Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.61/1–3149: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

secret
niact
urgent

Moscow, January 31, 1949—6 p. m.

242. Re Embtel 233, January 30. In talks with western colleagues, have found unanimous agreement Soviet Foreign Office blast against Atlantic Fact and Oslo démarche indicates Kremlin hard-hit by unexpectedly rapid development Atlantic Pact and other effective defense measures non-Communist world against Soviet aggression. All agree Stalin replies to INS smoke-screen to cover “practical ultimatum” to Norway (and indirectly Denmark and Sweden), in accord Soviet technique of confusion and deception ably analyzed by “Historicus” article.¹

Re Stalin’s replies, it must be remembered submission questions to Stalin, both by letters from Moscow correspondents and cables from abroad, is regular insidious journalistic practice. One out of hundred answered, when it suits Kremlin purposes, and convenient supply thus always at hand. Replies sometimes omit, remodel or combine correspondents’ questions. While questions usually phrased tendentiously to evoke answer by serving Soviet interests, some further light might be cast on Stalin’s intent if Department or Paris could compare exact text Kingsbury-Smith original communication.² Radio reports indicate apparent mistranslation or distortion to effect Stalin “ready meet President any time, any where” or at “any mutually agreeable place” (as fourth question actually phrased). Published official text Stalin’s reply specifically, deliberately restricted to “as I have declared earlier, there are no objections to a meeting”.

Whole thing tactical maneuver on journalistic level constituting part propaganda campaign designed capture initiative for Kremlin. We think opportunity presented for positive effective answer on same level possibly at early presidential press conference. In our view approach should be positive, rather than defensive, and put baby back in Stalin’s lap where it belongs. Occasion might be taken not only reiterate President’s readiness see Stalin in Washington any time but even to add willingness meet him any mutually agreeable place after demonstration satisfactory to our allies and ourselves Kremlin ready abandon its policy hostility and aggression and really cooperate, in acts rather than words, in building peaceful world.³

In elaboration, might be pointed out Stalin’s declarations pose many questions regarding bona fides Soviet intentions. Does Stalin really want to talk peace while Soviet blockade Berlin takes lives of British and American airmen? Does he really believe a non-war declaration would have any meaning without settlement underlying issues? Is Stalin ready, to mention only few examples, to:

(1) Reverse Soviet Government’s avowed goal of wrecking West European reconstruction?

(2) Permit effective inspection in Soviet Union essential to atomic control and any real disarmament?

(3) Accept and help carry out UN decisions on Balkans, on Korea, and “Little Assembly,” heretofore flaunted by Soviet bloc?

(4) Open his hermetically-sealed country, grant his people Four Freedoms and allow them enjoy normal relationships with other peoples?

(5) Renounce goal of Communist world daily trumpeted in Soviet press?

Sent Department 242, London 26, Paris 38; Department pass Oslo as 11.

Kohler

1. Historicus, “Stalin on Revolution,” Foreign Affairs (New York), vol. xxvii, no. 2 (January 1949), pp. 175–214. (This article was reprinted under the author’s own name, George Allen Morgan, in the book edited by Philip E. Mosely, The Soviet Union, 1922–1962: a Foreign Affairs Reader (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., publisher, 1963), pp. 215–255. At the time of the original publication, Mr. Morgan had been First Secretary of Embassy and Consul at Moscow since May 1948.)
2. The Department of State itself speculated whether the whole story might have been arranged in Moscow without the participation of Kingsbury Smith. In telegram 275 to Paris, repeated to Moscow as telegram 47, on January 31, it stated that “Questions answered by Stalin through INS read as if had been drafted by Soviets” and requested that the endeavor should be made “discreetly [to] get full account”. (711.61/1–3149) On the next day Ambassador Caffery replied from Paris in telegram 420 that Kingsbury Smith had said that “he hoped that ‘questions and answers would help clear smoke rising from Soviet peace drive’” and that there was “no reason to doubt Smith’s story”. (711.61/2–149) Specifically in telegram 436 from Paris on February 2, Ambassador Caffery stated that “Kingsbury Smith has informed us that wording of questions he submitted to Stalin was unchanged and that four questions as published were only ones he submitted.” (711.61/2–249)
3. Secretary of State Acheson made remarks about Stalin’s answers to Kingsbury Smith at his press conference on February 2. For the text of his comments, see Department of State Bulletin, February 13, 1949, pp. 192–194. President Truman had been asked questions about a possible meeting with Stalin at his news conferences of January 13 and February 3, to which he had made brief replies. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. 98, 129.