Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–949: Telegram

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia ( Jacobs ) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

Praha , April 9, 1949—midnight. ¹

518. Section one of two. For officers concerned Monday a. m. RefDeptel 436 and 437, April 8.²

Following is report of developments to date, with comments and suggestions on Hill–Jones case:

Realizing after despatch to Foreign Office my note 219 (third paragraph mytel 497³) that Foreign Minister Clementis was leaving for Sofia, I endeavored contact Foreign Office and was able call upon Deputy Hadju⁴ morning April 8, who had present Vinar, Foreign Office representative at interview of soldiers. I pointed out to them in no uncertain terms that interview clearly indicated such grievous miscarriage of justice that if full report thereof were ever released to American public, Czechoslovak-American relations would suffer serious impairment and that present efforts of at least certain segment of his government to improve such relations, especially in economic fields, would come to nought.

Hadju first tried weakly to belittle seriousness of case by saying men had confessed and that documents which they had signed read like “fairy tale” of espionage. I replied that we would like to read the fairy tale and that it was a “fairy tale”. Then he said soldiers could invoke clemency which may indicate Foreign Office thinking as regards way out but that way is unsatisfactory to us because request for clemency still implies guilt. Hadju said he would confer with Minister Justice on request for transcript and might have some news by Monday, April 11, but interjected that since Foreign Minister Clementis would be absent in Sofia for about ten days there might be delay.

I favor strong early action for following reasons: First, sooner or later we must take strong and firm action in connection with such abominable acts of satellite regimes. Second, in this particular case we have about as good a case as we could hope for since American people will be outraged at this travesty of justice and support strong action. Third, we just cannot afford in interest future US prestige and security of Americans in Czechoslovakia to allow these two soldiers to be treated in this manner without retaliation. Fourth, I fear that only strong action will accomplish desired results.

Before stating my recommendations wish to observe as follows:

Since Czechoslovakia is weak, if not weakest link in Iron Curtain, situation exists which it [we?] can continue to exploit to great advantage because of Czechoslovakia’s contiguous border with Bavaria, USSR must realize this and, if it has not with malice aforethought incited Czechoslovaks to perpetrate this travesty, would perhaps welcome such strong action on our part as would bring about rupture of diplomatic relations notwithstanding obvious economic harm which would ensue both to Czechoslovakia and to USSR. In view obvious advantage keeping toe hold in this weak link, we must weigh carefully retaliatory steps which we take and select those which are likely to harm us least. Accordingly, I agree with General Clay (Frankfurt’s 5, March 30, repeated Department 392⁵) that such steps should be confined primarily to those open to our military authorities in Germany since they are least likely to involve US and Czechoslovakia in retaliatory action toward one another.

When I suggested limited but immediate retaliation in mytel 432, March 29⁶ (on which General Clay commented in Frankfurt’s 5, March 30) I was speaking of sudden reflex action and not premeditated action which we are now considering. In case of former subsequent relaxation had to be envisaged; in case of latter, as General Clay correctly states, there can, or at least should be no relaxation until satisfaction is obtained.

In addition to stoppage international transit traffic, closure of border should include German-Czechoslovak traffic notwithstanding some possible damage to German economy. First, chief sufferers (remember for our soldiers) would be Belgium Netherlands and Denmark (and to less extent France), who could complain and accuse us of favoring German economy at expense of theirs. Second, USSR would not fail to observe this fact and seize opportunity to use it to great propaganda advantage, especially in France which is sensitive on this question and in Czechoslovakia where fear of resurgent Germany is a bugaboo to all Czechoslovaks, Communists and non-Communists alike. The USSR theme would be that such action is another indication of “indecent” solicitude for Germany.

Strong action is now necessary for a recently developed and growing reason. Since we have done nothing and true facts are not known in Czechoslovakia, public opinion here is crystallizing around Communist theme that soldiers are really guilty of serious espionage and that the US is engaged in vast espionage efforts in Czechoslovakia. At same time Czechoslovak public is beginning to fall for corollary Communist theme that, with USSR’s support, Czechoslovakia can do what it will with our nationals and we are powerless to prevent or to retaliate. Also along this same line of thought, I fear that if we do not take strong action soon, we shall not only lose prestige and support in Czechoslovakia but our own American public will, if full facts are revealed, become resentful and critical of failure to take effective measures.

Accordingly I shall see Deputy Hadju again and, as under instructions from my Government, leave with him aide-mémoire along lines directed in Deptel 436, April 8, which will lend strong support to what I have already told him since it will urge immediate deportation of soldiers and carries veiled threat that some action will be taken if soldiers are not released as aide-mémoire would contain quotation from Deptel 436: “Foreign Minister must realize that American Government can never countenance such miscarriage of justice involving American citizens.”⁷

If deportation of soldiers is not effected or some other satisfactory proposal advanced by Foreign Office within reasonable time (say two weeks—longer interval than I would recommend if Foreign Minister Clementis were not absent), I recommend following course of action:

1. On basis prearranged schedule, General Clay would take following action:

(a) Order cessation all passenger and freight traffic across Bavarian Czechoslovakian border. This order would include trains, trucks and barge traffic (if any). There should be no exceptions. In order however to make it really watertight, our authorities in Germany would also have to take measures to prevent diversion of Czechoslovak-bound or Czechoslovak-origin traffic across Austro-German border. Also if present blockade between Soviet-US zone and British-Soviet zone is not sufficient to prevent similar diversion across those borders, steps should be taken to seal US-Soviet border to Czechoslovak-bound or Czechoslovak-origin traffic and to seek British assistance in similarly sealing British-Soviet border.

(b) Order all Czechoslovak offices in American zone closed except one, either at Frankfurt or Heidelberg, which office should, however, not be permitted to increase its staff because of closing of others. Since British and French are not happy over treatment of military permit office here as result of military-case they might be persuaded similarly to close all Czechoslovak offices in their zones except one in each zone. Have recommended leaving one office open in thought Czechoslovakia might then permit allied military permit office here to remain open; if not, then all Czechoslovak offices in all three zones should be closed; and

(c) Release full record of interview with soldiers in order to produce favorable reaction to strong military government action.

2. In sphere of US-Czechoslovak relations, suggest following which should be kept separate from General Clay’s action on behalf military government;

(a) In response to press queries re Department’s attitude on action taken, Secretary should especially emphasize that it was military government action;

(b) At appropriate time inform all Czechoslovak representatives either in USA or here engaged in negotiating or attempting to negotiate more favorable economic arrangements with US that negotiations and discussions that subject must cease pending release of soldiers:

(c) Possibly Department may also wish to refer incident to UN, or mention it as example in satellite states of gross denial of basic human rights but do not recommend this step during initial stages. (Section two will follow early tomorrow.)

Section Two

I realize that foregoing recommendations are of drastic character which will either bring about release of soldiers or lead to completely new and difficult phase in US Czechoslovak relations notwithstanding fact that primary retaliatory action was that of Military Government. In order not to create, at least until that step becomes absolutely necessary, a face-saving situation from which Czechoslovakia would find it difficult to retreat, Department may consider it desirable for me, before retaliatory measures are imposed, to visit Foreign Minister Clementis upon his return and, without publicity, say that our patience and that of Military Government is exhausted and that Military Government will take drastic action (general nature of which I might reveal, to him) within say three to five days if men are not released within that interval.

In submitting my recommendations I have not been unmindful that one or more of following alternative steps might be taken: We could let border rest indefinitely in its present semi-closed status as result of Wildash case;⁸ refuse to discuss any assistance of economic nature to Czechoslovakia; tighten still further our control over exports to Czechoslovakia; refuse continue issuance of Consular invoices for Czech exports to USA (which might lead to closing Consulate General at Bratislava and curtailing Consular functions in Praha); refuse to return four Czech planes now in Germany mentioned Deptel 438, April 9.⁹ These planes are of little value to Czechoslovakia and our military authorities have declared themselves unwilling to withhold them for fear of retaliatory action by USSR against our planes making forced landings in Soviet Zone (re Heidelberg’s 15 to Praha repeated Department 29, Berlin 18⁹); and stop all Czech commercial and other air flights over US Zone with probable result immediate cancellation of Pan American’s flights to Praha and withdrawal our Air Attachés’ planes. Due obvious disadvantages and lack of immediate effectiveness of these measures I have not proposed them.

Sent Department 518; repeated Heidelberg 65, Berlin 63.

Jacobs

1. The second section of this telegram reached the Department of State on the morning of April 11 (Monday).
2. Telegram 436, April 8, to Praha, not printed, instructed Ambassador Jacobs to urge Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Clementis to arrange the immediate deportation of Hill and Jones (see the editorial note, supra), pointing out that Clementis must be aware that no grounds existed for the espionage charges against the two men and that the trial was a travesty of justice. Jacobs was further instructed to emphasize that the United States Government and public would never countenance so gross a miscarriage of justice involving American citizens and that a marked deterioration in American-Czechoslovak relations was bound to ensue (740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–649). Telegram 24, April 8, to Heidelberg, Germany (repeated as telegram 437 to Praha), not printed, instructed James W. Riddleberger, Acting United States Political Adviser for Germany, to discuss with General Lucius D. Clay, United States Military Governor for Germany and Commander in Chief, European Command, United States Army, steps other than the closing of the German-Czechoslovak border which might be undertaken in the event Czechoslovak authorities refused to grant the request for the deportation of Hill and Jones. Riddleberger was informed that the Department of State did not believe that steps should be taken “at this time” which might lead to a severance in diplomatic relations (740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–849).
3. In his telegram 497, April 6, from Praha, not printed, Ambassador Jacobs reported that he had that day sent a note to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry requesting a transcript of the testimony in the Hill–Jones trial and stating that pending its receipt the Embassy was reserving its position in the case (740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–649).
4. Vavro Hadjů, Czechoslovak Deputy Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs.
5. Not printed; in it General Clay recommended that American military authorities in Germany break off all relations with Czechoslovak representatives until satisfaction was obtained from the Czechoslovak Government Measures recommended by Clay included the prompt expulsion of all Czechoslovak officials from the American zone of occupation and the immediate closing of the frontier with Czechoslovakia to international transit traffic (740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–3049).
6. Not printed; in it Jacobs had recommended the immediate but temporary complete closure of the Bavarian-Czechoslovak border to all rail and highway traffic as a method of emphasizing American refusal to condone the treatment of Hill and Jones (740.00119 Control (Germany)/3–2949).
7. In his telegram 523, April 11, from Praha, not printed, Ambassador Jacobs reported that he had seen Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister Hajdů at noon that day and had stressed particularly that the United States Government desired a copy of the Hill–Jones trial transcript and the release of the soldiers by deportation. Jacobs further stressed that the United States Government considered the trial a travesty of justice which it would not countenance. Hajdů appeared alarmed at the strong position taken (740.00119 Control (Germany)/4–1149).
8. On March 22, 1949, Cap. Philip Wildash, a British officer in the Combined Military Permit Office in Praha (an agency of the American-British-French Combined Travel Board in Germany which administered the issuance of travel permits for visitors to the Western zones of occupation of Germany) and a British vice consul, was arrested and interrogated by Czechoslovak police on charges of anti-state activity. Wildash was subsequently obliged to leave Czechoslovakia within 24 hours. Several Czechoslovak employees of the Military Permit Office were also arrested. British Embassy officials were convinced that the charges against Wildash were unfounded. In reaction to the arbitrary arrest and expulsion of Wildash, American, British, and French authorities agreed to the temporary closure of the Military Permit Office in Praha and the cancellation of outstanding permits issued by the Office. Certain categories of persons would not be affected, such as holders of diplomatic passports, bona fide emigrants, and nationals of Western countries. Negotiations continued through April and May between the American, British, and French Ambassadors in Praha and the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry regarding the terms for the full resumption of operations by the Military Permit Office in Praha. Terms were finally agreed upon and set forth in an exchange of notes between the three Ambassadors and Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Clementis on June 30–July 1. In exchange for the resumption of the issuance of travel permits, Clementis confirmed that the personnel and premises of the Military Permit Office enjoyed immunities and privileges equivalent to those enjoyed by a foreign consular office. Documentation on the Wildash case and its consequences is in files 740.00119 Control (Germany) and 862.111.
9. Not printed.
9. Not printed.