Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

800.01B11 Registration/11–1949

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European A fairs (Thompson) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb)

secret

[Washington,] November 19, 1949.

Mr. Webb: Your attention is drawn to the following considerations with respect to the Amtorg Case and the negotiations for its settlement:

1. A group of our officers who have been studying the case involving the arrest of our Consul General in Mukden are convinced that this action was taken in retaliation for the arrest of the Amtorg officials.¹ While we do not of course know whether or not this is true, there are in fact a striking number of parallels, such as the fact that Ward and his colleagues were arrested three days after the arrest of the Amtorg officials. In any event, we have just requested the governments having diplomatic and consular representatives in China, including the Soviet Union, to intervene in the Ward case. A prompt settlement of the Amtorg case would undoubtedly assist us in settling the Mukden incident. As you are aware, this case plays an important role in the implementation of our China policy and its satisfactory settlement would doubtless strengthen our position in China with respect to other American officials or citizens in communist-held territories.

2. While the settlement of the Amtorg case through a plea of nolle contendre² and a nominal fine would be a reasonable one from an Anglo-Saxon point of view, I do not think we could ever convince the Russians that we had responded satisfactorily to their high-level intervention in this case. This psychological factor is important if we are to obtain full advantage from a settlement of the case in our dealings with the Russians on other cases involving our officials. For example, we are extremely worried about the status of our officials behind the Iron Curtain who do not have full diplomatic immunity. If the Soviet Union or its satellites ever makes stick its ability to convict and sentence any of these people, we will probably for security and humanitarian reasons be obliged to withdraw all of them and cut down our operations behind the Curtain to a skeleton staff consisting of a Chief of Mission and a few officers.

3. It is perhaps significant that both the Ambassador and Vyshinsky in their interventions in this case have stressed the trade aspect and they will probably read into a failure to secure a prompt settlement that is satisfactory from their point of view much more than is justified.

1. The arrest of Consul General Angus I. Ward, Vice Consul William N. Stokes, and some other members of the Consulate General at Mukden by Chinese Communists occurred on October 24, 1949. After detention and trial, Mr. Ward and four others were released and returned to the Consulate on November 22. For documentary details of this incident, see Foreign Relations, 1949, volume viii , Chapter I (Mukden Consulate General) in the compilation on problems of United States Consulates in areas occupied by the Chinese Communists.
2. i.e., nolo contendere.