330/2–850: Telegram
The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Secretary of State
138. In course conversation with Bebler latter’s request this morning, Gross asked him reasons for proposing yesterday that communications from Chou En-lai concerning Chinese representation in UN be distributed as SC documents.1 Gross wondered whether Bebler considered some action to settle Chinese representation questions and get Russians back into UN essential.
Bebler replied strongly in affirmative. He said UN before world public opinion now in very strong moral position in face of Russian walkouts constituting “ultimatum” against UN and universal idea of UN. He was sure that in very short time moral position would be reversed if through failure of UN to resolve present situation large part of world (Eastern Europe and China) were kept out of UN.
Emphasizing our adherence to principle of universality and hope Russians would return Gross, however, raised following two points:
- (a)
- Referring situation of Yugoslavia and recognizing that although Yugoslavia probably wants Russians back in anticipation possible difficulties, Gross emphasized that resistance to ultimata and blackmail itself involved important principle. One day this might be of critical importance to Yugoslavia itself, if the price of appeasement was raised higher and higher. Question we all had to examine was price we might have to pay to keep Russians in UN in terms of giving them facility for turning spigot on or off from time to time on one pretext or other. Such denial of principle loyal observance majority rule would foster development chaos.
- (b)
- Gross questioned whether Chinese Communists really want to get in in view of their attitude towards recognition by, for example, UK, India, etc.
Bebler recognized point made by Gross under (a) required serious consideration. On point (b), Bebler thought question of seating: Chinese Communists in UN and recognition by individual governments were two entirely separate questions. He referred in this connection to Yugoslavia’s position ad hoc [Political] Comite favoring: admission Bulgaria, et cetera despite adverse state relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
Bebler went on to say he thought fundamental question involved was independence China. He was sure Mao could not have stayed in. Moscow two months without independence China being involved. He felt that longer Chinese Communists kept out UN the more we would be playing into hands Russian effort to isolate China from West [Page 226] and destroy Chinese independence. He believed recent history of his country pointed a lesson and said “I would be last to want to discourage Titoism in China”. He concluded with somewhat illogical explanation that he had raised question yesterday hoping SC might take action in absence Soviet representative, thereby depriving Soviets of argument they had forced the action.
Please relay American Embassy Belgrade as USUN 3, Moscow as USUN 3.
- For the proceedings of the February 7 meeting under reference, see SC, 5th yr., No. 5, pp. 33 and 34.↩