Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.60f/12–1549

Department of State Policy Statement¹

secret

[Washington,] December 15, 1949.

Czechoslovakia

a. objectives

The US seeks in cooperation with the other democracies the liberation of the Czechoslovak people from Soviet-Communist rule. The long-range goal is the deliverance of the country from any form of internal dictatorship or external control, making possible the restoration of an independent national existence whereby the Czechs and Slovaks may freely determine by orderly processes their own institutions, development and relation to each other. It is our purpose at the same time to promote the revival of natural ties in the political, economic and cultural fields between a free Czechoslovak people and the western community. We look forward ultimately to the full participation on an equal footing of a free and independent Czechoslovakia in the organization of a European union.

Among our more immediate objectives is the endeavor to weaken in any way we can the position of the Communist regime and, specifically, to limit the development of Czechoslovakia’s economic and military potential. It is considered important to increase popular discontent with the existing rule and to strengthen the spirit of hope and resistance through repeated evidences of continuing American interest in the future of this part of Europe. We would attempt to foster the growth of nationalist opposition to ruinous Soviet impositions, extending appropriate support as an interim step to any independent national Communist government that might emerge. Regardless of the duration of the present government our hope is to preserve the friendly relationship between the American and Czechoslovak peoples existing since the establishment of the Republic.

b. policies

Our policies have been adapted to the fact that the Communists have progressed a long way toward transforming a country of advanced economic and technical development, with full experience in parliamentary democracy, into a de facto component of the USSR. This typical police state, acting as a dutiful Soviet puppet in close association with the other Cominform members, conducts psychological and diplomatic warfare against the western democracies and above all against the US. During the past year the Communists have tightened their control over the population through ruthless repression and terror. They have extended domination over all organizations of more than local importance capable of resistance, with the exception of the Catholic Church, with which they are now engaged in a bitter conflict.

1. Political

Current policy has three major aspects, having regard to three distinct elements in the Czechoslovak situation: the present Communist regime, the Czechoslovak people, and the political emigration.

A primary consideration with regard to the regime is continuance of a diplomatic mission at Prague in spite of the fundamental antagonism between the two governments. Considerable importance is attached to the operations of the mission as a means of encouragement to the Czechoslovak people and of acquisition of information on developments within the curtain area. Consequently we endeavor, without giving the impression of approval of the regime or its policies, to avoid any activities which might interfere with the maintenance of correct diplomatic relations. The US has expressed or implied condemnation of the regime through diplomatic notes protesting its specific acts, through release of public statements by the Secretary censuring the abrogation of fundamental freedoms, through our public position on various issues in the UN and its subsidiary organizations, and through programs of the Voice of America. The Embassy’s dealings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the past year have been largely concerned with US efforts to obtain release of a number of American citizens from unwarranted detention on charges of espionage and anti-state activity.

Manifestations of our policy as they are directed toward the Czechoslovak people are intended to sustain the spirit of the non-Communist forces in the country, yet to avoid inciting overt acts which would expose the resistance to reprisal and increased repression. The popular attitude at this time is generally one of friendliness toward the US and attachment to free institutions. The great majority of the public refuses to accept Communism either as a body of doctrine or a system of government. The problem is how to maintain and strengthen this attitude when the means of extending assistance are limited by the existing circumstances and the population is subject to the effects of coercion and systematic Communist indoctrination from the cradle to the grave. One principal aim is to counter tendencies toward apathy and resignation—the conclusion that the Czechoslovak people have been written off by the free nations and that the situation in this area of Europe is inalterable, obliging everyone to make his peace with the regime as best he can.

In counteracting Communist influences, we place dependence primarily on the US information program, the Embassy, and the visits of Americans. In order to keep alive the natural aspirations of the Czechoslovak people to democratic institutions and national independence, we attempt through the information services to present the facts and significance of the developments in Czechoslovakia and other countries as well as the basic principles of US policy, to illustrate the friendly feeling of the American for the Czechoslovak people in contrast to our attitude toward the Communist regime, and to report the activities of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and news of individual representatives of Czechoslovak democracy in exile.

Any possibility of a nationalist movement against the top Communist leadership is fostered largely through the voice of America. Our psychological offensive toward this end stresses the fact that efforts to integrate Czechoslovakia with the Soviet bloc spell economic and cultural retrogression for a state which belongs by tradition to the west. It appeals to agrarian individualism against steps in the direction of collectivization and to the urge for religious freedom against anti-Church actions. Attention is repeatedly drawn to the incompatibility of the present authoritarian state and the high standards of humanism—of freedom arid probity—on which the Republic of Masaryk was founded.

Because of the importance attributed to visits of US citizens to Czechoslovakia as ambassadors of American democracy preserving contact between the two peoples, we assist travel unless it appears to be for a political purpose contrary to our interests. The Communist Government has not so far obstructed the entry of American citizens on a considerable scale. although it denies visas in specific cases for publicists conspicuously unfriendly to the Communist order and discourages the stay of foreigners with extensive contacts or expels those who have resided in the country for a long time. Since the avowed purpose of the entire educational system is to produce devoted supporters of the regime, we oppose the use of public funds for educational activities of American students and teachers in Czechoslovak institutions. We approve the relief and welfare activities of US voluntary agencies in Czechoslovakia so long as they remain free to conduct their operations without interference or Communist exploitation of the aid.

Our policy toward the political emigration is to assist in every possible way the relief and other activities of the refugee leaders. With our encouragement they worked to form an organization designed to achieve the greatest possible unity among the democratic forces in exile and with the nation at home. Representatives of the London and Paris exiles and refugees in the US finally established the Council of Free Czechoslovakia at a conference in Washington in February 1949.² In addition to serving as a directing center for those dedicated to the freedom of their country, it seeks in the welfare field to organize relief for the refugees and their early resettlement in the western democracies. The Council, having its headquarters in Washington, includes an Assembly limited to 180 representatives of Czechoslovak public life, but functions principally through an Executive Board of 12 members with regional boards in London and Paris. The President is Dr. Petr Zenkl, former Deputy Prime Minister from the National Socialist Party.

The problem raised by the mass flight of Czechoslovak political emigrants to the US zone of Germany remains acute in spite of IRO care during the past year. The Displaced Persons Act contains a special provision allowing 2000 Czechoslovak nationals who had fled to Italy and the American, British, and French areas of Austria and Germany to be admitted to the US, but since by June 1949 only 233 applications for visas had been processed, this provision has accomplished little. The Act applies only to persons who arrived in those areas before June 25, 1948, but we are supporting amendment that would extend its benefits to selected persons who escaped after that date.

Since our objective is to preserve and strengthen the friendly feeling of the Czechoslovak people for this country, we do not approve any step altering the pre-Munich frontiers unless it is freely negotiated by, or mutually acceptable to, representative governments of the states concerned. The scope of territorial questions has been reduced since the Paris Conference in 1946, because claims for rectification of the Austrian and German frontiers are no longer actively pressed and because, through the Hungarian peace treaty, a small district near Bratislava has been ceded to Czechoslovakia.³ There are three dormant issues of concern to the US: the final status of the Carpatho-Ukraine, lost through the imposed treaty with the USSR of June 29, 1945; possible transfer under Soviet demand of Czechoslovak Teschen to Poland as compensation for any territory beyond the Oder-Neisse line that may be returned to Germany; and a solution of the Sudeten German problem involving possible compensation to the transferred Sudeten population for property losses or partial resettlement of this group in Czechoslovakia. Our best course at the present time with respect to these issues is to capitalize on any Soviet action adverse to the permanent interest of the Czechoslovak people by giving it publicity in the US information program.

Its reduction to a complete satellite has widened our previously existing differences with Czechoslovakia in the United Nations. While carefully avoiding any step that would place us in the position of a leading proponent in the Czechoslovak case before the SC following the February coup, we supported an inquiry in connection with the charges brought on the initiative of the Chilean Government, sponsored an invitation to Czechoslovakia to participate in the Council discussion, and backed efforts, vetoed by the Soviet representative, to have the Council obtain facts on the charges.⁴ Vladimir Houdek, the new permanent delegate to the UN, has undeviatingly adhered to the Soviet line, but the Czechoslovak delegation is less aggressive and vituperative than that of the other satellites. Without neglecting opportunities for propaganda against the US, the Czechoslovak delegates show a disposition to pay somewhat more attention to technical considerations and national interest in the economic and social agencies, where they are fairly able and, with some exceptions, comparatively business-like. In the ECE they have been active and reasonably cooperative in those technical committees which the Russians do not attend.

2. Economic

The fundamental basis of policy toward Czechoslovak economic matters derives from the broad US objective of assisting the economic reconstruction of the western democracies while seeking to restrict the growth of war potential in the countries under Soviet domination.⁵ Account is taken of the rapid progress in the sovietization of the Czechoslovak economy and reorientation in foreign trade toward the eastern European countries.

Accordingly, US exports to Czechoslovakia are restricted under the “R Country” export licensing procedure in so far as they might contribute significantly to the war potential of the Soviet bloc or prevent fulfillment of the prior needs of the OEEC countries. We also try through ECA negotiations to obtain the agreement of the OEEC countries for parallel action in regard to controls on exports to eastern Europe including Czechoslovakia. Although recognizing the contribution of east-west trade to the economic development of the Soviet bloc, the US approves an expansion of trade with Czechoslovakia which benefits the economies of the western democracies and at the same time conforms to our security interests. In general, US commercial policy toward Czechoslovakia will remain consistent with the principles and objective of GATT and the Havana Charter for an international trade organization, both of which Czechoslovakia has signed.

Czechoslovakia has complained directly to us and in international forums that US export controls are discriminatory, charging at Annecy that the controls violate the general most-favored-nation clause of GATT. The US reply placed the controls squarely within the security exceptions provided in the Agreement. The assembled contracting parties, by a vote of 17 to 1, decided that the US had not failed, through its administration of export licenses, to comply with its obligations under GATT. The US therefore does not face any problem with Czechoslovakia of export restrictions conflicting with the provisions of a formal commercial agreement. As at Annecy, we will make clear in future discussions in international meetings that US export controls are not aggressive or provocative in intent, but are a response to Czechoslovak policies inimical to our national security interests. This position implies that in the event of the emergence of an independent regime, US export controls might be relaxed to encourage the ultimate success of the development.

Since the suspension in September 1946 of further deliveries under a surplus property line of credit amounting to $50 million, after Czechoslovakia had utilized about $7.6 million, no US public agency has extended financial assistance to that country. As of May 31, 1949, Czechoslovakia had repaid about $19.5 million of the outstanding principal of a $20 million cotton credit received from the Export-Import Bank in May 1946. In the fall of 1948 and again early this year Czechoslovak representatives raised the question of a new US Government cotton credit. These approaches were not encouraged, although, in line with our traditional policy of non-interference with private commercial transactions, we would take no position regarding a private cotton credit through American exporters or banks. An Export-Import Bank cotton credit, however, we feel could only be justified by a substantial quid pro quo to the US or the OEEC countries, regardless of considerations of maintaining the Czechoslovak market for American cotton.

Having examined the findings of the Timber Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe, the International Bank has under consideration a timber credit to a number of timber-producing countries, including Czechoslovakia. Because of the importance of additional timber supplies to western Europe, we made no objection to this credit.

After previous private and inter-governmental approaches, negotiations were opened in Washington in April for the settlement of the claims of American nationals for the loss of property through nationalization and other takings. They were recessed after three plenary sessions in order to enable the Czechoslovak representatives, following the defection of their most experienced technical expert, to assemble new information. The Czechoslovak Government subsequently agreed to resume negotiations in September only to cancel plans at the last moment. Notwithstanding an estimate of the claims at $80 million, present conditions oblige us to seek an agreement calling for the payment of $35 million for distribution by a US claims commission to be established for the adjudication of claims relating to Yugoslavia. Circumstances might even warrant the acceptance of a minimum figure of $25 million. We shall press for a solution of this issue, but cannot agree to the position of the Czechoslovak negotiators that a settlement depends on favorable US action on export license applications and financial assistance.

In the financial field we continue generally to cut down US government dollar expenditures in Czechoslovakia. Every effort is made to cooperate with the Department of the Army in the attempt to expend approximately $1.1 million worth of crowns under existing agreements with the Czechoslovak Government which provide that payment for current procurement in Czechoslovakia should be 25 percent from the Army’s crown holdings and 75 percent in dollars. The operating expenses of the US Mission at Prague are being covered with crowns drawn under the local currency option provision of the Surplus Property Credit Agreement.

We press for the widest possible adoption among the western democracies of our aviation policy to restrict the civil air operations of the USSR and the satellite states until air rights can be obtained from them on a reciprocal basis.⁶ The US does not intend to cancel its air transport agreement with Czechoslovakia of January 3, 1946, particularly since the operations of the Pan-American line to Prague serve the interests of our policy toward that country. Necessary steps are taken, however, to prevent the further exercise of Czechoslovak rights under this agreement, including denial to Czechoslovakia of a permit to operate a trans-Atlantic service to the US. Attention has centered during the past year on efforts to withhold planes and parts to Czechoslovakia from western countries and to contain Czechoslovak air expansion in the Near and Middle East.

c. relations with other states

Policy concerning Czechoslovakia depends under the present international situation on its relation to the USSR and the Cominform. As a Communist police state on the Soviet pattern, Czechoslovakia is ruled by a small group of Moscow-trained servants of the Kremlin. This inner circle receives the unqualified support of the hard core of Communist faithful comprising about a half-million and operates through a total party membership (including candidates) of some 2.3 million, proportionately the largest of all Communist parties. The firm Soviet control rests on the unswerving loyalty of the top Communist leadership, the ever-present possibility of armed intervention from contiguous areas and a structure of bilateral agreements. The trade agreements produce an eastern reorientation of trade which renders Czechoslovakia dependent on the USSR for certain supplies and raw materials. The force of these factors is strengthened by the absence of a basic national antagonism toward Russia, in contrast to the attitude of the Polish people, and by the long-standing appeal of Pan-Slavism for the Czechs and Slovaks. The historical tendency of the people to avoid active opposition to alien rule and apprehension over the signs of German revival facilitate domination by Moscow. Soviet control is exerted through the Cominform, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, the Soviet Embassy and MVD center at Prague, non-Russian Stalinist agents within the state administration, and informal contacts between party officials of both countries.

As an integral dependency in the eastern European system, Czechoslovakia constitutes an important asset for the Soviet Union, providing a strategic salient to the west and, along with Poland, an arsenal of heavy industry. The USSR exploits apparently without compensation the uranium deposits of the western areas. Owing to the position of Prague as a window on the west, it is used by the Kremlin for international conferences of front organizations and for the transmission of instructions to Communists in foreign countries.

The immediate Soviet purpose is to keep Czechoslovakia in a predominantly bilateral relationship with the USSR and with each of the satellites by which its indentured economy can be drained for Soviet benefit. This is accomplished through a system of trading arrangements requiring Czechoslovakia to furnish heavy industry products and low-grade mass consumption goods in return for non-essential items and raw materials of inadequate amount and inferior quality. Prevented from exporting essential products to the west and unable to market any considerable quantity of high-quality luxury products in the west, Czechoslovakia suffers from a chronic scarcity of foreign exchange and raw materials and from never-ending industrial maladjustments. At the same time Soviet requirements oblige it under the Five Year Program to scrape up capital from its own resources, without credits from the west, for the further expansion of heavy industry. Soviet financial aid does not go beyond what is necessary to assist the Czechoslovak economy for purposes of continued Soviet exploitation. The resulting situation inevitably depresses the Standard of living downward toward the Soviet level.

In the continued imposition of Soviet-Communist rule, Moscow encounters as its chief problem a set of conditions—economic difficulties, religious resentment, deterioration of national standards—which provide the basis for a nationalist opposition extending from the dispossessed groups as a center. The intensification of these conditions may ultimately force a modification in the relationship between Czechoslovakia and the USSR in the direction of more overt and formal control. The state is already subject to certain multilateral tendencies in the Soviet bloc such as the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, which seems to play some part in the rationalization of the satellite economies in relation to Soviet demands, and the triangular trade agreement concluded on June 29 of this year with the USSR and Finland.

[Here follows a review of Czechoslovakia’s political, economic, and cultural relations with other nations in the Communist bloc and with the United Kingdom and France and her policies toward Germany, the Vatican, and the Near and Middle East.]

d. policy evaluation

Steps to achieve the ultimate deliverance of Czechoslovakia from the existing totalitarian tyranny necessarily constitute only one part of the larger struggle against Soviet-Communist imperialism. Success in this specific theater therefore depends on, and keeps pace with, the success attained in the general effort to contain Soviet power while strengthening the position of the west. Such developments as Western Union, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the airlift to Berlin obviously caused the Communist regime anxiety and braced the democratic forces both inside Czechoslovakia and abroad. On the other hand, the Communists have seized on the recent evidences of lowered economic activity in the US and UK in propagandist justification of their doctrine and policies.

Within Czechoslovakia both US official agencies and private persons are subject to numerous restrictions. The friendly attitude of the people as a whole does not eliminate the need for Embassy personnel to limit their contacts with individuals for security reasons or for fear of exciting police suspicion against them. Since the expulsion of two assistant attaches and the arrest of a clerk in October of this year, it has been necessary for Embassy personnel to exercise increased caution in dealing with the local population lest the Czechoslovak Government formally accuse members of the staff of espionage. The Embassy, distracted by persistent attempts of the secret police to penetrate its security, must exercise constant vigilance in counter-measures. The extent of activity permitted the information services can be attributed to the risk of reprisals against its publications in the US which the regime would incur if it attempted prohibitive restraints.

We have found a reluctance to accede to our representations unless retaliation or the threat of retaliation is invoked. On the basis of recent experiences we should in the future rely on the principle of retaliation and reciprocal treatment whenever it appears advisable to reenforce our representations with stronger pressure.

Our public statements expressing from time to time the US Government and people’s condemnation of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms will not deter the Communist rulers. But these condemnations do indicate for the record that we hold the regime accountable, continue to regard its actions as a matter of concern, and will never permit the mere passage of time to endow the regime with international respectability. In the absence of treaty obligations like those in the peace treaties with Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, we find it impossible to follow the procedure adopted in connection with the Balkan countries. It is doubtful at this time that a useful purpose would be served by any move to initiate UN action against the present Government for deprivation of fundamental freedoms.

By our economic policy we exert a continuing pressure on the Communist Government. Because of its higher industrial development, Czechoslovakia has proved more vulnerable than any other member of the Soviet bloc to the effects of US export controls and the priorities accorded OEEC countries for goods in short supply. Its industries are thereby denied, or forced to procure through clandestine channels at premium prices, strategic raw materials, replacements for obsolescent equipment and capital goods essential to reconstruction under the Five Year Plan. These effects combine with the economic drain on Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union, the lack of external financial assistance, and unsettlement incident to the Communist coup and Sovietization of institutions to cause the Communist rulers grave economic problems. All of these factors contribute to depress the standard of living and render improbable fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. While these economic developments have not produced a critical situation from the standpoint of Communist retention of power, it forces increasing impositions on the working population and helps to continue the inability of the regime to win acceptance by the public.

The revision of US policy toward Yugoslavia to help assure the continuance of the Tito regime further adds to the difficulties of the Czechoslovak Government.⁷ To the extent that the Tito Government can continue its successful defiance of Moscow and achieve its economic viability and independence, its example will exert a strong influence on the democratic elements inside Czechoslovakia. At this time, however, possibly less evidence of nationalist deviation appears among the well-disciplined Communist leadership than in any other satellite state. In time, under favorable circumstances, forces of nationalist disaffection might cause a cleavage between the inner circle and the balance of the Party ending in the isolation of the former and the assertion of deviationist sentiment.

Insofar as the people are concerned a reservoir of discontent has accumulated since the coup. It is fed by the economic and cultural retrogression experienced under Communist government and by Soviet disregard of Czechoslovak national interests. The attack on religious freedom and the shadow of collectivization over the land give impetus to the forces of dissatisfaction. These feelings are translated into limited opposition activities, such as sporadic sabotage, physical resistance to the police, and several ill-starred plots. An underground exists in the form of numerous local groups. The spirit of resistance tends to increase as the organization of the western democracies develops and they follow more forceful policies. This relationship was demonstrated by the intensified opposition activities at the lifting of the Berlin blockade last May.

The resistance, both active and potential, also finds encouragement in our irreconcilable attitude toward Communist repression reflected in official public statements and Voice of America programs. Of all the US information media, the VOA is proving the most effective avenue to the Czechoslovak public, and, assuming no active interference with reception, it will take on increasing importance in our psychological campaign as the regime imposes new restrictions on other activities in this field. The improvement attained during the past year is suggested by the mounting bitterness of Communist press attacks on the programs and growing evidence that the VOA may be winning over the BBC in popularity, thanks to timely broadcasts, speedy interpretation of the news, and a bolder approach. The Embassy continues to play an indispensable role as a symbol of the deep bonds of friendship between the Czechoslovak and American peoples despite the existing regime and of the power of the democracies to assist in the ultimate liberation of the country. This was evident in May, when about 40,000 letters were addressed to the Embassy appealing for the holding of free elections under UN auspices.

Progress in the refugee field has been confined largely to the formation of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia and its activities in the leadership of Czechoslovak democracy abroad. It is unfortunate that this organization has not won the support of all Slovak exiles and of those Slovak Americans, who, in devotion to Slovak separatism, refuse to see the possibilities inherent in the Council. The Council is regarded favorably by most Czech groups in the US and is making contact with other organizations and individuals. The establishment of the National Committee for a Free Europe marks a significant advance in facilitating the activities of the Council, which is now receiving the assistance of the Committee in undertaking the publication of an information bulletin and in planning for broadcasts on a private basis to the Czechoslovak people.⁸

While the Council may not become a government-in-exile so long as we maintain diplomatic relations with the Communist regime, it serves at the present time as a useful instrument of our policy, preserving an overt organizational form for Czechoslovak democracy which renews the faith of the Czechoslovak people in their future, and it cooperates closely with us. It affords a tangible means of preserving the cordial feelings for the US of the Czechoslovak nation and remains ready to assume a new character and new duties as developments permit.

Treatment of the refugee problem has suffered not only from slowness in accepting any considerable number of refugees in the US, but also from lack of assistance in obtaining employment for them suitable to their training and experience. The former difficulty arises from the inadequacies of the Displaced Persons Act and delays in its execution. It is hoped that the problem of employment will be solved through the National Committee for a Free Europe, which is now taking initial steps in this direction.

So far as we are successful in maintaining the friendship and good will of the democratic forces abroad as at home, we will be able to renew the sympathetic relationship between the two countries and our influence in this area in the event of the liberation of Czechoslovakia. The possibility of the separation of Czechoslovakia from Moscow Communism and reintegration into the western community will be brought nearer as western Europe acquires sufficient political unity, economic vitality, and military strength to be a counterweight to the Soviet Union. The fulfillment of our ultimate objective toward Czechoslovakia closely depends therefore on the extent to which the US achieves the goals of its foreign policy as a whole.

1. Regarding the nature and scope of Department of State Policy Statements, see footnote 1 to the Policy Statement on Bulgaria, July 1, 1949, p. 332.
2. Regarding the establishment of a Council of Free Czechoslovakia, see telegram 296, January 27, to London, p. 277, and annotations thereto.
3. Documentation on the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 is presented in Foreign Relations, 1946, volumes iii and iv .
4. For documentation on the attitude of the United States with respect to the Czechoslovak governmental crisis of February 1948 and its aftermath, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, pp. 733 ff.
5. For documentation on United States policy on trade with Eastern Europe, see pp. 61 ff.
6. For documentation regarding the civil aviation policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see pp. 184 ff.
7. For documentation on the attitude of the United States toward the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Cominform and American efforts to provide economic assistance to Yugoslavia, see pp. 854 ff.
8. Regarding the establishment of the National Committee for a Free Europe on June 1, 1949, see the circular airgram of June 21, p. 289.