted that the French authorities had agreed to permit the training of this number in France and that a likely chateau was in prospect as a base for this activity, which would have to be conducted in secrecy. While a few Bulgarian emigrés were receiving informal training on their own in France with this objective in view and under purely Bulgarian emigre sponsorship, Dr. Dimitrov, when the money was available, wished to bring emigrés from areas such as Italy, Greece, and Germany for a formal training course of several months. The training completed, these men, if small bases could be secured in Turkey and Greece, would be able to arrange regular two way communication channels with Bulgaria.

Because of the ignorance of the opposition forces in Bulgaria of the true international situation and of the world factors involved in organizing resistance to Communism, due to the complete blackout of reliable information from abroad, Dr. Dimitrov stated that the Bulgarian opposition looked to him and to the National Committee [Page 281] to give the signal as to the extent and the timing of any activity, since they trusted their judgment. He emphasized this feeling of responsibility he had in not engaging in any positive actions involving Bulgarians within the country until he had the prospect of the small and modest support outlined above as his minimum first step.

Following the establishment of regular and reliable communications on a businesslike basis through the employment of Bulgarians in behalf of their own national freedom activity, Dr. Dimitrov foresaw the second step arising in the restoration of “political discipline” among the quiescent and disorganized opposition forces in the country, which would be built around the peasants as the great political reality of the present and the future. He foresaw the need for organizing three distinct segments of the population, which would only touch in their activities most indirectly and on the basis of a stringent compartmentation of these groups into cells which, if uncovered by the Communist regime, would not disrupt the general activities of the political underground. The three population segments described by Dr. Dimitrov were (1) sympathizers who were able to operate legally because of their covers as ostensible full supporters of the present Communist regime; (2) the mass of discontented people who, since they represented the overwhelming majority of the country, were tolerated by the Government so long as they obeyed orders; and (3) the so-called illegal element presently in hiding because of their strong opposition to the regime, some of whom are engaged in limited partisan activity in the hills.

With the strengthening of political discipline and the continued organization of the opposition, Dr. Dimitrov expressed the hope that realistic factors would induce a slowly mounting volume of material aid to be made available to his Committee for its activities, which might include small arms, portable and powerful radio sets, and other materiel, extending eventually to plane drops of supplies.

When queried if, in his hypothetical planning to overthrow the present regime, he had fully taken into account the methods of the Communist police state which might prevent the unfolding of such an organized political underground, Dr. Dimitrov replied that he had. He had been engaged in such clandestine operations against autocratic Bulgarian governments for more than ten years and considered his supporters were just as alert as any Communist organized Bulgarian police, which within a reasonable time could be riddled with his own people. Dr. Dimitrov asserted that his movement could continue until it had a skeletal governmental organization underground and waiting to assume power.

On the question of how and when in his thinking he envisaged the overthrow of the present regime, Dr. Dimitrov replied that such an action would take place when a phase in the international situation [Page 282] had been reached that would make it doubtful whether the Red Army would actively intervene to save the present Communist Government through fear of precipitating a grave crisis with the US and its allies, thus making feasible external support of a nature justified by the circumstances to the Bulgarian democratic movement.

In a descent from theorizing upon the future, Dr. Dimitrov stated that the struggle of his democratic underground with the Communists was of such a life and death nature and the dangers to persons engaged were so great that the Bulgarian National Committee and its adherents within Bulgaria could not afford to have persons operating in Bulgaria using his and the Committee’s name unless they were fully accredited. Before any newcomer would be trusted, he asserted, the opposition within the country would first contact him and the Committee, since in his belief no sincere clandestine activity will be undertaken by those within Bulgaria unless he and the National Committee give the signal. Because of this, he is concerned over the consequences if agencies of foreign states seek to utilize Bulgarians clandestinely within the country unbeknownst to the Committee for purely intelligence matters, which he considers necessary but as a complement to the Committee’s great objective.

[
Roy M. Melbourne
]
  1. Dr. George M. Dimitrov, President of the Bulgarian National Committee and Secretary General of the International Peasant Union. Dr. Dimitrov, in exile from 1945, formerly was head of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. (Dr. Dimitrov is identified as George M. Dimitrov in these pages in order to distinguish him from Georgi Mihailov Dimitrov, Bulgarian Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party.)
  2. The reference here is to the European Movement which met in Brussels, February 25–28.
  3. The reference here is presumably to Melbourne’s memorandum of January 5 conversation with Dr. Dimitrov, not printed (874.00/1–549).