761.00/4–149: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
1306. 1. We have discussed Moscow’s 701 to Department March 19,1 repeated Paris 95 with [Robert M. A.] Hankey, head Northern Department, and [Roger] Allen, head UN” (Political) Department, Foreign Office.
2. Hankey said Moscow telegram coincides closely Foreign Office thinking. Agrees that tempo of war scare propaganda is rising simultaneously with all-out peace propaganda offensive. Doubts whether Russia will go as far as Moscow telegram suggests in working up war scare, because consensus British experts is that Russia not yet prepared for war and will avoid risks which might conceivably lead actual hostilities.
3. Hankey also expects we shall soon be confronted by actual “peace overtures” and offers to “settle” our differences. Believes these proposals will concentrate on Germany and involve offers to withdraw all occupation forces and establish central government; and may also relate to Austria.
4. Hankey and Allen inform us that British delegate to GA fully briefed with respect to position to be taken should Russia launch peace proposals there. Allen doubts whether peace overtures will be made in GA but does not exclude this. If made elsewhere he expects Russians will try inject peace proposals into GA sessions.
5. Foreign Office not worried about effect peace offensive on British people who are now thoroughly conditioned brains and suspicious of Russian maneuvers and would not be taken in. However, Foreign Office believes peace offensive and proposals will have repercussions on continent where many people still disposed to grasp at straws. [Page 825] Foreign Office, therefore, agrees it is of highest importance steps be taken to counteract Russia’s current propaganda effort which is so obviously designed to drive wedge between Western peoples and their governments and between Western Europe and US and UK. Hankey agrees Moscow Embassy’s suggestion special counter-measures be taken in information field to analyze and expose Russian peace propaganda, and informed us they have already taken special steps to disseminate such information, and are ready step up these efforts. We can confirm British press has recently devoted unusual amount editorial and reporting space to current Soviet peace maneuvers.
6. With respect to point b in Moscow telegram, Hankey has also been considering desirability of high US or British official delivering major speech, but he is uncertain whether desirable such statement be made before Russia comes out with actual proposals or after. However Hankey feels it may be tactical mistake to limit such statement to “minimum conditions”. He thinks we should set our sights high and should indicate, for example, that a settlement must involve the establishment of really democratic governments in satellites and even restoration of sovereignty to Baltic states. Hankey’s reasoning is that if we make minimum proposals, Russia might well accept them as a basis for discussions in order impress world opinion that Russia peacefully motivated, again proceed to tie us up in endless and fruitless discussions, and then try to fasten responsibility for a breakdown on us. If, however, Russia is determined to effect a détente, we have nothing to lose by stating a good many conditions.
7. Following our view of Moscow telegram and Foreign Office comment:
8. As far as British public is concerned it remains calm in face current war scare propaganda and unimpressed by peace offensive. At same time, it believes that we should patiently look for opportunities to effect a détente, and similarly stand ready to consider any Russian offer which looks like a reasonable basis for reopening of discussions. This is also characteristic of government attitude. For this reason there will be strong but cautious reaction here if Russia makes peace offer which has appearance of being serious.
9. Whether major US or UK pronouncement is made before or after any Russian proposals is not very important in terms of British public opinion, although it may be important to public opinion in less stable countries for us to take initiative.
10. Confidence in Russia now so shattered British public does not see how any real agreement can be reached or any large measure of confidence in Russia can be restored except over long period of testing Soviet bona fides. It will take more than peace treaty with Austria or lifting blockade to overcome now pervasive suspicion here of Russian double-dealing. We think what British public would therefore want to [Page 826] see in any major statement, in addition to those suggested in Moscow’s telegram, is some reference to how we can secure a détente, as well as how we can establish relations with Russia on a long term basis.
11. In re point b and Hankey’s view of it expressed in paragraph 6 above, we therefore suggest that should any statement be made, consideration be given to wording it in such a way that it deals with this long term problem. We suggest, for example, that statement might indicate that fundamental differences exist between us arising from the destruction of democratic processes in satellite countries, suppression of individual liberties, etc., etc.; secondly, that because of these fundamental differences, a stable and durable relationship can only be established by stages as confidence is gradually restored and suspicion reduced; and thirdly, that this can best be accomplished one step at a time by arriving in the first instance at agreements with respect to the danger points, then passing on to other problems as a measure of confidence is built up.
12. As we see it such an approach has the advantage of not committing us to either minimum or maximum conditions; gives us tactical flexibility in the event of negotiations; helps establish our moral position; tells the people at home and abroad brutal truth; further educates them in the realities of the situation and checks wishful thinking; does not prejudice our continuing to make defense arrangements; and gives us a powerful weapon to counteract Soviet propaganda.
Sent Department 1306, repeated Moscow 33, Paris 251.