861.85/6–2049
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State
| Participants: | The Acting Secretary, Mr. Webb |
| Assistant Secretary, Mr. Thorp | |
| Deputy Director for European Affairs, Mr. Thompson | |
| The Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Panyushkin |
The Ambassador came in at my request to continue our discussion on the return of certain vessels under the Lend Lease Settlement. After outlining the position regarding our request for the return of the three icebreakers and twenty-eight frigates under Article 5 of the Lend Lease Agreement, I said I saw no basis for connecting our request that the Soviet Government honor this specific obligation with the overall Lend Lease Settlement. I said I felt obliged to take the view that failure of the Soviet Government to comply with our request would constitute default on this specific agreement.
The Ambassador pointed out that he had drawn to our attention the fact that the Soviet Government was awaiting a reply to its note of December 9. In its December note, the Soviet Government had expressed the view that the United States Government interpreted Article 5 too broadly. In a United States note which, to the best of his recollection, was dated September 1948,1 the United States Government had stated that it did not matter what disposition was made of these naval vessels. He said that Article 5 provided that there should be no discrimination and that the Lend Lease Settlement should be made for the mutual benefit of both governments and that the Soviet Government was not indifferent to what use these returned military goods would be put.
[Page 707]I then showed the Ambassador the text of Article 5 and pointed out that the language of this Article was clear.
The Ambassador countered by saying that the Article provided for the return of these items if they were of use to the United States for the defense of the United States or for the Western Hemisphere.
I replied by pointing out that these words were followed by the words “or for other use.”
The Ambassador again observed that our September Note contained a broad interpretation of Article 5.
Mr. Thorp said he did not understand what had happened as he and the Ambassador had agreed months ago that the icebreakers be returned, and the Ambassador had agreed to appoint experts. The icebreakers had nothing to do with the national defense.
The Ambassador said that on May 25, Mr. Webb had handed him a note in regard to three icebreakers and twenty-eight frigates and he had promised to inform his Government. This had been done but he had not received any reply. However, he had been instructed to say he was awaiting a reply to the Soviet Government’s note of December. The Soviet Government had not withdrawn its agreement to the return of the three icebreakers and the twenty-eight frigates.
Mr. Thorp referred to the fact that when arrangements had been made for the return of the tankers, the experts had been designated almost immediately. In the present case, there was a delay of months.
The Ambassador referred to the long delay in our reply to its note of December 9.
I stated that the position of this Government was that the question of the return of the three icebreakers and the twenty-eight frigates was a matter which we regarded as a clear and specific obligation. There were a number of matters in the note of December 9, some on which I was sure we could reach agreement, but if the Soviet Government was not prepared to carry out its specific obligation to return these vessels, I did not see how we could go forward with the discussions. We were coming to the conclusion that the Soviet Government did not intend to go forward in good faith, but were in effect in a situation which would constitute default on an engagement, and I pointed out that would be very unfortunate from the standpoint of our two governments.
The Ambassador said he was not trying to delay; the matter was being studied. On the other hand, he thought the United States Government was delaying with regard to the settlement by not replying to the Soviet Note of December 9.
I said we were anxious to proceed with the overall settlement. We had supplied to the Soviet Union under Lend Lease a vast amount of material and carried out our obligations under Article 5. We had requested the return of these vessels in accordance with the provisions [Page 708] of Article 5, and I now reiterated this request. If the Soviet Government proceeded to appoint the experts, we could go ahead; otherwise, we could only conclude that they were in default. I repeated that the language of Article 5 and the Soviet obligation were very clear. I could inform the Ambassador, however, that the United States did not in fact intend to dispose of these vessels. Moreover, with reference to the Ambassador’s reference to discrimination, I wished to point out that we were prepared to let the Soviet Government have 242 of these naval craft which we considered was very favorable treatment for the Soviet Government.
The Ambassador observed that he had not raised the question of mutual benefits and what the Soviet Army had contributed to the defeat of Germany. He said that these matters were as clear as was Article 5.
I reiterated that Article 5 stood on its own feet; it gave us a clear right and imposed a clear obligation on the Soviet Government.
After further exchanges, along the same line as the foregoing, I asked the Ambassador whether there was anything in the Lend Lease Agreement which gave the Soviet Government the right to hold these vessels.
The Ambassador replied that they were not going to hold them, nor was the Soviet Government delaying its answer. Perhaps the experts were in fact being appointed. He pointed out, however, that any delay in appointing the experts was short in comparison with the delay in our reply to their note of December 9.
I again impressed upon the Ambassador the importance we attached to the Soviet Government’s fulfilling its obligation and demonstrating its sincerity in these negotiations.
The Ambassador said their proposals of December 9 showed that the Soviet Government sincerely desired to settle this problem. He said that the Soviet proposals were appropriate and based on the precedent of other settlements. It was recalled that eight tankers had been returned and that the Soviet Government had conducted negotiations with representatives of oil companies with regard to patent rights. The Soviet Government wished to appoint experts, but he admitted this had been a little delayed. He added he thus could not agree with my conclusions that there were no signs of a Soviet desire to conclude an agreement, but while he admitted some delay he did not agree that the Soviet Government was in default on Article 5.
I then asked the Ambassador if he could not agree to do something to speed up the appointment of the Soviet experts in order that we could move forward on this matter. The Ambassador agreed that he would report this conversation to his Government and gave the impression that this might be effective.
- Note from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union, dated September 3, 1948, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 1004.↩