Policy Planning Staff Files
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff ( Nitze ) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Counselor’s Paper on International Control of Atomic Energy
Though agreeing with much of this paper, there are a number of important points where I would place a different weight on the various considerations.
As I see it, there are two important new facts dealt with in this paper and five interrelated problems on which these facts have a bearing. The two new facts are (a) the demonstrated Soviet fission bomb capability, and (b) the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviets and of ourselves.
The five problems on which these facts have a bearing are:
- (a)
- whether the United States should accelerate its program to determine the feasibility or non-feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon;
- (b)
- whether our strategic plans and our related objectives and programs should be revised in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union or for other reasons;
- (c)
- whether the present policy of the Defense Establishment with respect to the conditions under which atomic bombs would be used in the event of war should be revised;
- (d)
- whether our present position with respect to the international control of atomic energy should be revised; and
- (e)
- whether our public relations stance with respect to atomic energy should be revised.
With respect to these problems and the order in which it is suggested they be taken up, the following considerations appear to be pertinent:
(a) There are considerations which make it advisable to accelerate the program to determine the feasibility or non-feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon while deferring a determination as to whether to manufacture the weapon for stockpile, if it should prove feasible. Even though there may be some tendency to manufacture for stockpile if the investment has been made in testing feasibility, the major portion of the investment would be useable either for fission or thermonuclear weapons. It must be assumed that the U.S.S.R. is proceeding with a program in this field, and it would seem that the military and political advantages which would accrue to the U.S.S.R. if it possessed [Page 14] even a temporary monopoly of this weapon are so great as to make time of the essence. The possibility that an incorrect decision as to stockpiling or use might at sometime in the future be made does not appear to warrant a further delay in initiating an accelerated program to test feasibility. On this subject, it is recommended that a paper along the lines of Arneson’s draft1 be submitted to the National Security Council working group.
Problems (b) and (c) are closely interrelated. There are important general policy considerations in favor of a use policy based solely on retaliation in the event of prior use by an enemy. These include the deep abhorrence of many of the people of the United States to the use of weapons of mass destruction, the improvement in our public stance toward atomic energy throughout the world if we are able to adopt such a policy, and the greater possibility of achieving our political objectives during and at the conclusion of a war if it is possible to avoid the use of weapons of mass destruction during such a war. Added to these are the strategic considerations flowing from the expected growth in the U.S.S.R.’s atomic bomb capabilities. Certain of the military experts have estimated that within five to ten years our present net strategic advantage in atomic weapons may be neutralized. This equation would be materially affected by the U.S.S.R. development of a thermonuclear weapon inasmuch as we seem to be more vulnerable to the use of such a weapon than is the Soviet Union.
A final determination as to use policy can only be arrived at after much fuller joint study with the Defense Establishment than has as yet been possible. Such a study could take place under the aegis of the National Security Council in connection with the currently scheduled review of U.S. objectives, commitments and risks, or as the result of a special directive to the National Security Council as suggested in Arneson’s draft paper on the thermonuclear program. The political, psychological and moral imponderables bearing on this problem as they affect our strategic plans and our related objectives and programs would seem to fall in whole or in part within the competence of the State Department.
It is recommended that the State Department representatives go into such a study with a preliminary presumption in favor of such a revision of our strategic plans as would permit of a use policy restricted to retaliation against prior use by an enemy.
The two most difficult points to meet will be (1) what do we substitute for the present presumed deterrent effect of our atomic bomb [Page 15] policy to Soviet military aggression, and (2) in the event of Soviet military aggression, what do we substitute for our present net atomic strategic advantage.
As to (1), the following points should be taken into consideration. On the one hand, the deterrent effect of an atomic bomb capability and a willingness to use it is not necessarily eliminated by an opposing atomic bomb capability. On the other hand, the present use policy of the Defense Establishment may impede the establishment of those conditions under which a more general relaxation of tension between the U.S.S.R. and ourselves might be possible.
It is also possible that a use policy, based solely on retaliation, would not wholly eliminate the deterrent effect to Soviet military aggression of our atomic capability. They would never be quite certain that we would in fact stick to such a policy if the nature of their aggression too deeply upset the moral sense and vital interests of the people of the United States and of the world in general. This problem of the war deterrent effect of various formulations of atomic policy is one where the primary responsibility is that of the State Department. It is recommended that a more intensive study of this problem be undertaken within the State Department as part of the backstopping of our representatives in the National Security Council study.
The second problem, as to what we substitute in the event of war for our present net atomic advantage, is the most difficult problem to face up to. If it is correct that this net advantage is a declining asset in any case, this is a problem which must eventually be faced, irrespective of a decision on use policy. Certain of the problems involved are primarily of a military character, but it is recommended that the State Department require a full justification from the military as to its position. The questions are of so broad a nature that they would appear to rise above mere technical considerations to a level where it should be possible to make them clear to non-technical minds. Insofar as no strictly military substitutes are practicable, the problem becomes one of prime responsibility to the State Department.
It is recommended that no final decision on use policy be taken until the suggested review of strategic plans under (b) has been completed.
(d) As recommended in the Counselor’s paper, a final decision as to a revision of our position with respect to international control of atomic energy should not be made until the National Security Council study is completed and a decision made on use policy. It does not appear clear to me, however, that if the decision is made to adopt a policy of holding atomic weapons only for retaliatory purposes that the recommendations of the Counselor’s paper as to international control [Page 16] necessarily follow. It would appear to me that three sets of considerations would still have to be carefully weighed.
The first one is whether a control scheme such as it envisages actually gives greater assurance against the possible use of atomic weapons than the retention by the United States of an adequate retaliatory capability. In part, this requires a judgment as to the adequacy of the inspection facilities which it would provide. If inspection cannot be judged to be adequate, a scheme of this kind may give rise to continuing uncertainties and frictions which could be as disturbing to the world’s sense of security as the continued holding of atomic weapons by both sides. Furthermore, the analysis of the Counselor’s paper indicates that it is improbable that the U.S.S.R. would itself initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction. If this improbability is backed up by an adequate power of retaliation on our side, it would appear that if we adopt a use policy limited to retaliation that the chances that atomic weapons would be used against us would be small. It would appear sensible that we go into an international control scheme only if the effect thereof is clearly to improve the chances that atomic weapons will not be used against us or our allies.
The second set of considerations go to the point of whether the suggested scheme is negotiable. Even though some of the U.S.S.R. objections to the U.N. proposal have been eliminated, it is difficult to conceive of the U.S.S.R. being willing to abandon even on an interim basis its position as to peacetime uses. There is also a real question as to whether the U.K. and the Canadians would go along with the suggested scheme.
The third set of considerations go to the point of whether a successful negotiation on international control of atomic energy is practicable for us, for our allies, and for the U.S.S.R. except in the context of a broader program for the relaxation of tensions between the East and West. This leads to the question of whether further progress toward working out German and Japanese peace settlements, a mutual withdrawal of troops from the center of Europe, and a program for the limitation of conventional armaments must not be made before we can realistically expect a satisfactory agreement on atomic energy.
(e) Our present public stance toward atomic energy is undoubtedly confusing and may be detrimental to us in the light of General Bradley’s testimony that the atomic bomb would be “our principal initial weapon in any war”. This should certainly be clarified. For our public stance to be soundly based, however, it is necessary for us first to decide on our positions with respect to (a), (b), (c) and (d) above. Certainly if a modification is made in our use policy our public stance could be greatly improved, even though it should be decided that our position with respect to international control can only be modified in the event of a better and more effective plan being proposed or as [Page 17] part of a more general relaxation of tensions. If it were decided that the present use policy of the Defense Establishment cannot be revised, in the absence of convincing evidence of a change in U.S.S.R. attitudes such as would be implied by an acceptance by them of approximately the present U.N. proposals for international control of atomic energy, the reasons therefor could be clarified and our public stance made less confusing.