396.1 LO/5–350: Telegram
The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State
Secto 110. Second US–UK bilateral FE problems May 2 devoted entirely to China.1 Dening’s opening remarks supplied theme for discussions and it is believed supply clue to Bevin’s approach to Secretary. He said probably chief area of difference US–UK policies was over China. He suggested while tactics differ long term aims probably identical. We both would agree, he stated, we don’t want China irrevocably in Soviet camp. In employing divergent tactics let us be careful not to hurt each other.
In Foreign Office estimation Chinese situation will develop along one of following lines:
- a.
- Peiping will turn more and more to USSR in order sustain itself.
- b.
- Titoism may develop out of Soviet attempt dominate Chinese scene. No evidence as yet.
- c.
- CPG will fail and people will overthrow it. Little likelihood of such an eventuality. There are no opposition leaders in sight.
- d.
- CPG through own efforts will make China strong and vigorous nation.
Kremlin faction in Chinese politics obviously has upper hand but domination far from complete. US support Formosa, blockade of Shanghai and bombing Chinese cities have been largely responsible for extension Soviet military power as far south as Shanghai.
Bevin very appreciative Secretary’s statement on FE policy;2 statement on Formosa especially did much to clear atmosphere.3 There still appears to be misunderstanding in US that UK tactics are dictated by commercial interests. This definitely not the case. Real motive is if West disembarrasses itself of China it will leave field entirely to USSR. Presence of UK mission in Belgrade largely instrumental in growth of Titoism. This accounts for UK persistence in attempting negotiate with CPG. In this connection there have been no new developments re establishment diplomatic relations with CPG and Foreign Office now considering submission to Cabinet of paper recommending UK Chargé d’Affaires be authorized to inquire of CPG what its real purpose is in delaying negotiations and intimating in event unsatisfactory reply Chargé d’Affaires will discontinue efforts.
Bevin when he talks to Secretary will not suggest US adopt different tactics toward China; he will merely urge US not to take any action which will make UK position untenable. If UK is forced out of China all West interests will share same fate, and East-West division which we all so anxious to avoid will become accomplished fact.
In replying to Dening, Merchant stated that for our part we would agree on primary objective as stated with addition that US and UK were in accord in attempting to prevent Chinese Communists from building up their military potential. We said US probably further away from considering recognition than at time of Foreign Ministry talks in Washington last September.4 Referring to his statements re Shanghai blockade we said here was another instance of disagreement re tactics. While US recognizes the distorted propaganda value of blockade, effect on Communists, including multiplication of economic and administrative difficulties, should not be discounted.
Dening was inclined to doubt whether blockade was having material effect on Communists who he felt had little regard for popular suffering. He thought attack on Chusan which is anticipated in near future would be not so much to break blockade as to obtain base for invasion [Page 994] of Formosa. He quoted UK Chargé d’Affaires Peiping as reporting Communist military program remains paramount consideration for them. China, he pointed out could continue to subsist under conditions of total blockade as it did during war with Japan.
Dening reported that on initiative MacDonald5 in Singapore UK was thinking of informing CPG that it was prepared to accept Communist consuls everywhere except in Malaya, even at the expense of closing of UK consular offices in China. If it were decided to raise this issue it would have to be done before arrival of UK Ambassador otherwise UK might be faced with necessity withdrawing him in event of extreme Communist reaction.
Dening felt that even if US could not arrive at decision to recognize Peiping there were certain things we could certainly do in concert, such as closer coordination re propaganda. He felt we should not make our propaganda too blatant but use subtler methods to encourage Titoism, and we should be careful to ensure our propaganda was not harmful to UK position.
Dening inquired whether US representatives Taipei would intervene with Nationalist Government authorities in behalf of UK to attempt to obtain release of four British registered merchant ships now held by them. We said if we had particulars I should be glad to refer matter to Washington.
Sent Department Secto 110, repeated Paris 727.
- The meeting was held in Dening’s office following the second meeting of Subcommittee C at 2:30 p. m.; for a report on the work of Subcommittee C, see Secto 89, p. 938.↩
- For the text of Secretary Acheson’s address to the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco on March 15, see Department of State Bulletin, March 27, 1950, pp. 467–472.↩
- For the texts of the statements by President Truman and Secretary Acheson on Formosa, released to the press on January 5, 1950, see ibid., January 16, 1950, pp. 79–81.↩
- For documentation on the September Foreign Ministers talks, see Foreign Relations, 1949, volumes iii , iv , and v .↩
- Malcolm MacDonald, Commissioner General for Singapore.↩