711.61/2–949

Memorandum by Mr. John Patterson, Assistant Chief in Charge of the Analysis Branch, Division of Public Studies, Office of Public Affairs1

The following are the salient aspects of heavy discussion in the American press and radio during the past 9 or 10 days:

1.
The strongest and widest reaction to Stalin’s “peace move” in his replies to Kingsbury Smith has been deep skepticism as to the motives of the Soviet leader. Observers, noting the continuance of Moscow’s obstructive and unfriendly actions in the recent past as well as over the past three years, have indicated faint hope that Stalin is ready to reach any agreement on terms that we could accept.
2.
It is widely suspected that Stalin’s words had two main objectives: (1), to obtain a propaganda advantage by demonstrating that Russia wants “peace” and that we do not; and (2), to weaken and divert the US and like-minded nations from pursuing such policies as the North Atlantic Pact, by raising false expectation of reaching an understanding with Russia.
3.
Accordingly, a common reaction has been to assert that Russia must show “by deeds, not words” her sincerity in seeking an understanding. Observers point to the Berlin blockade, to Greece, to the ECA programs in Europe and to the CFM and UN as areas where Russia might show whether she means business.
4.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there has been manifested a [Page 568] strong belief that the “slight crack in the door” opened by Stalin’s words should not be shut entirely. There is evident a widespread feeling that an agreement with Russia is so important that any possibility of obtaining one should be explored, no matter how faint the hope is.
5.
Secretary Acheson’s press conference statement was very well received and considered an effective answer to the Stalin overtures. The specific points which the Secretary made were convincing to most commentators, particularly the point that the problems at stake are not bilateral in character.
6.
Nevertheless, a significant number criticized Secretary Acheson’s presentation, as too “chilly”, “glib”, “ironical”, “sarcastic”. Some of these critics reflected a belief that the Secretary should have indicated more clearly this Government’s readiness to seize any reasonable opportunity to reach a settlement with Russia.2
7.
Also, in response to President Truman’s reference to Stalin coming to Washington, there is apparent considerable feeling to the effect that the President should not insist on Washington as a meeting-place, should a meeting seem desirable. People say that the matter is so important that we can well afford to go more than half-way.
8.
Finally, there clearly appears to be a residuum of sentiment that this Government ought to respond more positively to “peace” gestures like the recent one, even if they may be only “phonies”. It is probable that many are unable to understand what can possibly be lost by taking advantage of such gestures. It should also be noted, however, that parallel to this sentiment—and shared in common with it—is a strong feeling that the Government must not make any more “concessions” to Russia.

  1. Transmitted on the following day by Mr. S. Shepard Jones, Chief of the Division of Public Studies to Mr. Bromley K. Smith, the Assistant Director of the Executive Secretariat, as of possible interest to the Secretary and Under Secretary of State.
  2. Considerable reaction in the press of the Soviet Union to criticisms in the United States of the “negation [of] direct Soviet American talks” was mentioned in telegram 315 from the Embassy in Moscow on February 9. (711.61/2–949)