PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, PPS Meetings

Memorandum by Mr. Robert P. Joyce, Member of the Policy Planning Staff to Mr. Carlton Savage, Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff 1

secret

I made no really complete or adequate notes at the meeting this morning but I did jot down certain ideas which were expressed, which I set forth below:

1.
Ambassador Smith said that he considered it important for us to answer Soviet allegations against the United States no matter how outrageous and silly they might be. He pointed out that the Russian [Page 11] and satellite peoples have great respect for the printed word and could be calculated to believe a great deal of the false propaganda constantly pumped into them by the printed word and by the radio. Lies and distortions about the United States should therefore be answered and their falsity pointed out. Mr. Thompson generally agreed but advanced the thought that it might not be feasible to answer all of the allegations against the West and particularly against the United States which are produced by Soviet propaganda. We would find ourselves in a maze and would be in a position of replying in accordance with the Soviet terms of reference.
2.
Ambassador Smith spoke of the always latent anti-Semitism in Russia and said that this fact might be used in counter-propaganda. Many of the top Kremlin agents in the satellite areas are Jews. The Soviet Union makes use of the intellectual qualities of these Jews but when they have accomplished their purposes they are usually liquidated.
3.
The idea was expressed that it would be a good idea to get some of the Jewish voices off of the Voice of America as it had been discovered that many of the Voice broadcasts to the satellite countries were made with heavy Jewish accents in the languages of the countries concerned.
4.
Minister Chapin stated that Communist propaganda in the satellite areas was drumming in the idea that the United States was reactionary and, in Hungary in particular, would like to see a return to Horthy and the feudal landlordism of previous Hungarian regimes. Mr. Chapin thought that there should be clearer statements which could be carried on the Voice of America that the United States did not stand for a return to feudal conditions but stood for progress. Such statements give heart to social-democratic thinking which in many instances has been made to suspect the motives of the United States.
5.
Minister Heath stated that what we might do in the satellite areas could perhaps be divided into three fields: (a) psychological; (b) economic; (c) political. He particularly emphasized what might be done in the political field in the way of encouraging the establishment of free Bulgarian organizations outside of Bulgaria. Such organizations could lay the foundation for underground organizations in Bulgaria which could keep the spark of hope alive. Our propaganda should stress the fact that the United States has by no means forgotten the satellite peoples but is taking what steps are possible to alleviate their unhappy condition.
There was some discussion of the Church in the various satellite countries as a source to keep alive resistance and hope. The Orthodox Churches in Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia were not as effective [Page 12] as the Catholic Church as the Orthodox Churches have to varying degrees gone over to the Communist regimes or at best were nationalist forces. The Catholic Churches in Poland and Hungary were particularly potent forces in keeping alive the sparks of hope and resistance to Communist domination.
6.
Minister Schoenfeld was in general agreement with what had been said but questioned the desirability of stepping up the ideological attack on Communism and the Soviet Union. He thought that this was too negative and that our propaganda should be more positive in setting forth what we stood for. He indicated that he did not consider that anything could be accomplished in Rumania in the propaganda field with respect to anti-Semitism. He said that he believed that the Jews are in Rumania to stay rather than as temporary Kremlin agents. Mr. Schoenfeld considered that our information programs should harp on the theme that the communist regimes in the satellite countries were minority regimes imposed from without. The satellite peoples should have constantly dinned in their ears that they were being oppressed and their civilizations destroyed by a gang of foreigners.
7.
It was generally agreed that the most vulnerable point of attack was the relation between the communist regimes in the satellite countries and the Kremlin. This theme should be pounded constantly. The people should be encouraged to distrust the Kremlin agents who were oppressing them and the local Communist leaders themselves be encouraged to resent the iron control of the Kremlin. Mr. Kennan pointed out that the bond binding the Communist leaders in the satellite countries with the Kremlin was a very tenuous one. Everything possible should be done to increase the suspicion between the Kremlin and its agents abroad. Titoism as a disintegrating force in the Kremlin monolith should be stimulated and encouraged by all devices of propaganda.
8.
There was a considerable discussion regarding what could be done in the economic field to break the hold of the Kremlin on the satellite countries. Mr. Martin spoke of East-West trade and how the satellite countries might be allowed to obtain certain much needed commodities. They would base their economic planning on supply of such commodities from the West and when the flow of the desired commodities were cut off confusion in the economic field would result. Mr. Martin remarked, however, that there was a great deal of pressure, particularly in England, to seek outlets for consumers goods in the satellite countries. He pointed out that British manufacturers were up to 50% over and above the level of 1938 and in France as well the 1938 levels had been reached or surpassed. Both of these western European countries naturally did not desire to lose their Eastern European markets.
9.
There was considerable discussion with regard to the Albanian situation and it was generally agreed that something very definitely [Page 13] might be accomplished now in the way of: (a) assisting in the overthrow of the present pro-Kremlin regime by a pro-Tito gang, or (b) assisting in the setting up of a new regime which would be anti-Communist and therefore pro-western.2
10.
Out of the general discussion it might be said that the following conclusions were reached:
a.
Our propaganda should be more active, if possible, in replying quickly and clearly to the lies about American institutions and intentions. Our information services should also have a definite positive accent of making the peoples of the satellite countries quite certain that the United States stands for basic human freedoms and dignities and is with them in their struggle against communist domination and Russian imperialism.
b.
Our propaganda should keep before the satellite peoples the fact that they are being held in subjection and their respective cultures are being destroyed by a small minority of foreigners or native quislings who are working in the interests of the Soviet Union.
c.
We should single out the weak points in the Kremlin control of the satellite peoples and concentrate on these troublesome areas in our propaganda approach. We should encourage a healthy nationalism within the satellite countries as an antidote to the iron controls exercised by Moscow. Titoism within the Soviet orbit should be encouraged and fostered wherever possible and by all means of propaganda.
d.
Full use should be made of the refugee organizations representing the various free movements within the satellite countries. Assistance and, wherever possible, support should be given to elements within the captured countries which represent a weakness in the political control within the Russian orbit.

Robert P. Joyce
  1. This memorandum is an attachment to the brief summary record of the 56th Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, April 1, 1949. That record indicates only that the meeting was devoted to a discussion of papers on the Eastern European satellite countries. Regarding earlier Policy Planning Staff meetings on this same subject, see the Record of the 36th Meeting, March 1, and annotations thereto, supra.

    Present for this meeting were the following members of the Policy Planning Staff: Director George F. Kennan; Deputy Director George H. Butler, Staff members Ware Adams, James Lampton Berry, Dorothy Fosdick, Robert P. Joyce, Gordon P. Merriam, and Edwin C. Wilson, and Staff Executive Secretary Carlton Savage. Also present were: Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup; Former Representative to Bulgaria Maynard Barnes; John C. Campbell, Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs; Minister to Hungary Selden Chapin; James F. Clarke, Chief of the Balkan Section of the Division of Research for Europe; Minister to Bulgaria Donald R. Heath; Edwin McCammon Martin, Acting Director of the Office of International Trade; George F. Bernhardt, Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs; Minister to Romania Rudolph Schoenfeld; former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Walter Bedell Smith; Llewellyn E. Thompson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

  2. For additional documentation regarding the attitude of the United States toward the regime in Albania, see pp. 298 ff.