611.35/8–2550
The Ambassador in Argentina (Griffis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)
Dear Eddie: Following my wire to you on Tuesday1 that Mallory and I had had a long conference with Paz and Remorino unofficially on Korea and officially on wool, a publicity curtain descended although the brief announcement was apparently given out by the Foreign Office that I had called on Paz and Remorino and that they expected to consult with the President and the Cabinet on Wednesday noon in reference to the international situation. Neither Wednesday night’s nor Thursday’s papers referred in any substantial way to the Cabinet meeting and Remorino, who had promised to call me between three and four on Wednesday, was not heard from.
We ferreted him out yesterday, Thursday, and I have just returned from luncheon with him. In brief, he stated that the Cabinet had considered the Korean matter at length; that they had, as he expected, come to the conclusion that they could furnish no ground forces but that they felt that the solution would be to offer the services of certain ships of the Argentine Merchant Marine to aid in the transport of personnel and/or supplies. He did not make the categorical statement but the implication was clear and at the end of the luncheon he stated that he expected to fly to Washington next Tuesday or Thursday, August 29th or 31st, would call on you and discuss the matter with [Page 732] the chiefs of operation at the Pentagon. If this eventuates it seems to me it will be real progress.2
During the luncheon Remorino was bursting with optimism regarding the progress of Argentine-American relations and I played very sour and disparaging. This brought the query from Remorino as to the reason for my depression and I told him that it was not my position to criticize his chief, but that I felt that Perón had gone a long way in his recent utterances to undo all the good work that you and Remorino and I had done for a year. I went over, word by word, the recent statements of his chief which brought forth the usual defense “for home consumption”. I told him that we felt that there were plenty of subjects for home consumption but that all of Perón’s utterances were printed in the United States and that there were just two subjects that he must avoid if he wanted our cooperation and friendship, these being the tax [attacks?] on so-called capitalism and the tax [attacks?] on the independent papers here which roused the fighting ire of every newspaper in the United States. I said that I didn’t really give a damn what he said so long as he confined it to local problems, to Communism, to Argentine agriculture or even nosing into Brazilian politics, so long as he did not bite the hand that fed. There was little left unsaid. Remorino seemed in complete agreement and urged that I have a personal talk with the President which I shall try to do. Yet, I hesitate in the wisdom of it until this aid to the United Nations is settled and I am still pessimistic enough to give small odds that a clear cut offer of aid will not be forthcoming; yet, I believe strongly that both Paz and Remorino are doing their best to secure it. You will be interested to know that Remorino expressed his somewhat grudging admiration for Paz and his continued enmity towards Cereijo.
My feeling regarding this whole Korean matter and Perón’s outburst of violence culminating in his statement that La Prensa and La Nacion were controlled by enemies of Argentina and friends of capitalism and that Communists and capitalists were “now at one another’s throats” and would inevitably destroy each other, making way for justicialism, came as a result of the hornet’s nest which was stirred up throughout the country as a result of the signing of the Rio Pact and stated approval of the United Nations’ Korean policy in such a short time.
This feeling was, I think, expressed in letters to you at about that time3 and as the days have drifted by I believe that my diagnosis has [Page 733] been more than ever confirmed. Perón just simply lost his nerve and felt that he had better put the nation back on his side and follow the old theory that attack is the best defense. Writing more in sorrow than in anger, I am afraid that this is the real Perón who will put himself first in every crisis, who can run like a deer and who regrettably may be found looking out the window whenever the pinch comes. I do not want to destroy the gentle idealism of a distinguished young Assistant Secretary of State towards a great, sic, statesman, but I gather from some of your recent notes that it is pretty well destroyed anyway. It is all very sad.4
[The remainder of this letter deals with problems encountered by United States newspapermen and United States firms in Argentina.]
- Telegram 136, August 22, 1950, not printed.↩
- In telegram 161, September 11, 1950, the Department stated: “Remorino offered UN Sep 11 unspecified quantities canned and frozen meat delivered US port. … Dept puzzled Remorino’s failure offer volunteer forces after having told Asst Secy Miller Sep 6 he expected (offer to include them. Appears possible Remorino’s instrs changed after he left BAires.” (795.5B/9–1150)↩
- Notably in the Ambassador’s letter of July 20, 1950, to Mr. Miller. (611.35/7–2050)↩
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In a letter of August 14, 1950, to Ambassador Griffis, in reference to statements by President Perón, Mr. Miller had said in part: “I am sorely tempted to call up our mutual friend Gaston and tell him to terminate the negotiations for the loan but I promise you I will refrain from doing so. We have to be completely scrupulous in showing our good faith over a sufficiently long period of time so that the Argentines can always know that we live up to our side of bargains.” Mr. Miller also suggested that an approach to Sr. Perón on this subject by a private American individual might be more effective than one from any official quarter. (611.35/8–1450)
In a letter of September 1, 1950, from Buenos Aires, to Mr. Miller, Ambassador Griffis reported in part that he had asked Mr. H. A. (“Bill”) Arnold (who had previously been scheduled for an interview with President Perón) to discuss with the latter the problems created for U.S. policy by his recent statements regarding capitalism and freedom of the press and to encourage him in his policy of support for the UN action in Korea. The Ambassador indicated that Mr. Arnold had complied with his request. (611.35/9–150)
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