714.001/11–1550

The Chargé in Guatemala (Wells) to the Department of State

secret

No. 508

Subject: Speculation Regarding Arbenz’ Attitude and Future Policy Toward the Communists.

Now that Lieutenant Colonel Jacobo Arbenz has been elected1 to succeed Arévalo to the Presidency on March 15, 1951, the big question on everyone’s mind is “Will Arbenz divorce his administration from the strong Communist influences which have compromised the present Government?” The question is an important one to us due to the bearing of the Communist problem on our relations with Guatemala.

Observers, Guatemalan and foreign, are inclined to argue the question pro and con, but in general the feeling of optimism outweighs that of pessimism, and the majority share the belief that the coming Arbenz administration will veer somewhat toward the center and that the Communists will be quietly pushed aside even if not entirely eliminated from their present positions of influence. This does not imply that extremism will disappear. To the contrary, even should the Communists disappear from the Governmental scene, leftist nationalism will remain to carry forward the 1944 revolution, and, no doubt, will produce its quota of problems for United States-Guatemalan relations.

The Embassy presently is inclined somewhat to the optimistic side. At the same time, the consensus of staff opinion is that effective steps toward curbing the influence of the Communists cannot logically be expected between now and the time Arbenz is inaugurated on March 15, 1951. In the first place, best evidence is that the preeminence of the extremists within the Government is due in very large measure to President Arévalo’s own complacency, tolerance and sympathy. More and more the Embassy finds it difficult to reconcile Arévalo’s overt friendship with international Communists such as Cesar Godoy,2 Pablo Neruda, and others, with his protestations of devotion to purely democratic principles. All too many Communists owe their position, or their happy abode in Guatemala, to the personal patronage of Arévalo or members of his immediate official family. For example, when Pablo Neruda visited Guatemala only a few months ago, he was virtually a State guest. His hotel bill was paid personally by Hugo Salguero, pro-Communist private secretary to Arévalo, obviously out of the President’s confidential funds.… [It is reported] that Arévalo is too compromised to do anything about the [Page 923] Communists, and, therefore, cannot be depended upon to take effective anti-Communist measures in the last weeks of his term of office unless the international situation should force his hand.

A very good example of Arévalo’s handling of Communists is the recent appointment of Julio Estrada de la Hoz as Under Secretary of Communications (Embassy’s Despatch no. 347 of September 29, 1950.3 Estrada de la Hoz is generally regarded as a covert Communist. Under his editorship, the semi-official Diario de la Mañana consistently reflected pro-Communist sentiments. The only pro-Soviet editorial in the Guatemalan press (apart from the Communist newspaper Octubre) following the invasion of the Republic of Korea appeared in Diario de la Mañana, presumably from the pen of Estrada de la Hoz. Assistant Secretary of State Miller took the occasion to mention this to President Arévalo on July 3. (Embassy’s Despatch no. 8 of July 6, 1950.3) Later, the Foreign Minister told me he was very glad the Assistant Secretary had spoken to the President about the editorial, since it would strengthen his own hand in trying to do something about the pro-Communist slant of that newspaper. Nevertheless, a few weeks later President Arévalo appointed Estrada de la Hoz as Under Secretary of Communications, a position he now holds concurrently with the editorship of Diario de la Mañana.

Regardless of Arbenz’ opinion on the subject, it is doubtful that he will become a “back-seat driver” as President-elect to the extent of forcing forthright action on Arévalo. It would not appear to be good politics for him to do so, although he may exert his influence quietly in the right direction. Such influence, for example, might take the form of supporting the nomination and, election of non-Communist deputies in the Congressional elections of mid-December. Conceivably he could urge upon the Government the adoption of limited anti-Communist measures. Before last week’s presidential election, several indirect hints came from Arbenz that he would, in fact, issue a public statement denouncing Communism following the elections (when he no longer needs their votes). Then there is persistent talk that the Army is very unhappy with the state of internal affairs in general and is going to back Arbenz in a determined anti-Communist policy.

The skeptics argue that Arbenz himself is also too compromised by and in debt to the extremists to make a clean break possible, not to mention doubt as to his real ideological sentiments. Also, some argue, the scandal of the Arana assassination, in which Arbenz, the Caribbean Legion, and the Communists are popularly believed to be associated, gives these latter elements a black-mailing grip on the President-elect which he will not be able to loosen. The Embassy places little importance on the last argument. Guatemalans in general have [Page 924] shown a cynical attitude toward the Arana assassination as evidenced by their votes. Admittedly, however, a forthright anti-Communist stand would force Arbenz to disavow politically many of his closest friends and campaign supporters (such as Jose Manuel Fortuny, Victor Manuel Gutiérrez, and Manuel Pinto Usaga), to risk alienating the political affections of such covert pro-Communists as Roberto Alvarado Fuentes (Secretary General of Partido Acción Revolucionaria and Vice President of Congress), and to ignore much of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria platform upon which he was nominated (Embassy’s Despatch no. 251 of February 23, 19504). Party principles should not constitute a serious obstacle. Despite the many fine campaign speeches to the effect that his candidacy was one of principles in contrast to the traditional personalísmo, the Embassy would characterize Arbenz as an Arbencista and a realist, rather than a devotee to ideological principles. It is not thought he would have any qualms about forgetting the so-called party platform if it should suit his purposes to do so. The many covert pro-Communist and pro-Communist suspects, such as Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, Hector Morgan and Roberto Alvarado Fuentes, who guide the destinies of Partido Acción Revolucionaria today, already have proven themselves realists by disguising whatever Communist leanings they may have, and they can be expected to go along with any ostensible anti-Communist program Arbenz thinks is required by political circumstances. As for the avowed Communists, such as Fortuny, Pinto Usaga, Gutiérrez, Guerra Borges,5 Pellecer6 and Ernesto Marroquin Wyss, who have been prominent on the Arbenz bandwagon, there are many inconspicuous Government jobs which could be used to take care of them quietly if practical politics made a clear break too difficult.

As for the Communists, currently they seem to be riding a crest of enthusiasm. The censure of Minister of Government Monzón for his anti-Communist measures was considered a victory, reversing a short-lived trend against them. The Communist school “Jacobo Sanchez” is again in full operation, the Communist newspaper Octubre has reappeared, and all reports are the extremists are now fairly confident of the future in view of the Arbenz landslide.

Conclusion

It is the Embassy’s opinion that our attitude must continue to be one of “watchful-waiting”, with little expectancy of decisive anti-Communist developments between now and next March 15, but with [Page 925] restrained optimism as to the long-range policies of the coming Arbenz regime.

Milton K. Wells
  1. In the election held November 10–12, 1950, Colonel Arbenz received more than 60% of the votes cast. Gen. Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes was runner-up and Jorge García Granados was third.
  2. César Godoy Urrutia of Chile, an adviser of several Guatemalan labor leaders.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not printed.
  5. Not printed.
  6. Head of the Jacobo Sanchez labor school and editor of the newspaper Octubre.
  7. Carlos Manual Pellecer Durán, Secretary of the Confederación General de Trabajadores de Guatemala.