Upon the recommendation of the Acting Director of Central Intelligence,
his enclosed memorandum and its attached draft Directive on the subject
are circulated herewith for consideration by the National Security
Council.
As recommended in paragraph 3 of the enclosed memorandum, the Departments
of State and Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are being requested
to transmit to this office their respective comments for Council
consideration in connection with the enclosed draft Directive.
Enclosure7
Washington, January 11, 1951.
DRAFT NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTIVE on
RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIA (OPC) WITH RESPECT TO GUERRILLA
WARFARE
The Problem
1. To determine the appropriate responsibilities of CIA (OPC) in the field of guerrilla warfare.
Definitions
2. For the purpose of this study the several types of military or
paramilitary forces which may be involved in armed conflict are
defined as follows:
- a.
-
National Military Forces. Organized
and uniformed military elements which are organically
components of a national military establishment.
- b.
-
Guerrilla Forces. Organized bodies
of politically motivated and predominantly indigenous
irregulars, in or out of uniform, not organically a part of
national military forces, trained and equipped for armed
conflict of specialized character and for limited
objectives.
- c.
-
Underground Resistance Forces.
Politically motivated and predominantly indigenous
individuals and groups organized and trained clandestinely
for covert subversive operations against the state and, when
opportunity offers, for semi-covert physical operations,
including armed conflict. In the latter stages, underground
resistance movements tend to become identical with guerrilla
organizations.
Discussion
3. This study deals with the respective roles of the U.S. Military
Forces and CIA (OPC) in the exploitation of friendly
guerrilla forces in order to determine the responsibilities of
CIA (OPC) in this field.
General Responsibilities of CIA (OPC) in Guerrilla Warfare
- a.
- This organization is the national agency responsible under
specified conditions for the “planning, preparation and
execution” of the various types of covert operations enumerated
in NSC 10/2. Some of these
operations do not involve armed conflict and will not be
discussed in this study. Some of the physical types of covert
operations might indirectly involve armed conflict but it is
primarily in the field [Page 78]
of guerrilla warfare that responsibilities of CIA (OPC) and the national military forces
overlap.
- b.
- The responsibility of CIA
(OPC) with respect to
guerrilla operations differs in peace and war. In peacetime,
OPC formulates doctrine and
technique for utilization and employment of guerrilla warfare,
plans guerrilla warfare operations to be implemented in case of
war in response to and consistent with the requirements of the
military authorities, and within the limits of feasibility,
makes the physical preparations necessary for such
implementation. It foments, supports and conducts only such
peacetime guerrilla operations as may be authorized by the State
Department with the approval of the Department of Defense. In
wartime, OPC implements plans
previously prepared, and continues the planning and execution of
guerrilla warfare operations within the framework of
organization and command specified in NSC_______.8
Characteristics and Capabilities
of CIA (OPC) in Support of Guerrilla Warfare
4. a. The covert operations of CIA
(OPC) “do not include armed
conflict by organized military forces.” Therefore CIA (OPC) has no responsibility for the organization,
training or operations of such units as “Commandos,” “Rangers,”
etc., which are in all respects organic components of national
military forces. This does not, however, prevent mutual arrangements
between the national military forces and CIA (OPC) for employing
the same facilities, when appropriate, for the training of
individuals or groups in subjects of common interest.
b. A distinguishing characteristic of guerrilla operations by CIA (OPC) is the employment of relatively limited numbers of
American CIA (OPC) personnel. This consists of
individual operatives and leaders rather than large bodies of men.
Such personnel, however, must have specialized qualifications,
including linguistic and political background, imagination,
resourcefulness and initiative. They must have access to clandestine
intelligence sources. They will be concerned with such intricate
matters as establishing initial contacts with appropriate leaders of
underground or guerrilla forces in enemy territory, gaining their
confidence and developing their capabilities by furnishing
communications, weapons, equipment and training, and by exercising
such controls over their organization and operations as will insure
that their activities support U.S. political and military
objectives.
c. These operations will generally be strategic rather than tactical
in nature. Initially and usually they will be deep in enemy
territory and will require special intelligence, communications and
covert transportation [Page 79]
facilities. In the initial phases, the fomentation, development and
exploitation of indigenous underground and guerrilla forces should
be exclusively a responsibility of CIA (OPC). Without
wasteful duplication, the national military forces could not be
expected to have the assembled talent and flexibility of
organization for such operations.
d. Most resistance activities and movements in their earlier stages
are covert in character, and have their origins in the successful
establishment and operation of underground organizations. As they
begin to develop strength, these movements have a tendency to come
out into the open and under proper circumstances, including support
by the local population, favorable terrain, and assistance from the
outside, develop into organized resistance movements on a major
scale. Assuming the successful development of large-scale and
relatively well organized resistance movements behind enemy lines
resulting from successful covert operations or originating
spontaneously, the control and exploitation as well as the support
and provisioning of such resistance movements should become the
responsibility of the theater commanders whose interests are most
directly affected or benefited.
e. However, such guerrilla movements never entirely lose their covert
characteristics in that they maintain contacts with underground
operatives located in cities and in or near centers of enemy
control; and moreover, in that they depend for their survival upon
extreme mobility and secrecy as to their location and movements as
of any given time. Finally, they remain highly political in their
nature and inspiration, and for this as well as other reasons
already mentioned, cannot be used against all types of objectives
and targets. It follows that even though control and direction of
large organized resistance movements should pass to the senior
military commanders, there remains the necessity for close
cooperation by and assistance from those experienced in covert
operations.
Responsibility of the National
Military Forces in Unconventional Combat Methods
5. a. As previously stated, guerrilla forces are not to be confused
with organizations such as “Commandos” and “Rangers”. These latter
are organized by and are organically a part of the national military
forces. The combat operations of these types of units will often
require methods similar to those employed by guerrillas. The
training of such organizations will, in some respects, be analogous
to that of guerrillas. Their operations can best be described as
employment of “unconventional combat methods” by orthodox
forces—unconventional only in the sense that they have been little
exploited in the American Military Forces and are more flexible and
adaptable to circumstances than those of conventional combat
units.
b. Independent Commando-type units can accomplish close-in or distant
raids for a variety of purposes. They may include airborne or [Page 80] landing operations.
Ranger-type units, organic to the division, consist of specially
equipped personnel trained in hand-to-hand combat, furtive movement
and individual resourcefulness in all situations. They are adept at
infiltration and disruptive tactics behind enemy lines. The activity
of these units is limited to the zone of combat of the parent
division and is employed to assist the division in carrying out its
specific missions. These units may at times employ local indigenous
inhabitants. While they employ tactics similar to guerrillas,
neither Commando nor Ranger operations are deemed to be guerrilla
operations, and CIA (OPC) has no responsibility respecting
them.
Responsibility of the National
Military Forces in Guerrilla Warfare
6. a. The national military forces rarely, if ever, will be in
position to assume responsibility for the covert techniques required
in fomenting guerrilla movements, establishing initial contacts with
existing ones, and in the early development of the movements into
appreciable military assets. This is the mission of CIA (OPC) and that agency should be afforded all feasible
logistical support by the military forces.
b. In wartime, a guerrilla movement having successfully been built up
to a certain magnitude, may require military direction and
logistical support from an appropriate military commander similar to
that furnished regularly constituted forces under his command. Such
direction and support will exceed the resources of CIA (OPC). At this time, control, exploitation and supply of
the movement should be assumed by or assigned to the appropriate
military commander. Nevertheless, for reasons stated in paragraph
4–e, CIA (OPC) personnel should either serve as, or continue to
be a part of, the operating link between that commander and the
guerrilla forces.
In some cases a decision by the theater commander becomes
necessary as to whether or not command of the guerrillas should
pass. In a few cases, attended by profound political
implications, consultation in the matter of command will be
advisable between the theater commander and higher
authority.
Conclusions
7. a. Guerrilla warfare is defined as the operations of organized
bodies of politically motivated and predominantly indigenous
irregulars, in or out of uniform, not organically a part of national
military forces, trained and equipped for armed conflict of
specialized character and for limited objectives.
b. CIA (OPC) is the agency of this Government which in
peacetime has the sole responsibility under specified conditions for
the planning, preparation and conduct of guerrilla operations. In
wartime CIA (OPC) is responsible for continued planning and conduct
of guerrilla [Page 81] warfare,
subject to the provisions of NSC___________,9 and in collaboration with the
national military forces as follows:
CIA (OPC) is responsible for the development of
existing guerrilla movements and the fomentation of new
ones; and for the control and support of guerrilla
operations until their magnitude requires that such control
and support be passed to an appropriate military commander.
Such elements of CIA (OPC) as may be required should
either serve as, or continue to be a part of, the operating
link between that commander and the guerrilla forces.
Recommendations
8. That the National Security Council accept the Discussion as
guiding principles and approve the Conclusions.
