Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.61/3–1949: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kohler ) to the Secretary of State

confidential

Moscow , March 19, 1949—5 p. m.

701. We consider increasingly clear Kremlin developing mammoth spring “war scare/peace offensive” and believe important Department make careful plans to meet and handle, preferably in close cooperation with our allies (Embtels 568, Paragraph 5, March 5,¹ and 578, March 6²). As we see it, two steps are essential:

(a) Beginning immediately, constant and continuous analysis and public exposure of Soviet propaganda to show both alleged peace movement and developing war scare are artificially, deliberately “made in Soviet Union” in order promote Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives; and

(b) Early authoritative statement minimum conditions acceptable to West Powers for any real “settlement,” designed to undercut highly publicized inadequate Kremlin “peace offer” which may well follow maximum development spring propaganda campaign.

Suggest (a) perhaps best accomplished by speech level Assistant Secretary Public Affairs, exposing origin and purpose various current Soviet propaganda lines and efforts, supplemented by regular weekly analysis featured VOA and provided US radio and press, as well as stimulation and assistance special private articles this subject (Embtel 615, March 10;³ Secretary Allen’s statement on American “peace conference,”⁴ excellent start). Peace offensive and war scare are reverse sides of same medal, both having many facets. Practically everything Soviet authorities, Satellites and stooges have been doings and will do, in coming weeks will be blended into rising chorus of confusion, doubt, hatred and fear. Main elements, many already apparent, worth particular attention seem to us:

(1) While not major item, extent Soviet desire confuse and mystify outer world and leave impression impending change in Soviet foreign policy well illustrated by cryptic announcement Molotov–Mikoyan “relief” from Ministries⁵ and prohibition Moscow correspondents comment over 24 hours while foreign press indulged wild speculations.

(2) Statements Thorez–Togliatti on Communist support Soviet Union,⁶ now re-echoing throughout world, calculated identify Atlantic Pact with World War III, solidify Communist Party cores and spread feeling hopelessness and defeatism among ordinary people.

(3) Organization international meetings for “peace” stemming from Wroclaw Congress last August⁷ and featuring end-March New York Conference Intellectuals, aimed whip up enthusiasm for April World Congress at Paris, following Atlantic Pact signature and coinciding UNGA.⁸

(4) Probable introduction spectacular Soviet delegation proposal UNGA, possibly resolution to outlaw regional military pacts, designed capture popular imagination, exploit GA propaganda possibilities and provide focal issue for concurrent Paris Congress.

(5) Major effort smear American and British diplomats and correspondents as “spies” through use clerical espionage trials East Europe and world-wide diffusion fantastic libellous Bucar book,⁹ designed “unmask” undercover activities directed against Soviet Union and Satellites with aim provoking war. This supplements and supports continuing campaign against “war-mongers,” who described as master diplomats.

(6) Real war scare already in making with reports Soviet troop movements to Finnish–Norwegian border, Satellite military threats on Yugoslav frontier, and apparent indiscretions ostensibly “drunken” Soviet officers (of which probably more to come). These likely be supplemented by initiation or intensification partisan activities in North Greece, South Yugoslavia, Iran–Iraq (Kurds), and South Korea. Just when all this will be brought to climax is difficult to estimate. Vigorous special efforts now being made against Atlantic Pact in Italy, France and Denmark are probably not with serious expectation preventing signature but rather with aim confusing and dividing popular support. Main effort will more likely be aimed at ratification process, especially in US, in hopes divided opinion or crippling amendments in Congress will in turn affect action European parliaments. With stops wide open on all themes, stage will be set for “peace offer” which we believe likely to follow if public reaction up to Kremlin hopes. As we see it, next move this nature will not be journalistic “Uncle Joe” approach, but ostensibly serious offer at government level. We venture guess it might include lifting Berlin blockade and concessions Austrian peace treaty, as warranty Soviet bona fides, in return for suspension Bonn Assembly and immediate convocation CFM to consider:

1. Formation all-German Government located Berlin;

2. Four-power control Ruhr and German reparations settlement;

3. Peace treaty and withdrawal occupation forces.¹⁰

Direct reference Atlantic Pact would probably be avoided, but move timed leave impression no longer necessary and thus affect finalization ratification procedures; though if propaganda campaign does not develop satisfactorily, Kremlin might delay and aim at discouragement implementation rather than ratification of Pact.

This brings us to recommendation (b) above, which we believe best accomplished major address Secretary of State or higher (or possibly Bevin on occasion visit to US for Pact signature), fully agreed beforehand with our principal allies. Referring to recurrent talk of settlement arising from Stalin replies to Wallace open letter (Embtel 936, May 18, 1948¹¹) and INS questions (Embtel 242, January 31¹²), address might review history abortive efforts achieve just such settlement, then proceed to studied analysis conditions which would really remove tension poisoning international atmosphere, make possible normal political and economic relations between Soviet Union and rest world, and justify relaxation Western preparedness efforts.

Even if foregoing highly speculative prognosis wrong, we consider recommended steps advisable; if right, we believe them essential.

Sent Department; repeated Paris 95, London 68.

Kohler

1. Ante, p. 585.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed. It expressed the View that the forthcoming Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace in New York was an instrument in the current Soviet “peace offensive/war scare” propaganda campaign (800.00B/3–1049).
4. Regarding the statement under reference here, see the editorial note, p. 808.
5. Regarding the changes in the Soviet Council of Ministers, see telegram 568, March 5, from Moscow, p. 584.
6. On February 22, 1949, Maurice Thorez, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, told a session of his party’s Central Committee that should the Soviet Army find it necessary to enter France in the course of another war, the French workers and people would be obliged to support Soviet forces. In a Rome newspaper interview on February 26, Palmiro Togliatti, Secretary General of the Italian Communist Party, expressed similar views.
7. Regarding the Wroclaw Congress of Intellectuals under reference here, see the draft paper prepared by the Department of State, December 9, p. 839.
8. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 2; the Second Part of the Third Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on April 5.
9. Regarding former Embassy employee Annabelle Bucar and her book The Truth About American Diplomats, see despatch 129, March 4, from Moscow, p. 581.
10. Documentation on the subjects referred to here is presented in volume iii.
11. For the exchange of correspondence in May 1948 between Henry A. Wallace, former United States Vice President and Secretary of Commerce and currently candidate for President of the Progressive Party, and Marshal Stalin, see Margaret Carlyle, Ed., Documents on International Affairs 1947–1948, issued under auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp. 160–164. For the telegram under reference here, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, p. 870.
12. For documentation on the exchange of communications between I.N.S. correspondent H. Kingsbury Smith and Marshal Stalin, including the telegram under reference here, see pp. 561–568.