CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 151: Secto Cables

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State
secret

Secto 126. During third US–UK bilateral on FE problems May 3,1 Dening renewed his scarcely veiled criticism US policy. He said he hoped to get Bevin to inquire of Secretary what US position in China really was. He said White Paper2 and Secretary’s talk at San Francisco contained passages hardly flattering to a friendly government. Given US inability to recognize Communists, what were relations with Nationalists? When Formosa falls what will be US reaction? Will it [Page 995] result in greater pressure from Congress and public to do something? Will US recognize the Nationalist government in exile?

Merchant quoted Secretary as publicly saying although US is not considering recognition present regime, it retains affection for Chinese people and relies on course of events to bring to surface fundamental conflicts between China and USSR. He said US military attach high importance to strategic value of denying Formosa to Communists. Although permanent maintenance of Formosa in present hands improbable, US not prepared take steps which might contribute to earlier collapse. He expressed personal opinion that it would be highly improbable that US would recognize a Nationalist Government in exile, and hence for an indefinite period we would probably recognize no Chinese Government. Re present regime, there are certain fundamental requirements upon which we feel entitled to insist if we are to consider recognition. There comes a point where recognition can become symbol of humiliation rather than a beacon. From beginning US did not feel immediate recognition was proper answer.

In directing conversation to problem of Communist China in SC, Dening pointed out this was yet another instance of divergence of views. In long run, he argued, one cannot from legal viewpoint exclude a charter member merely because one does not like his ideologies. UK not prepared to make deal with CPG re SC in return for establishment diplomatic relations. On other hand, Ceylon for example anxious obtain UN membership and Ceylon should not be indefinitely excluded merely because US has a quarrel with Peiping and Moscow.

In reply to query from Merchant, Dening said consideration had been given to breaking of Shanghai blockade but it was now felt that occupation of Chusan would in itself lift blockade. In fact it would not be UK but Moscow which through its assistance to Peiping would break blockade. In order to obtain Moscow’s military assistance, Peiping likely had to make a deal of some sort, nature of which future course of events will bring to light. After fall of Formosa will Moscow withdraw?

In Dening’s view Japan presents almost equally gloomy picture. While West continues to fumble, Peiping and Moscow are taking offensive. Sino-Soviet treaty clauses re Japanese peace treaty show Communists have something in mind. Will probably insist on attending treaty conference if only for nuisance value, or Moscow itself may call a conference. If US–UK accept invitation, Moscow may have nothing substantial to propose; if they decline, they will be made to bear onus. Obvious Japanese Communists have been inspired in their present agitation for peace treaty. In UK view US policy of “sliding into a peace treaty” is wrong. Japan by nature is “same leopard” and [Page 996] present piecemeal treatment only whets its appetite. Prospect of obtaining kind of treaty needed diminishes with time. Soviets might suggest, for example, returning of salmon fisheries to Japan in order to buy Japanese support for something it can’t use. Japan may soon be in position play off one side against another. Japanese bargaining position improving daily. One constructive step might be joint study of political and economic implications Japanese trade with China. Merchant reiterated present inability discuss treaty.

In general wind-up of FE discussions Dening stated UK convinced present China policy right and should continue. Problem is how to square UK policy with continued nonrecognition by US. Is this divergence to be perpetuated? At least we should avoid taking policy actions without consulting one another in order that adverse reaction can be minimized. Dening said he regarded with envy close UK–US relation in Middle East on all levels. In Far East there is little close consultation in higher brackets. This he regarded as a most serious gap in Anglo-American relations which he earnestly hoped present talks would help bridge. Dening recommended development of facilities for frequent consultation on highest plane—if not between Foreign Ministers than between Ambassadors and respective Foreign Ministers. We asserted equal interest in close relationship, stressing its existence re SEA.

Foreign Office now preparing brief on FE talks indicating areas of agreement and disagreement and agreed recommendations. Substance will be forwarded soonest.3 In brief colloquy identity US–UK views re Indonesia and Thailand confirmed.

Sent Department 126; repeated Paris 738.

  1. The meeting was held at 3:00 p. m. in Dening’s office.
  2. Under reference here is the China White Paper, United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), made available to the public on August 5, 1949.
  3. This paper was circulated as UKUS/P/8, “Agreed Anglo-American Report summarizing discussions on China held at the Foreign Office on May 2nd and 3rd,” dated May 5, not printed (Conference Files: Lot 59 D 95: CF 24). Regarding the consideration of this paper by the U.S.–U.K. plenary on May 5, see Secto 164, May 5, p. 964.