Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955

251. Paper Prepared by J. Patrick Coyne of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government Prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government

By the Task Force on Intelligence Activities

CHAPTER I—Brief History of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities (Pages 1–12)

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER II—The Central Intelligence Agency (Pages 13–75)

Recommendation 1 (page 72): That “covert intelligence” and “cold war” functions of the current DD/P be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility shall be administratively and logistically self-supporting. (A minority of the Task Force members did not concur in this recommendation, believing that “covert intelligence” and “cold war” operations should be under the staff and operating control of a single operating Deputy Director—as at present.)

Agency Comment: CIA opposes the recommendation on the grounds that: (1) “the experience of CIA during the period of separate operation prior to 1952 proved the operational disadvantages of attempting to conduct, on a secure and efficient basis, two world-wide clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other”; and (2) organizations of separate supporting elements for each of the clandestine services would be duplicative, costly and ineffective.

Additional Action Required: Presidential decision as to whether the Task Force (majority) recommendation or the contrary views of CIA should be adopted.

Observation: CIA’s view should be adopted since the majority proposal of the Task Force has been tried previously and found less satisfactory than present organizational arrangements which combine the covert and cold war functions of CIA. (The CIA view is consistent with that of the Doolittle Committee² whose survey of CIA’s clandestine services was much more extensive than that made by the Task Force.)

Recommendation 2 (page 73): That CIA be reorganized with a Director, a Deputy Director, an Executive Director, a general Secretariat, necessary staff sections and offices of the administrative and logistic services and an operating Deputy Director of Intelligence with seven operating offices thereunder, including an Office of Basic Intelligence.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the creation of, and has established, an Office of Basic Intelligence. CIA notes that the balance of this recommendation consists of suggesting that the names of four of the offices under the Deputy Director of Intelligence be changed. CIA will change the name of one of these offices shortly, but believes that little will be accomplished in effecting the other name changes suggested.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 3 (page 73): That CIA re-establish the Office of Executive Director to relieve the DCI of the necessity of having to devote a large part of his time to the solution of many daily administrative and minor operational problems.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed on the grounds that the interposition of another command echelon would not necessarily accomplish the intended objective. CIA is giving this recommendation further study, however.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 4 (page 73): That the status of the three major operating Deputy Directors be changed from Civil Service appointees (now Grade GS-18) to Public Law Presidential appointees, at an annual salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs in the recommended pay increases but thinks it unwise that the Operating Deputy Directors require Senatorial approval, particularly where an individual’s background and competence in clandestine operations would have to be reviewed. CIA has received no indication of any Senatorial desire to review CIA appointments, other than the appointments of the DCI and his Deputy.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or NSC. CIA is taking action through appropriate channels in an effort to obtain the pay increases recommended.

Recommendation 5 (page 73): That the “cold war” operating deputy director be designated as CIA’s representative on the Operations Coordinating Board to free the DCI to devote a greater share of his time to the Agency’s intelligence functions.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed. It notes that the DCI is required to personally attend OCB meetings by virtue of a Presidential Directive, and that his participation in OCB meetings is not unduly burdensome. CIA notes further that the Deputy Director/Plans is closely associated with OCB activity in that CIA members of OCB working groups are drawn from CIA’s clandestine services.

Additional Action Required: Presidential decision as to whether the Task Force recommendation should be adopted.

Observation: Because the benefits derived from DCI’s participation in OCB meetings outweighs the burdens occasioned by such participation, the Task Force recommendation should be rejected. If this observation is concurred in advice should be communicated to CIA as to the President’s reaffirmation of the directive which provides for DCI’s membership on the OCB.

Recommendation 6 (page 73): That a comprehensive internal management survey of the Agency be conducted by CIA within a year following the reorganization of CIA, as recommended by the Task Force.

Agency Comment: CIA presently has in progress three concurrent programs of an internal management nature.

Additional Action Required: None, at this time.

Recommendation 7 (page 74): That all NSC, IAC, and DCI Intelligence Directives be reviewed by the IAC and others concerned, with a view to establishing clearer areas of responsibility and to allocating intelligence tasks in accord with each agency’s capability, interest, and paramount national responsibilities.

Agency Comment: The DCI will recommend the establishment of an IAC Subcommittee to review all such Intelligence Directives, as necessary, to clarify areas of responsibility or reallocate tasks.

Additional Action Required: Action at appropriate levels (IAC, DCI, NSC) to be taken on the basis of the review of Intelligence Directives being initiated by CIA.

Recommendation 8 (page 74): That responsibility for procurement of foreign publications and collection of scientific intelligence be shifted from State to CIA, and that CIA be authorized to appoint scientific attachés to U.S. diplomatic missions as necessary.

Agency Comment: CIA agrees that facilities for procurement of foreign publications and collection of scientific intelligence should be strengthened. The substance of this recommendation is under active study by State and CIA and it is hoped that an agreement thereon will be reached at an early date.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC.

Recommendation 9 (page 74): That the Scientific Estimates Committee be abolished and in lieu thereof there be established under the IAC a Scientific Intelligence Committee with appropriate subcommittees to insure community-wide coordination.

Agency Comment: CIA is in general agreement with this recommendation. The substance thereof is under active consideration in the IAC.

Additional Action Required: None, other than the normal actions which will flow from IAC consideration of the recommendation.

Recommendation 10 (page 74): That the effectiveness of CIA’s security program be re-evaluated to establish a system assuring personnel security rechecks on a minimum five year basis.

Agency Comment: CIA reports that the recommended program has been in effect as of March 26, 1955 and, in addition, that there is a continuing review made of the security of its employees, including automatic rechecks in the case of personnel actions, such as transfers, promotions, appointments to special activities, etc.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 11 (page 74): That Congress be requested to appropriate funds to construct adequate CIA housing facilities in or near Washington.

Agency Comment: CIA reports this has been done.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 12 (page 74): That the CIA Act of 1949 be amended to authorize employment of “any” (instead of 15 now authorized) retired officers or warrant officers of the Armed Services; and to authorize overseas personnel additional dependent medical benefits and employee leave accumulations equivalent to those authorized for Foreign Service personnel.

Agency Comment: CIA would welcome an increase in the number of retired officers of the Armed Services authorized to be employed by the Agency. It believes that the authorized number should be between twenty-five and fifty. CIA concurs in granting additional Foreign Service benefits for dependents as well as leave benefits and leave accumulations for CIA employees.

(Current inquiry of CIA reflects the Agency has prepared draft legislation—now being processed by the Budget Bureau—designed to authorize employment of as many as forty retired officers of the Armed Services, as well as draft legislation designed to carry into effect the Task Force recommendations concerning CIA personnel, their leave accumulations, and additional medical benefits for dependents of CIA employees stationed abroad.)

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 13 (page 75): That legislation be sought to increase the annual salary of the DCI to $20,000; to increase the compensation of the Deputy DCI to $17,500; and to authorize the appointment of an Executive Director of CIA at an annual salary of $16,000.

Agency Comment: The recommended increases in the salaries of the DCI and the Deputy DCI have been included in proposed amendments to the Executive Pay Bill of 1949.³ CIA, as indicated in Recommendation 3 above, opposes establishing the office of Executive Director, but is giving further study to the Task Force recommendation on this point.

Additional Action Required: None.

CHAPTER III—The Department of State (Pages 76–88)

Recommendation 1 (page 87): That the personnel strength of the Intelligence Area be maintained at a level consistent with functional responsibilities and work load.

Agency Comment: State concurs. An increase of ten persons for the present fiscal year has been authorized for the Intelligence Area. State is budgeting a substantial increase for its intelligence function in fiscal year 1957.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 2 (page 88): That NSCID No. 10⁴ be revised to place responsibility for collection of information in the basic sciences in CIA.

Agency Comment: State reports that while it is not possible to comment favorably or unfavorably on this recommendation at this time, meetings on the subject are being held with CIA and every effort will be made to develop a satisfactory solution.

Additional Action Required: Action is dependent upon the outcome of the State–CIA meetings mentioned above and on the IAC review of all Intelligence Directives (to which reference is made in Chapter II, Recommendation 7).

Recommendation 3 (page 88): That State finalize its plans for the periodic review of all personnel coming within the provisions of Executive Order 10450.⁵

Agency Comment: State has given substantial thought to the matter and agrees that a program for periodic review should be carefully considered. Through its normal channels State will pursue the matter with interested agencies, such as Justice and the Civil Service Commission.

Additional Action Required: None, beyond that indicated in State’s comment.

Recommendation 4 (page 88): That intelligence personnel occupying positions which have been designated as Foreign Service assignments be included in State’s program for accelerated language and area training.

Agency Comment: State reports that such personnel are eligible for participation in these programs and that the Intelligence Area is represented in the planning and selection process for such training.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 5 (page 88): That in implementing the Foreign Service Integration Program due regard should be given the special qualifications of intelligence personnel transferred to foreign posts; and to the extent practicable special qualifications developed should be safeguarded upon reassignment.

Agency Comment: State concurs and is developing procedures to accomplish the intent of this recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None.

CHAPTER IV—The Department of Defense (Pages 89–205)

A. Office of Special Operations (Pages 89–94)

Recommendation 1 (page 94): That DOD Directive 5105.7⁶ be examined with a view to clarifying and eliminating any ambiguities which would lead to a misinterpretation of the functions and misapplication of the authority of OSO; and that the relationships of OSO with the intelligence organization of the JCS and the military departments be spelled out more specifically to reduce possibilities of friction and misunderstanding.

Agency Comment: DOD does not consider that the Directive is ambiguous. However, DOD will give continuing attention to the operations of OSO under the Directive.

Additional Action Required: None, beyond that referred to in DOD’s comment.

B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Pages 94–99)

This Section contains no recommendations.

C. Department of the Army (Pages 99–137)

Recommendation 1 (page 137): That the Army Attaché System be manned to permit full exploitation of its collection potential and that present personnel ceilings imposed by DOD be lifted in order to achieve greater flexibility and permit more extensive prior training of assigned personnel.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees with the concept calling for maximum exploitation of the intelligence potential of the Attaché System. It does not agree that present personnel ceilings are seriously inhibitive. DOD reports that its ceilings on Attaché strength (in the three services) are flexible; that DOD now has underway a program for consolidating and simplifying the Attaché functions of the services; and that it is studying ways of improving selection and training of Attachés.

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to lifting personnel ceilings in the Attaché System.

Recommendation 2 (page 137): That the (Army) Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, be elevated to the level of Deputy Chief of Staff.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It notes that the top staff of the Army was recently reorganized following a balanced consideration of all its aspects and it concludes that it would be premature to reorganize now as recommended, particularly since legislation would be necessary to achieve the Task Force’s recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 3 (page 137): That the National Security Council revise NSCID No. 5⁷ to provide for clandestine intelligence activity on the part of the Military Services consistent with their capabilities and statutory responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947.

Agency Comment: DOD notes that this recommendation “reflects the strong and unanimous views of the Services” and that “it involves a fundamental issue within the intelligence community.” Because of the importance of this particular recommendation the remainder of the Defense comment thereon is quoted in full:

“NSCID No. 5 has been interpreted as assigning to CIA the exclusive right to control and conduct covert foreign intelligence operations. Such activities as the services have been allowed to conduct during the past 7 or 8 years in this important field even in war theaters have been essentially on the sufferance of CIA. Meanwhile, however, CIA’s record of performance in covert intelligence operations of direct interest to the mission of the Armed Services has been disappointing, particularly against primary Soviet orbit intelligence targets. The services, which consider that they have generally a longer record of experience in this work, are convinced that they can produce through covert operations more effectively than CIA various needed categories of intelligence related to their particular missions and requirements. They point out moreover that CIA’s covert operations are conducted to a large extent under military cover.

The Agreed Activities paper (DCID No. 5/8)⁸ represents a cautious compromise, which is not altogether satisfactory to the services. It provides for a measure of participation by them in covert operations on a best-qualified basis. The services believe their right to participate should be explicit in a NSCID and not dependent on a subsidiary agreement.

It is too early to judge whether this agreement will prove workable. First steps have been taken by CIA to function under the agreement, and the services are proceeding to strengthen their covert collection resources. Each side tends to be wary of the other; and more generosity and good will than has been shown in the past will be necessary if the present tentative arrangement is to work.

Monitorship over this problem has been assigned to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) who has been directed to keep the developments under continuing review. If events develop favorably under the Agreed Activities paper, revision of NSCID No. 5 may prove to be unnecessary.”

Additional Action Required: Further action may be taken by IAC and NSC now or it may be delayed, depending upon: (1) developments under the “Agreed Activities Paper,” as revised, or (2) the outcome of the proposed review of all NSC, DCI and IAC Intelligence Directives, as set forth in Chapter II, Recommendation 7 of the Task Force Report.

Observation: It is to be noted that: (1) the Task Force Report and the comments thereon present only the military side of this controversy; and (2) CIA, despite its primary responsibility in the field, is not cognizant of—and, therefore, has had no opportunity to comment on this and other military-related segments of the Task Force Report which are germane to the primary mission of CIA. The controversy over NSCID No. 5 has raged too long (several years); IAC and, if necessary, NSC should act upon it at an early date.

Recommendation 4 (page 137): That the implementation of NSCID No. 13⁹ be extended to permit participation in the Soviet and Satellite defector inducement program by the Military Services and CIA in direct proportion to the capabilities of each.

Agency Comment: DOD reports that the three Services strongly support this and related recommendations, believing that at the working level CIA has often tended unnecessarily to restrict their participation in this area of intelligence operations which is of vital importance to them. The Military Services believe they have substantial present and potential capabilities in the inducement of defection of which full use should be made. DOD will undertake to negotiate with the Director of Central Intelligence to bring about optimum participation by the Services and fullest realization of their potential in the defector program.

Additional Action Required: NSCID No. 13 should be expeditiously reviewed by IAC and modified by NSC, if modification is determined to be necessary.

Observation: This recommendation of the Task Force appears to be somewhat at variance with its Recommendation 6, Appendix II, wherein it proposes “that the inducement phase of the Defector Program, as applicable to active participation by diplomatic and military representatives serving overtly abroad, be discontinued.”

Recommendation 5 (page 137): That consideration be given to more extensive use of “Schedule A”¹⁰ in the employment of civilian analysts and other intelligence specialists in the Department of the Army, in order to achieve necessary flexibility.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in general and has initiated a thorough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its study of the problem.

Recommendation 6 (page 137): That the Army aggressively attack the linguist problem by developing and using outside sources for training in colleges and universities through the method of, (for example) its comprehensive ROTC and Reserve programs.

Agency Comment: DOD reports that considerable use is now being made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated, but that the problem involves quality rather than quantity and is most acute in the case of rare languages. The recommendation concerning ROTC language training requires further study.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its further study.

Recommendation 7 (page 137): That measures be instituted for the periodic security rechecking of personnel assigned in sensitive areas at intervals not to exceed 5 years.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required: Apart from the review referred to by DOD, no additional action is required.

D. Department of the Navy (Pages 138–156)

Recommendation 1 (page 156): That the Navy put its counterintelligence program on a wider base so as to bring its worldwide protection up to an adequate level.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs but believes that the actual method of expansion should be further investigated.

Additional Action Required: Further investigation as suggested by DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative findings and with the objective of establishing an adequate counterintelligence program in the Navy.

Recommendation 2 (page 156): That the Navy provide for periodic review of the security status of intelligence personnel who come within the provisions of Executive Order 10450.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 3 (page 156): That the Navy expand its intelligence collection effort.

Agency Comment: See DOD’s comment on Recommendation 1 of the Task Force Report on the Department of the Army, (page 7, above).

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to lifting personnel ceilings in the Attaché System.

Recommendation 4 (page 156): That the Navy continue and expand its efforts to improve intelligence consciousness at all ranks and levels of the Department.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. Instruction on the mission and role of intelligence is included in the regional training schools, intelligence centers, and in the curricula of line schools at all levels.

Additional Action Required: None.

E. Department of the Air Force (Pages 156–179)

Recommendation 1 (page 178): That the position of Director of Intelligence, Air Force, be raised to that of a Deputy Chief of Staff.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It notes that the Task Force made a similar recommendation (which DOD opposes) with respect to the Director of Intelligence, Army, but that it made no recommendation respecting the position of the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Additional Action Required: None by the White House or the NSC.

Observation: This recommendation does not involve any major policy considerations. Internal reorganizations of the type recommended should be left to the sound discretion of the agency head.

Recommendation 2 (page 178): That a limited number of civilian personnel spaces for Air Force Intelligence be exempt from certain Civil Service requirements.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in general and has initiated a thorough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: Decision by DOD following its study of the problem.

Recommendation 3 (page 178): That a board or commission be established to make an equitable and coordinated allocation among the member agencies of personnel spaces exempt from certain Civil Service requirements.

Agency Comment: DOD has initiated a thorough study of the problem.

Additional Action Required: None, pending the completion of DOD’s study.

Recommendation 4 (page 178): That the Air Attaché System be maintained at a level which will insure an adequate collection capability and that Air Attaché qualifications be commensurate with the collection potential of the station.

Agency Comment: See DOD’s comment on Recommendation 1 of the Task Force’s Report on the Department of the Army (page 7, above).

Additional Action Required: Final decision by DOD as to the Attaché System, its adequacy, personnel strength, training, qualifications, etc.

Recommendation 5 (page 179): That an Intelligence Research Center be established under CIA to guide the total intelligence research program.

Agency Comment: DOD notes that each service intelligence agency and CIA conduct research programs and it agrees that a common research service would be desirable. However, it believes that the effort to establish such a center “should be under the DCI acting for the IAC and not under the CIA.”

Additional Action Required: Joint consideration of this recommendation by the IAC agencies.

Observation: It would appear desirable that CIA be apprised of, and be afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recommendation. This is particularly so if the “additional action” indicated above is not taken (if such action is taken, CIA will automatically have such an opportunity by virtue of its identification with the IAC).

Recommendation 6 (page 179): That a board be established to supervise declassification of security information.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. It believes such a procedure would be cumbersome, and is of the view that its present practices in this area are adequate.

Additional Action Required: None, because ultimate responsibility for such matters is lodged in the head of the Department concerned.

Recommendation 7 (page 179): That a periodic examination be made of Air Force intelligence publications to assure justification for both the publication and distribution thereof.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs; the recommended action is now being implemented.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 8 (page 179): That mechanical and electronic devices to analyze, classify, file, and produce intelligence information be put into use at the earliest possible moment.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. It believes that automation in intelligence production has undoubted value and it notes that considerable investigation has been conducted along the lines indicated in this recommendation.

Additional Action Required: Implementation of the recommendation by DOD.

Recommendation 9 (page 179): That all possible resources be used to exploit technological means for intelligence collection.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, advising that the recommendation is currently receiving attention.

Additional Action Required: None (assuming the attention being afforded this matter by DOD results in the implementation of this recommendation).

Recommendation 10 (page 179): That the use of “overflights” to secure vital information receive constant consideration.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that the constant support of other U.S. Government agencies is required if full results are to be achieved. (DOD observes that upon resolution of some of the details involved in this recommendation, it may be advisable to seek NSC action thereon.)

Additional Action Required: Presidential and/or NSC consideration following receipt of DOD’s recommendation on the subject.

Recommendation 11 (page 179): That the Air Force develop adequate procedures for the periodic security review of personnel occupying sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: DOD believes that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objective of this recommendation. The general subject will be reviewed by DOD however to insure that the underlying objective of the recommendation is adequately served.

Additional Action Required: Apart from the review referred to by DOD, no additional action is required.

F. Covert Operations—Department of Defense (Pages 179–205)

Recommendation 1 (page 204): That under the terms of the “Agreed Activities” paper, the services expand their clandestine collection efforts with primary emphasis focused on targets in the Soviet Union and Communist China. Personnel and funds to accomplish this objective should be made available to the military intelligence services.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs and suggests that the satellites, including areas of Southeast Asia, should be added to the primary target area.

Additional Action Required: This recommendation should be reviewed and acted upon by the IAC and, if necessary, the NSC. (See Chapter II, Recommendation 7, which calls for IAC review of all NSC, DCI, and IAC Intelligence Directives and Chapter IV, C, Recommendation 3, which calls for revision of NSCID No. 5 in particular.)

Observation: It is noted that CIA has not been advised of, nor otherwise afforded an opportunity to comment on, this recommendation, which involves one of the primary missions of that Agency. (This situation will be remedied if the additional action mentioned above is carried into effect.)

Recommendation 2 (page 204): That the intelligence community establish adequate and positive measures for the identification and listing of all clandestine operators as provided in IAC Directive No. 54, approved July 24, 1952.¹¹ Mutual trust regarding the divulgence of intelligence sources should be cultivated within the community.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that an effort has been made under the IAC Directive to create a national source control mechanism. DOD thinks it probable that the recommendation can be implemented effectively on some clearly mutual basis, such as rotating the chairmanship of the source control mechanism.

Additional Action Required: None for the reasons set forth in the following paragraph.

Observation: The Task Force seems in its recommendation to have missed the point of IAC–D–54. This directive is designed to identify for the entire intelligence community “papermills” and “fabricators” who have been exposed as such. It does not provide that each intelligence agency disclose to the others the identities of their “clandestine operators”—such a practice would be foolhardy. Current inquiry reflects that in the main the intelligence agencies are exchanging information concerning fabricators, frauds, etc., as provided in IAC–D–54.

Recommendation 3 (page 204): That the defector program, including inducement policies, early access to the defector and prompt determination of the use to which he is to be put, be improved, with the objective of making defection more attractive and of deriving greater benefit for the entire intelligence community.

Agency Comment: DOD’s comments on this general subject are set forth under Recommendation 4, Chapter IV (page 9, above). CIA was not furnished with the section of the report which contains this recommendation.

Additional Action Required: IAC review of NSCID No. 13.

Recommendation 4 (page 205): That the military services be permitted greater latitude in offering inducements to potential defectors.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. The gist of DOD’s comments on this and related aspects of the defector program are summarized under Chapter IV, Recommendation 4 (page 9, above).

Additional Action Required: As set forth under Chapter IV, Recommendation 4.

Observation: This recommendation of the Task Force is, in part at least, contrary to its Recommendation 6, Part II, wherein it is proposed that the inducement phase of the Defector Program, as applicable to active participation by diplomatic and military representatives serving overtly abroad, be discontinued.

Recommendation 5 (page 205): That the National Security Council review present assets and direct the necessary action to assure adequate preparation for evasion and escape and support of guerrilla warfare.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs. To facilitate the review recommended DOD suggests that CIA and DOD report the pertinent facts to the NSC with recommendation for necessary action. To that end DOD will initiate a proposal looking to the preparation of an appropriate report.

Additional Action Required: None, pending preparation of the referenced report.

Recommendation 6 (page 205): [14 lines not declassified]

Recommendation 7 (page 205): That when military cover is used steps be taken to insure that the person so covered lives in consonance with the cover position and duties.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that an interim effort is being made to insure that all persons wearing the uniform are qualified to play the role convincingly.

Additional Action Required: None, other than continuing effort along the lines mentioned above.

CHAPTER V—Atomic Energy Intelligence (Pages 206–220)

Recommendation 1 (page 220): That CIA pay special attention to the production of atomic energy intelligence.

Agency Comment: CIA reports that that agency and the entire intelligence community long ago agreed that the highest priority be accorded this subject. Continuous attention at the highest level is directed to seeing that this program is energetically implemented.

DOD concurs, noting that in CIA’s appointed role as coordinator for the production of national intelligence it should pay special attention to the coordination of the production of atomic energy intelligence. DOD believes that the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee is an adequate instrument for this purpose and is now being so used.

Additional Action Required: None, since CIA reports that the highest priority and continuous attention is already being accorded this subject by the entire intelligence community.

Recommendation 2 (page 220): That the responsibility of AEC for intelligence be defined in an NSC Intelligence Directive and that an NSC Intelligence Directive set forth the responsibility, authority, functions, and composition of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.

Agency Comment: AEC agrees. It is of the belief that this two-fold recommendation may be accomplished by one NSC Intelligence Directive; that such a Directive should also establish the responsibilities of the other IAC agencies for atomic energy intelligence “in order that ambiguities of present directives … be clarified.”

CIA advises that AEC’s intelligence responsibilities are now under discussion between CIA and AEC, and that at the appropriate time an intelligence directive thereon will be proposed to the NSC.

DOD concurs in this two-fold recommendation. It favors an NSCID for the purpose of defining AEC’s intelligence responsibility; but it believes that since the JAEIC is a subcommittee of the IAC, a DCID (rather than an NSCID) will suffice to carry out the latter part of the recommendation.

Additional Action Required: None, pending completion of IAC’s processing of the directives envisaged by this recommendation.

Recommendation 3 (page 220): That the AEC define the responsibility and functions of its Division of Intelligence.

Agency Comment: AEC reports that its Division of Intelligence has received the informal concurrence of the other intelligence agencies as to its national intelligence responsibilities. Following Commission consideration thereof, the intelligence agencies will be formally notified of same.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 4 (page 220): That each of the member agencies of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee insure that it is represented on that Committee by the best qualified individual available concerning the matter under discussion, and that changes in representation be made as infrequently as practicable.

Agency Comment: AEC concurs. AEC reports that every effort has been and will continue to be made to comply with this recommendation.

CIA reports that it has pressed for the assignment of the best qualified personnel to the Committee, and it notes that the record of the Committee in the matter of continuity and length of tenure is a very favorable one.

DOD concurs in this recommendation noting that it will continue to make every effort to insure the fulfillment thereof.

State reports that it has been following the practice recommended by the Task Force.

Additional Action Required: None.

Recommendation 5 (page 220): That there be a thorough review of the processes for development of the atomic energy portions of National Intelligence Estimates to insure, in the first place, that everything practicable is done to develop intelligence regarding intentions, plans, programs, policies, doctrines and capabilities of the Soviet Union with regard to war-time use of atomic energy and, secondly, that the National Intelligence Estimates reflect the full extent of available intelligence in those matters.

Agency Comment: AEC strongly endorses this recommendation, noting that the accuracy and completeness of estimates on foreign atomic energy capabilities are of deep concern to it.

CIA reports that its Board of Estimates is already carrying out this recommendation; that the Board is not only going into Soviet war-time use of atomic energy, but is working on peace-time applications as well; and that it goes without saying that every effort is being made to have the National Intelligence Estimates reflect the full extent of available knowledge on the subject.

DOD concurs in this recommendation.

State concurs. In order that the National Intelligence Estimates may reflect the full extent of available intelligence in this field, State recommends specific courses of action which appear appropriate for IAC consideration.

Additional Action Required: Consideration by the IAC.

CHAPTER VI—The Federal Bureau of Investigation (Pages 221–226)

This Chapter contains no recommendations.

CHAPTER VII—Intelligence Production (Pages 227–244)

Recommendation 1 (page 244): That an agreed glossary of intelligence terms be produced and reviewed periodically.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees and suggests that an IAC Subcommittee be appointed to produce it.

State has no particular difficulty in this area, but it will be pleased to assist IAC in implementing the recommendation.

CIA reports that it has compiled a glossary of intelligence terms and that action will be taken through the IAC to secure acceptance thereof as the authoritative dictionary of intelligence nomenclature.

Additional Action Required: Completion of the project by the IAC.

Recommendation 2 (page 244): That positive measures be taken to increase the quantity and improve the quality of information collected, with special emphasis on the primary target area, to include the revision of existing directives to assign more explicit responsibility to agencies which can fulfill the requirement.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, adding that in its opinion and in the opinion of the military services the briefing and debriefing for intelligence purposes of U.S. travelers (now exclusively the prerogative of CIA) could profitably be decentralized to some extent. It believes that review of “official cover” requirements may indicate that certain intelligence operations now being performed by CIA may be more effectively conducted by other agencies. As to the Task Force recommendation that there be special emphasis on the primary target area, DOD notes that, in general, the service intelligence agencies have their sights set on the primary target.

CIA notes that NSC, IAC and CIA intelligence directives are being reviewed with a view to revision where appropriate (as indicated in Chapter II, above). As to the Task Force exhortation that, in the collection of intelligence, there be special emphasis on the primary target area, CIA notes that the entire intelligence community has invariably accorded the Soviet Union the highest priority as a target of intelligence.

Additional Action Required: None, other than that now being carried out, or that which may be indicated by current intelligence or by the review of Intelligence Directives referred to by CIA.

Observation: The oft-repeated exhortations of the Task Force that primary emphasis be placed upon the USSR as the primary intelligence target are in a sense misleading in that they could leave the casual reader with the erroneous impression that the USSR is not the primary intelligence target. Individually and collectively the intelligence forces of the United States Government concentrate on the USSR, its satellites, and International Communism in general, as the primary U.S. intelligence target. U.S. intelligence agencies are not satisfied with the quality or quantity of intelligence gained thus far with respect to this primary target, but they have felt it better to accept criticism such as that leveled in the Task Force Report and in the published report on the subject rather than risk disclosure of highly sensitive operations which do indicate that some inroads are being successfully made on the primary target.

CHAPTER VIII—Functional Intelligence (Pages 245–254)

Recommendation 1 (page 254): That the intelligence community actively give recognition to this primary intelligence target, i.e., the Soviet Union, and take such actions as are necessary to present a concerted effort for the single purpose of breaking this vital intelligence block.

Agency Comment: State notes that the intelligence community has been doing precisely this for some time and it adds that it is prepared to give continuing support to this intelligence priority.

Defense and CIA (as indicated previously) have commented (in the several instances wherein the point of this recommendation has been made) that the intelligence community is concentrating upon the USSR as a primary intelligence target.

Recommendation 2 (page 254): That the State Department’s programs for integration and expansion of the Foreign Service and for acceleration of language and area training be pursued vigorously.

Agency Comment: State reports that this matter is the subject of vigorous action at all levels of the Department on a continuous and top priority basis.

CHAPTER IX—Personnel (Pages 255–274)

Recommendation 1 (page 273): That DOD give consideration to the exploitation of the ROTC and reserve intelligence programs for language training purposes by offering credit toward reserve commissions and drill credits respectively, for the completion of selected language courses.

Agency Comment: DOD notes that considerable use is now being made of civilian facilities for the purpose indicated in this recommendation; that the problem involves quality rather than quantity; that the recommendations concerning ROTC language training require thorough study; and that it would be unwise to give blanket accreditation for language work regardless of the type of service for which the trainee is destined.

Additional Action Required: Completion of DOD’s study and consideration of the recommendation.

Recommendation 2 (page 273): That DOD conduct periodic surveys of service personnel procedures to insure that adequate consideration is being given to the requirements of the intelligence agencies for their share of the best qualified military personnel.

Agency Comment: DOD does not concur. DOD believes its current practices are adequate. It agrees that the highest practicable standards should be applied in the selection of attaché personnel.

Additional Action Required: None, assuming DOD’s current practices are in fact adequate.

Recommendation 3 (page 273): That DOD require that the Military Services study the problem of improving the prestige of the civilian analyst vis-à-vis his military colleagues.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that in practical terms there is no easy solution to this problem. DOD reports much has been done on the problem and that it will keep same under review.

Recommendation 4 (page 273): That DOD facilitate the employment as intelligence specialists of qualified retired military personnel by initiating action toward amending the laws concerning Federal employment of retired military personnel, with a view to removing the present ceiling on the Federal pay of such individuals.

Agency Comment: DOD believes present laws on this subject are too restricted; on the other hand it is fearful lest statutory amendments be such as to permit retired officers with intelligence experience to automatically find employment as civilian intelligence analysts. DOD reports that the CSC has developed a proposal to relax existing legislative requirements along the general lines of this recommendation.

Additional Action Required: Executive Branch processing of CSC’s legislative proposal and submission thereof for Congressional consideration.

Recommendation 5 (page 273): That DOD give consideration to more extensive use of “Schedule A” in the employment of civilian analysts and other intelligence specialists, in order to provide necessary flexibility in the recruitment of qualified civilian personnel by the military services, and to facilitate the interchange of such personnel between the Zone of Interior competitive service and the overseas excepted service.

Agency Comment: DOD agrees that greater flexibility in hiring and in the ability to shift civilian personnel between the Zone of the Interior and foreign stations is essential. It believes a degree of relaxation of Civil Service regulations is desirable to deal with these problems. DOD has initiated a thorough study of the matter.

Additional Action Required: Appropriate action by DOD following completion of its study of the problem.

Recommendation 6 (page 273): That DOD, in the consideration of future economies, give proper weight to the importance of intelligence in peace time, so as to avoid serious reductions-in-force in our centers of intelligence production.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs, noting that the purpose of this recommendation can be further served by applying such reductions-in-force as do occur to overhead positions rather than to basic productive elements.

Recommendation 7 (page 274): That DOD take prompt action to insure that proper consideration in personnel planning is given to the impact of the time lag involved in our present clearance requirements for filling sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: DOD believes this recommendation requires further study.

Additional Action Required: Further study and appropriate action by DOD.

CHAPTER X—Security (Pages 275–283)

Recommendation 1 (page 273): That any individual employed in an intelligence organization “about whom sufficient doubt concerning his security has been raised … should be removed from employment pending final determination of his case.”

Agency Comment: DOD considers that its current security practices and procedures essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. However, it reports that the general subject will be reviewed in order to insure that those objectives are adequately served.

CIA reports that it is carrying out the intent of this recommendation in that it adheres carefully to Executive Order 10450 which provides for the suspension of Federal employees when a reasonable doubt exists as to their security status. State reports that “this recommendation requires no implementation in the Department of State” … since State’s regulations do not preclude employee suspensions in such circumstances.

Additional Action Required: Strict adherence to Executive Order 10450 by the agencies concerned—such adherence will accomplish the objective of this recommendation.

Observation: State has missed the point of this recommendation. All agencies now have the authority to suspend employees under the circumstances indicated in the recommendation. The point the Task Force appears to be making is that some of the agencies fail to suspend when there is sufficient cause and it is the Task Force’s view that in the intelligence organizations of our government in particular, such suspension should occur pending final determination of the employee’s case.

Recommendation 2 (page 283): That the “findings and proposed disposition of those cases which were reported as still in process at the time the survey by this Task Force was concluded should be reported to the President.”

Agency Comment: DOD did not comment on this point.

CIA noted that under normal reporting procedures as established by Executive Order 10450, information is furnished to the Civil Service Commission or the FBI on such cases, and that thereafter the status of such cases is available to the President, through the executive agencies he has designated, to report on the implementation of Executive Order 10450.

State advises that detailed reports concerning the very small percentage of such employees in its Intelligence Area have been made available to the Civil Service Commission, and that CSC makes a composite report periodically on such cases in all government agencies.

Observation: CIA and State seem to have missed the point of this recommendation. (DOD did not comment upon it at all.) If the recommendation is deemed to have validity, the White House may wish to request that the heads of the intelligence agencies concerned report the findings and disposition of alleged security risk cases (in their intelligence areas) in process at the time the Task Force concluded its survey.

Recommendation 3 (page 283): That measures be instituted in all agencies to recheck the security status of all personnel engaged in intelligence activities at periodic intervals not to exceed 5 years in any individual case.

Agency Comment: CIA reports that this is now being done in that agency. State reports that the problem of periodic review of such cases is being given serious study, following which State will bring its views thereon to the attention of the agencies concerned, such as the CSC and the Department of Justice.

DOD considers that its current security practices essentially fulfill the objectives of this recommendation. However, the general subject will be reviewed to insure that the underlying objectives of the recommendation are adequately served.

Additional Action Required: This recommendation should be rejected.

Observation: This recommendation has been made in varying forms on a number of occasions in the Task Force report. In theory it has ostensible merit; in practice it is unsound. In lieu of subjecting employees to reinvestigations at least every 5 years a good counterintelligence program is what is needed. When employees are initially brought on board they should be exhaustively checked. Thereafter they should not be harassed by reinvestigations, but should be accepted as loyal, bona fide Americans unless counterintelligence discloses reasons for contrary views. Wholesale investigations of the type called for by the Task Force would constitute unjustifiable use of manpower and money, would not be productive of substantial results, and would be harmful to the morale of the employees concerned. Reinvestigations should be made on a selective, rather than wholesale, basis and only when there is reasonable cause therefor.

CHAPTER XI—Counterintelligence (Pages 284–292)

Recommendation 1 (page 292): That the Navy give due consideration to the requirement for additional competent and trained counterintelligence personnel in order to provide adequate security for its personnel and facilities.

Agency Comment: DOD concurs in principle, but believes that the actual method of expansion should be investigated.

Additional Action Required: Further investigation as suggested by DOD, followed by action consistent with its investigative findings and with the objective of providing adequate security for naval personnel and facilities. (See Recommendation 1, Chapter IV, D, page 10, above.)

CHAPTER XII—Maps and Libraries (Pages 293–305)

Recommendation 1 (page 305): That the IAC consider the adoption of a single index system based on the Intelligence Subject Code now in use by CIA.

Agency Comment: CIA and DOD concur. CIA reports that this recommendation is currently under study in a special subcommittee of the IAC. The subcommittee is expected to report to the IAC within the next few weeks.

CHAPTER XIII—Coordination in Overseas Areas (Pages 306–309)

Recommendation 1 (page 309): That senior military commanders in the field be given greater flexibility in their use of information on a need-to-know basis, giving due regard to the protection of its source.

Agency Comment: CIA comments that it is not aware of any complaints of restrictions on use of information supplied. CIA reports that it is fully cognizant of its obligation and responsibility to get information to the senior officer responsible for action and policy.

DOD considers that “current practices in the DOD are satisfactory within the regulations imposed by other agencies.”

CHAPTER XIV—Development of New Equipment and Techniques (Pages 310–311)

Recommendation 1 (page 311): That the IAC take positive action to insure that a definite and concerted effort is made to develop new techniques, methods and equipment for the collection and production of intelligence and insure that a free exchange of information concerning such projects is accomplished within the intelligence community.

Agency Comment: CIA reports that compliance with this recommendation will be accomplished in conjunction with IAC actions currently underway and that the means of producing intelligence on the Soviet/Sino Bloc are “always under continuous scrutiny.”

DOD concurs, stating that continuing efforts are being devoted to fulfillment of this recommendation. DOD observes that in all cases full effectiveness can be achieved only with a frank and free interchange of information.

State concurs, noting that it has initiated a number of steps in social science, psychological and research areas, all of which are designed to further the objective of this recommendation.

CHAPTER XV—“Watch-Dog” Commission (Pages 312–317)

Recommendation 1 (page 317): That a small, permanent, bipartisan commission, composed of members of both Houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens commanding the utmost national respect and confidence, be established by Act of Congress to make periodic surveys of the organization, functions, policies, and results of the Government agencies handling foreign intelligence operations; and to report, under adequate security safeguards, its findings and recommendations to the Congress, and to the President, annually and at such other times as may be necessary or advisable. The proposed “watchdog” commission should be empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needs for its own use. It would be patterned after the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission). Appointments by the President of persons from private life to the proposed commission should be made from a select list of distinguished individuals of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, and ability, with records of unselfish service to the nation.

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur in this recommendation. CIA believes, with the Hoover Commission itself, that “while mixed Congressional and citizens committees for temporary service are useful and helpful to undertake specific problems and to investigate and make recommendations, such committees, if permanent, present difficulties.” CIA points out that it now reports to the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House, and to the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. As a consequence CIA does not consider that a Joint Congressional Committee would add any essential helpful element. CIA does concur, however, in the appointment (as recommended by the Hoover Commission, but not by its Task Force) by the President of a committee of experienced private citizens to examine and report periodically on the work of the Government’s foreign intelligence activities.

DOD believes that the permanent, bipartisan commission recommended by the Task Force would afford improved protection for, as well as efficiency in, foreign intelligence operations.

Additional Action Required: None, in view of the establishment on January 13, 1956 by the President of a Board of Consultants¹² to review periodically the foreign intelligence activities of the Government.

CHAPTER XVI—Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations (pages 318–348)

This Chapter is merely repetitious of information appearing earlier in the Report. Conclusions and recommendations are restated in verbatim fashion in some instances; in other instances they are paraphrased and combined with still other opinions and recommendations contained in the body of the report. This Chapter does not appear to contain any new information. It merely restates, repeats, and reemphasizes certain of the points previously made.

Appendix

The recommendations discussed below are from Appendix I of the Task Force Report. The Department of Defense comments are supplementary to those submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence for the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), in which the Department of Defense and the three Services concur.

Recommendation No. 1

“That the National Security Council direct USCIB to establish COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, NSA, of what is required and its degree of importance.USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of producing the end product. If USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, then the latter should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.”

Department of Defense Position:

1. Concur, subject to comment.

2. Comment:

It is doubtful that IAC membership for the Director, NSA, would solve the problem; it would probably raise additional complications.

In this connection, the Department of Defense considers that the present status and membership of the IAC give rise to ambiguity which this particular recommendation would only sharpen. The IAC is unique in being neither a policy nor an operational body, but a mixture of the two. This is the result partly of unforeseen evolution within the IAC, and partly of significant changes which have occurred within the Department of Defense since the IAC was established.

To the extent that the NSC intended the IAC to serve as a policy body, its Defense membership (the three Services and JCS) is at once diffuse and incomplete in that the Service representation is largely at an operating rather than a policy level and the Secretary of Defense is not directly represented, although the JCS representative (Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee) coordinates with the appropriate elements of OSD. On the other hand, to the extent that the IAC serves as a body concerned with the coordination and formulation of intelligence estimates and the coordination of operational intelligence matters, its present formalized structure may not be entirely necessary. The three Service intelligence chiefs are suitable representation in this context, and although the Chairman, JIC, does not conduct operations, he is the appropriate indirect representative of the Secretary of Defense for these matters. In its dual capacity the IAC works, but in an unnecessarily complicated and probably uneconomical context of differing levels of activity.

The Department of Defense considers that a more desirable ultimate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence would involve a single board with policy cognizance over all aspects of intelligence. The Secretary of Defense’s representative would be an appropriate civilian official, competent to act for him. Under this board would be several specialist committees to deal with operational matters; one concerned with communications and electronics intelligence and communications security (as recommended by the Clark Task Force); another with intelligence operations; a third with intelligence production; and possibly others. Representation on these committees would be provided by the Service intelligence chiefs and other operators (such as the Director, NSA) when appropriate.

The following main points summarize the views that are crystallizing in the Department of Defense on the general subject of intelligence:

1. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense must assume final responsibility for guidance and control over all aspects of intelligence.

2. The Director of Central Intelligence as the actual executive agent must have adequate and clearly defined coordinative powers under the Secretaries of State and Defense.

3. National intelligence policy is under the cognizance of the National Security Council. However, because of the sensitive nature of important elements of intelligence, intelligence matters might most appropriately be dealt with by a Special Committee of the NSC (which is now the case, to the satisfaction of all concerned, with respect to COMINT and COMSEC matters: the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Attorney General for matters under his cognizance, with the advice of the Director of Central Intelligence, constitute the Special Committee of the NSC).

4. The concept behind USCIB has proved to be the most satisfactory solution so far in one important intelligence area. Appropriately modified, it could usefully be applied to the entire intelligence field.

The changes which this general concept would involve do not require legislation. Internal reorganization within the IAC and probably an executive order to establish the new organization would suffice.

The Department of Defense proposes to discuss this subject further with the Director of Central Intelligence and the Department of State, and hopes in due course together with them to arrive at an agreed proposal for submission.

Recommendation No. 2

“That the Director, NSA, be given clearcut directives which will enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce high-level communications intelligence. This is of such great importance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once.”

Department of Defense Position:

With respect to that portion of the Recommendation advocating “an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project” [1 line not declassified] the Department of Defense considers some expansion on the USCIB comments is warranted.

[24 lines not declassified]

With this objective in mind the Department of Defense has authorized the Director, NSA, to bring the best possible analytical brains from outside NSA to bear on the problem (if they can be found); and USCIB has recommended that this country undertake a maximum effort to [1½ lines not declassified].

The Department of Defense considers that [1½ lines not declassified] as to warrant the full force of the government behind both projects.

Recommendation No. 6

“That the Department of Defense carefully study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the three cryptologic agencies—AFSS, ASA, and NSG—with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personnel assignment policies and logistical support.”

Department of Defense Position:

USCIB considered that this recommendation pertains to an internal problem within the Department of Defense, and has accordingly referred it to this Department for comment.

The Department of Defense has long recognized that high professional standards and opportunity for a rewarding career for military and civilian personnel engaged in the communications intelligence effort must be strengthened if we are to deal successfully with the increasingly difficult technical problems confronting that effort. One means of achieving this objective is to constitute the Service cryptologic agencies as major commands. These should be subordinate neither to the intelligence nor to the communications elements within the Services, but should in each case report directly to the chief of staff. Adequate recognition of cryptology as a major operational career field cannot be otherwise achieved.

The Air Force cryptologic agency, the Security Service (AFSS), has been so constituted for approximately seven years. The AFSS is responsible for COMINT production [less than 1 line not declassified] and COMSEC activities, and in addition operated the Air Force’s ground-based ELINT stations and its SSO (Special Security Officer) system for the dissemination of COMINT. Largely because of its status as a major command, the AFSS has developed a dynamic and promising program for recruiting, developing and holding on to technically qualified military career personnel.

Until recently the Army cryptologic agency (the Army Security Agency (ASA)) was responsible for COMINT production [less than 1 line not declassified] and for COMSEC. It was subordinate to G–2. On 23 June 1955, the ASA was designated as a major command responsible to the Chief of Staff, with virtually complete cognizance over all Army aspects of COMINT, COMSEC, ELINT and communications electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM). It is anticipated that this action will facilitate development of an energetic Army cryptologic career program paralleling that of the Air Force.

The Navy cryptologic activity, the Navy Security Group (NSG), is not so constituted. It operates at a lower echelon and under divided intelligence and communications cognizance. The NSG does not nominally have a commanding officer; it functions under the Chief of Security Branch who in turn reports to the Director, Naval Communications. The responsibilities of the NSG include COMINT production [less than 1 line not declassified] COMSEC, and ELINT.

The Secretary of Defense proposes in the near future to ask the Secretary of the Navy to review the placement of the Navy cryptologic organization to determine whether a subordination and structure more closely paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force might not be advantageous.

Recommendation No. 7

“That the military Services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or ‘career’ reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. The feasibility of using [less than 1 line not declassified] should be thoroughly tested.

“It is also recommended that the Congress enact legislation to authorize the National Security Agency to employ specially qualified retired military personnel as presently authorized the Central Intelligence Agency and with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also permit the Secretary of Defense to recall retired officers to active duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA but not of the respective military services.”

Department of Defense Position:

The Department of Defense submits the following additional observations in expansion of the USCIB comment on this recommendation. As set forth in its comments on Recommendation No. 6, the Department of Defense believes that the establishment of major cryptologic commands in each of the military services will do much to promote the career possibilities advocated in Recommendation No. 7. Also, with the support of this Department, the Army and NSA are already embarked on a program to develop [less than 1 line not declassified]. Recently the Secretary of Defense endorsed a Navy proposal to augment the Naval Security Group with civilians.

With respect to the employment by NSA of specially qualified retired military personnel, the Department of Defense supports this proposal for NSA in principle as an element of the Department, but would emphasize that the highest objective standards of professional or technical skill should be applied in hiring such persons, in order to avoid possible abuses which could seriously prejudice career civilian morale.

Full consideration of the application of this proposal is currently in progress among personnel and legislative experts within the Department of Defense.

Recommendation No. 8

“That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of ‘super grades’ and positions under Public Law 313¹³ to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas.”

Department of Defense Position:

The Department of Defense is supporting the efforts of the Director, NSA, to obtain additional super grades from the Civil Service Commission. Further, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) is seeking as a priority matter (within existing legislation) to meet the request of the Director, NSA, for further inducements to selected consultants and privileges for civilians employed overseas. The consultant problem is not confined to NSA alone, and the Department prefers to resolve it for NSA as part of an over-all Department of Defense solution. Such additional legislation as may be required to achieve these objectives is also under consideration.

Appendix I¹⁴

Part 1—The National Security Agency (pages 1–58)

Recommendation 1 (page 46): That NSC direct USCIB to establish COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation of what is required and of its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of producing same. If USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, the latter should be made a member of the IAC.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers the first part of this recommendation to be in hand in that a revised COMINT requirements list, prepared with NSA participation, has been approved by a Working Committee within USCIB and will soon be presented for USCIB approval. With respect to the second part of the recommendation, USCIB does not believe that NSA membership on the IAC should be related to the development of or failure to develop USCIB directives or requirements.

DOD concurs, but is doubtful that the problem to which the latter part of the recommendation is addressed would be solved by making the Director, NSA, a member of the IAC. DOD is presently crystalizing its views on the general subject of intelligence and on the ultimate organization of the top structure of U.S. intelligence. DOD proposes to discuss the matter with State and CIA and hopes in due course, together with those agencies, to arrive at an agreed proposal for submission.

Additional Action Required: As to COMINT requirements—none. As to NSA’s membership on the IAC—defer decision pending a determination as to whether USCIB’s revised COMINT requirements constitute sufficient guidance for NSA. (In the interim consideration should be given to granting observership status on the IAC to the Director, NSA.)

Recommendation 2 (page 48): That the Director, NSA, be given clear cut directives which will enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce high level communications intelligence. This is of such great importance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once. (It is noted that in forwarding Appendix I, Part 1, the Task Force indicated that “the importance of the adoption of Recommendation 2 is especially emphasized—this is believed to be vital to the intelligence effort.”)

Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in the implication that guidance or lack thereof has adversely affected the production of high level communications intelligence. USCIB notes that “emphasis upon the guidance factor has tended to obscure the real, and critical, weakness which does exist, namely, [4 lines not declassified]. As to the proposed initiation of efforts in this field along the lines of the Manhattan Project, USCIB states that it is not now in a position to determine the nature and scope of the increased effort which might be applied to the solution of COMINT’s chief problem [less than 1 line not declassified]. USCIB believes it will be in a better position to decide this matter as a result of NSA’s plan for implementing the new COMINT objectives list, or as a result of a special study which is being undertaken by highly qualified, technical experts in an effort to [less than 1 line not declassified] problem referred to above. USCIB is convinced that maximum assistance would be provided to NSA in the solution of its major problem by the [2 lines not declassified]. Based thereon, the Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT (Sec/State and Sec/Def) has agreed that an optimum, if not indeed a prerequisite, step toward [2 lines not declassified] and should be accorded maximum priority. To that end the Special Committee has authorized marshalling of all relevant [less than 1 line not declassified] resources of the intelligence agencies.

Additional Action Required: Reconsideration by NSC’s Special Committee for COMINT of the recommended expansion of NSA’s efforts.

Observation: Such reconsideration should be deferred pending completion of the study and related steps referred to by USCIB and summarized above.

Recommendation 3 (page 49): That ELINT and COMINT be integrated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysis of the product and guidance and coordination in the collection and dissemination of ELINT. The authority of operational commanders over the integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged. USCIB or the combined board which is recommended in this report to replace it should exercise only policy control over ELINT matters.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes this recommendation has been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID No. 17¹⁵ and by the DOD Directive on ELINT dated July 13, 1955.¹⁶ USCIB believes no further action should be taken on this recommendation until these recent directives have been implemented and tried.

Additional Action Required: Following a reasonable trial period the reference directives should be re-examined in the light of this recommendation.

Observation: The USCIB response is unclear. By inference it appears that ELINT has not been placed under NSA, as recommended by the Task Force.

Recommendation 4 (page 50): That the military services and NSA continue to strive for a higher degree of cryptographic security; that the problem of communications security be restudied by USCSB (or the combined board as recommended in this report) with a view to reducing to the lowest practicable level the quantity of information released through telecommunications; and that NSC 168¹⁷ be re-examined to ascertain if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority to carry out his COMSEC responsibilities.

Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the need for a higher degree of communications security and feels that efforts to attain this end should continue; however, it does not consider that the recommendation falls within the purview of USCIB.

USCSB reports that, at all times, the military services and NSA keep the problem of cryptographic security under thorough review. USCSB concurs in the recommended review of NSC 168, but notes that in essence this review is already underway pursuant to the provisions of NSC 168 itself.

Recommendation 5 (page 51): That a single board with appropriate technical subcommittees have policy guidance over communications intelligence and communications security. If the recommendation to place the evaluation and analysis of ELINT under NSA is adopted, then policy guidance for ELINT as well as COMINT and COMSEC should be exercised by the proposed single board.

Agency Comment: USCIB is not now willing to recommend establishment of a single board “because the basic functions and organizational arrangements within a number of the interested agencies are sufficiently divergent to justify the continued separate existence of USCIB and USCSB.” USCSB opposes the recommendation because of the difficulties of implementation which would result from the establishment of a single board, as proposed.

Recommendation 6 (page 51): That DOD study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective services of the three cryptologic agencies—AFSS, ASA, and NSG—with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personnel assignment policies and logistic support.

Agency Comment: USCIB endorses the aim of this recommendation but considers it a problem internal to DOD. DOD believes that one means of achieving the objective of this recommendation is to constitute the service cryptologic agencies as major commands. The Air Force Cryptologic Agency (AFSS) has been so constituted for about seven years. The Army Cryptologic Agency (ASA) was designated as a major command following the submission of the Task Force Report. The Navy Cryptologic activity (NSG) is not so constituted at present; DOD will in the near future ask the Secretary of the Navy to review his cryptologic organization to determine whether it might be re-established on a basis paralleling that of the Army and the Air Force.

Recommendation 7 (page 52): That the military services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or “career” reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. The feasibility of using civilian intercept operators should be tested. It is also recommended that Congress enact legislation to authorize NSA to employ especially qualified retired military personnel with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also permit Sec. Def. to recall active officers to duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA, but not of the respective military services.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD reports that full consideration of these proposals is currently in progress within DOD.

Recommendation 8 (page 54): That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of “super grades” and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in this recommendation. DOD also concurs and is taking the steps it deems appropriate in an effort to accomplish the objectives of this recommendation.

Recommendation 9 (page 55): That USCIB or its successor board clarify the objectives and functions of intelligence liaison detachments with NSA, establish uniform procedures to be followed for such detachments in their relationship with NSA, and specify maximum numbers of personnel to be assigned for liaison duties after examining the extent of interest of each agency concerned. Intelligence personnel assigned to liaison duty with NSA should be required to attend an indoctrination course conducted by NSA.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not concur in this recommendation. It agrees that mutual familarization with the requirements, capabilities and operations of both NSA and consumer agencies is desirable; it feels, however, that because the necessary functions of intelligence liaison detachments vary continuously with the missions of the consumer agencies and the character of COMINT production activities, the arrangements called for by this recommendation cannot successfully be rendered uniform.

Additional Action Required: Decision as to whether the view of the Task Force or the view of USCIB should be adopted.

Observation: USCIB’s view is most sound. The Task Force recommendation should be rejected.

Recommendation 10 (page 56): That NSA and the three cryptologic services give greater emphasis to, and continue to develop mutual cooperation in, improving the technical factors of intercept stations.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs. Greater emphasis has been given this matter and USCIB considers the arrangements which have been undertaken in this regard to be satisfactory.

Recommendation 11 (page 56): That more thorough periodic reinvestigations of personnel be made. Particular effort should be concentrated on persons occupying the more sensitive positions.

Agency Comment: USCIB has established a special committee to investigate the matter, and USCIB is prepared to act on whatever recommendations are made by that committee.

Observation: See “Observation” Section of Chapter X, Recommendation 3.

Recommendation 12 (page 57): That the Director, NSA, be given authority to inspect the service cryptologic schools and make appropriate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is affected.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs.

Part 2—Communications and Electronics in Support of Intelligence Activities (pages 1–44)

Recommendation 1 (page 37): That an Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee (ICES) to the Combined Intelligence Board (this assumes that USCIB and USCSB have been combined into a single board, as proposed elsewhere in the report) be established to review and produce recommendations to the Combined Intelligence Board with respect to all communications and electronics proposals from intelligence activities which call for facilities, equipments, or additional personnel which cannot be obtained from existing resources; and to supply technical advice to the Board on such matters as it might request.

Agency Comment: USCIB does not agree. It believes that the spirit of this recommendation is being accomplished by expert communications and electronics advice provided from within the agencies concerned with the subject.

Additional Action Required: None, assuming the USCIB comment on this recommendation is accurate.

Recommendation 2 (page 38): That more effective use be made within DOD of the high potential value and know-how available in the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with communications and electronics problems related to the broad intelligence field. Responsibility should be placed on that group for reviewing and commenting on communications and electronics requirements that the NSA considers necessary to meet the intelligence objectives, and the demands being placed by NSA on the special communications and electronics groups in the military services under NSA operational control; and for submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on ways and means to insure maximum coordination and effectiveness in the over-all communications and electronics effort in support of intelligence.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that existing procedures for reviewing and commenting on NSA requirements are satisfactory.

Recommendation 3 (page 38): That more effective technical advice be injected into USCIB deliberations to permit development of more appropriate statements of the intelligence objectives to be accomplished by communications or electronics means.

Agency Comment: USCIB agrees with the spirit of this recommendation and believes that it is now being carried into effect.

Recommendation 4 (page 38): That the present basic policy for the provision of point-to-point communications services to intelligence community activities from existing governmental or civil communications services be continued. That any attempt to set up separate, duplicate, or paralleling point-to-point communications facilities be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in the first sentence of the recommendation. It agrees with the second sentence to the extent of believing that no separate facilities should be established for intelligence use without full consideration by appropriate authority.

Recommendation 5 (page 39): That a basic policy of utilizing existing facilities, services, and equipment to the maximum degree be applied wherever it is determined to be technically feasible in the COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC operations (this applies particularly to certain aspects of the technical training phases, operational procedures, and logistics); that exceptions to this policy be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation 1, above.

Agency Comment: USCIB considers that the spirit of this recommendation is now being carried out. It does not agree that the additional review, (called for in the last sentence) is either necessary or desirable.

Recommendation 6 (page 39): That any arrangements with respect to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to the immediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the need to keep electronic countermeasures (ECM)—a tactical weapon—clearly under military operational control.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes that this recommendation has been overtaken by the issuance of NSCID 17 and the related Department of Defense Directive of July 13, 1955.

Recommendation 7 (page 39): That all planning and operation of communications and electronics efforts in support of intelligence activities include full consideration of the following to meet national emergency conditions:

a. Day-to-day operation and training be based on realism in light of the situation and facilities expected to be available in time of war or national emergency. This applies in a special manner to planning operations to be effective in case of heavy jamming operations.

b. Key intelligence installations, served by costly, hard-to-replace electronics equipment and associated records be located outside established target areas. That these installations have integrated plans for national emergency or disaster operations. That all agencies involved in planning new, alternate, or emergency locations for Federal agencies expedite action to assist NSA in its current efforts to obtain a suitable site.

c. Pending accomplishment of b, that effective interim disaster plans be developed promptly for each key intelligence installation to include as a minimum (1) alternate site, (2) installed and tested minimum equipment with necessary basic records at the alternate site, and (3) adequate knowledge of disaster plans by key personnel.

Agency Comment: USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-a and considers that it is now being carried out. USCIB agrees in principle with Recommendation 7-b but notes that the great extension of target areas by fallout hazards would require relocation at such great distances that reduction in operational efficiency would be unacceptable and the agency concerned would be unable to retain or attract key personnel. USCIB reports that plans for the location of alternate NSA sites are now being developed by DOD. USCIB concurs in Recommendation 7-c and reports that it is being carried into effect except for bulky, costly, and complex cryptoanalytic machinery.

Recommendation 8 (page 40): That the present basic communications (cryptographic) security plan, providing for centralized control with effective decentralization of operations, be continued; that each agency and service maintain effective inspection and vigorous training programs to reduce to the minimum cryptographic operational security violations.

Agency Comment: USCSB concurs, noting that the Communications Security Plan referred to represents, in reality, a number of communications security arrangements each of which is considered satisfactory.

Recommendation 9 (page 40): That NSC determine ways and means to control more effectively release of valuable intelligence to potential enemies via clear text messages being transmitted over government and civil communication networks.

Agency Comment: USCSB considers that the policy responsibility for control of governmental clear text messages falls within its charter. It reports that it has long recognized this problem and is working toward its solution. It does not believe that the problem is one for NSC consideration. USCSB considers that the policy responsibility for control of nongovernmental clear text messages over civil communications networks is outside its purview.

Additional Action Required: Referral of the nongovernmental aspects of the subject to Commerce for consideration in the light of its NSC-assigned responsibilities relating to the safeguarding of unclassified strategic information.

Recommendation 10 (page 40): That the general tendency within the communications intelligence and the communications security agencies to overemphasize the special security facets of their operations with respect to basic communications and electronics features be examined objectively and comprehensively by [a] competent, technically qualified authority to insure that such overemphasis is not producing unnecessary duplication of facilities and operations in peacetime which will grow to completely unrealistic figures in wartime, and producing a system which may fail in an emergency because it will require considerable readjustment of basic operational practices at a critical time.

Agency Comment: USCIB believes existing procedures for review of communications requirements are adequate. USCIB does not believe that the security aspects of COMINT are significantly overemphasized. Accordingly, USCIB opposes creation of the special committee called for by this recommendation. USCSB, in essence, concurs in USCIB’s view; it believes that no separate examination of the problem is required.

Recommendation 11 (page 41): “SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION”: That the President set up a special commission composed of technically qualified civil and military communications and electronics representatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and means to insure the more effective utilization of all communications and electronics resources of the United States in the national interests in case of war or national emergency. (This recommendation was singled out by the Task Force as one worthy of special emphasis and as one believed to be of great importance.)

Agency Comment: ODM expressed the view (7/6/55)¹⁸ that the Report which was shortly thereafter to be made to the NSC by the Science Advisory Committee would contain organizational recommendations somewhat more far reaching than those suggested in the Task Force Report and, if adopted, would probably satisfy the recommendations of the Task Force Report.

Additional Action Required: DOD, ODM and CIA views should be obtained on this recommendation, including recommendations as to its implementation. (The ODM comment of 7/6/55 is not specific enough to assess the validity of the Task Force recommendation.)

Appendix II¹⁹

The Clandestine Services of the Central Intelligence Agency

Recommendation 1 (page 42): That the “covert intelligence” and “cold war functions” of the Deputy Director/Plans be assigned to separate Deputy Directors whose areas of responsibility should be administratively and logistically self-supporting.

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur, noting that the recommended system had been tried prior to 1952 and abandoned; that CIA’s experience during the period of separate operations proved the operational disadvantages of attempting to conduct on a secure and efficient basis two worldwide clandestine organizations, each compartmented from the other.

Additional Action Required: See Chapter II, Recommendation 1, Page 1, above.

Recommendation 2 (page 42): That the part of CIA’s July 15, 1952 Directive appointing area division chiefs as executives of the DCI and providing for their direct dealing with him and senior overseas representatives²⁰ be rescinded.

Agency Comment: CIA reports this Directive has been reviewed and rescinded.

Recommendation 3 (page 42): That the DCI re-establish the office of Executive Director of that agency.

Agency Comment: CIA is opposed to this recommendation on the ground that the interposition of another command echelon would not necessarily accomplish the intent of the recommendation. Further study, however, is being given the subject.

Observation: Because this is purely of an intra-agency character, it would seem appropriate to defer to DCI’s judgment thereon.

Recommendation 4 (page 42): That CIA’s espionage and counterespionage programs against Soviet targets be intensified.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs fully, noting that it is assiduously pursuing the course recommended. Recent organizational changes have stimulated a more intensified effort on the part of the clandestine services in the espionage and counterespionage fields.

Recommendation 5 (page 42): That the proposed annual CIA psychological warfare budget and allocations be submitted for NSC approval and subsequent changes presented by DCI to the OCB.

Agency Comment: CIA does not agree. CIA notes that the recommendation is inconsistent with the charter and function of the NSC; that NSC is an organ for the formulation of basic policy; that NSC does not have the time and staff required to consider details of budgets and funds allocation. CIA notes that in developing its psychological warfare budget, it is careful to conform to policy established by the Council, and to request Council authorization for any proposed action which is not covered by existing policy. In addition it is the practice of DCI to keep the NSC closely informed concerning psychological warfare programs.

Additional Action Required: Decision as to whether the Task Force recommendation should be adopted.

Observation: In view of the reasons advanced by CIA, all of which are valid, the Task Force recommendation should not be adopted.

Recommendation 6 (page 42): That the inducement phase of the Defector Program, as applicable to active participation by diplomatic and military representatives serving overtly abroad, be discontinued.

Agency Comment: CIA does not concur. It notes that cover employed by CIA personnel overseas often precludes direct contact with potential defectors and the use of overt diplomatic and military personnel for this purpose is a natural and essential adjunct to the defector program, provided their activities are closely coordinated with CIA. CIA believes that the fact that such work may result in occasional embarrassment is a calculated risk which it considers worthwhile inasmuch as the intelligence and cold war gains for defection or recruitment of Soviet personnel are considerable.

Additional Action Required: Expeditious review of NSCID No. 13 by IAC and, if necessary, NSC.

Observation: This recommendation of the Task Force is not fully consistent with its recommendations on pages 137 and 205. (On page 137 the Task Force recommends greater participation by the military services in the Soviet and Satellite defector inducement program; on page 205 the Task Force recommends that the military services be permitted greater latitude in offering inducements to potential defectors.)

Recommendation 7 (page 43): That the program for training of specialists in covert intelligence collection and for the development of linguists be intensified.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs and has in effect a number of measures the objectives of which coincide with this recommendation. A mandatory quota of five per cent of all clandestine service personnel are in training at all times.

Recommendation 8 (page 43): That submission of individual budgets to the CIA Project Review Committee by the area division chiefs be discontinued and funds for each cold war component be prepared under the supervision of its chief and submitted for the component to the Project Review Committee.

Agency Comment: CIA observes that this recommendation is based on a separation of CIA “cold war” and “covert intelligence functions” with which CIA does not concur. It notes, however, that in relation to its existing organization the programming system of the clandestine services now being put into operation assures a review by the DDP and his staff of the budget recommendations of the area divisions of CIA clandestine services.

Recommendation 9 (page 43): That the number of auditors of the regular CIA audit staff be increased materially.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs. This action is being taken as rapidly as possible in line with an internal organization survey made by CIA several months ago.

Recommendation 10 (page 43): That greater efforts be exerted to establish long-range deep cover for CIA personnel serving covertly overseas.

Agency Comment: CIA concurs. It has been working toward the objective of this proposal for many years. As a result of a current review of all aspects of “cover,” recommendations are now being studied which are designed to produce better results in this complex field.

Recommendation 11 (page 43): That the NSC render a specific interpretation of the provisions of paragraph 4-b, NSC 5412/1 as it affects the several members of the intelligence community.

Agency Comment: CIA notes that the reference paragraph directs that the DCI shall be responsible for “informing through appropriate channels and on a ‘need-to-know’ basis, agencies of the U.S. government, both at home and abroad, including diplomatic and military representatives, of such operations as will affect them.” CIA reports that it has been scrupulously careful to keep other agencies appropriately informed pursuant to the “need-to-know” principle; and that it is trying constantly to remedy and prevent individual instances of failure on the part of its personnel in their efforts to strike the difficult balance between the proper range of interests of another agency and the restrictive principle of “need-to-know.” CIA points out that as a standard procedure it provides individual briefings for Ambassadors and other State personnel, Defense Commanders, Chiefs of Military Missions, Attachés, etc.

Recommendation 12 (page 43): That the CIA Act of 1949 be amended to authorize the employment of “any” (instead of fifteen now authorized) retired officers or warrant officers of the armed services.

Agency Comment: See Chapter II, Recommendation 12, Page 4, above.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of White House Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 13, Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956. Top Secret. President Eisenhower had referred the classified Clark Task Force Report (Document 221), along with departmental and agency comments on applicable sections of it, to Dillon Anderson, the President’s Special Assistant, on December 15 for further action and recommendations as appropriate. This report is Coyne’s compilation of the departmental and agency responses, including his added “Additional Action Required” and “Observations,” which he completed in early 1956. (Memorandum from Anderson to Goodpaster, February 14, 1956; Eisenhower Library, Hoover Commission Report on Intelligence Activities, May 1955–October 1956, and memorandum from Coyne to NSC Executive Secretary Lay, January 20, 1956; ibid.) Some documentation on departmental and agency responses to the Clark Task Force Report are ibid. and in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1955–60, 711.52 and 711.5200. All ellipses in the original.
2. Document 192.
3. See footnote 10, Document 221.
4. Dated January 19, 1949; text is in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 429.
5. Security Requirements for Government Employment, April 27, 1953. (18 F.R. 2489)
6. Not found.
7. Document 256.
8. A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff, Job 84–B00389R, Box 4.
9. Document 252.
10. The U.S. Civil Service Commission defined “Schedule A” positions as those jobs that were other than confidential or policy determining in character, and for which it was impractical to require examinations. “Schedule A” positions also were excepted from the regular competitive U.S. Civil Service. (5 CFR, 1956 SUPP., 6.100)
11. IAC–D–54, approved July 24, 1952. (Central Intelligence Agency, Community Management Staff, Job 82–00400R, Box 2, Folder 9)
12. Regarding the creation of this board, see Public Papers: Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 72–74.
13. Reference presumably is to the law relating to the compensation of the professional and scientific services in the War and Navy Departments, approved August 1, 1947. (61 Stat. 715)
14. This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret; U.S. Eyes Only; Handle Via COMINT Channels Only.
15. Document 259.
16. Document 230.
17. The title of NSC 168, November 1953 was “Communications Security.” Documentation on this NSC paper is in the National Archives, RG 273, Policy Papers.
18. Not found.
19. This section of Coyne’s report was classified Top Secret.
20. Printed in Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman , pp. 465–467.