Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

396.1–LO/5–450: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Preparatory Meetings to the Secretary of State

secret

London, May 4, 1950—midnight.

Secto 142. Third [Fourth] meeting Bipartite US–UK Sub-committee R on FE and SEA took place this afternoon¹ to consider item 12 [11] US–UK agenda, with Hare and Palmer for US and Dening, Murray and Fry of Foreign Office² and Garner and Fowler of CRO for UK.³ Following questions discussed:

I. Indian Sub-continent.

A. UK and US roles.

Hare followed line recommendation one of D–5.⁴ UK representatives emphasized limitations placed on their use of influence in light sensibilities in Pakistan and, more particularly, India, to anything which they interpret as pressure. Dening thought US might have thought at times UK might have taken bolder lead in Indian-Pakistan problems and that UK on occasion has asked us to do too much. UK found it consistently necessary guard against giving any impression either Dominion of desire regain political influence which it had lost when two Dominions given independence. Any form of pressure which might give this impression would divert our ends. Hare emphasized that we were stressing assistance, not admonition. We realized limitations of UK in latter regard, but we felt that personal relations between UK and these countries, close economic relations between them, experience which UK has had in area and Commonwealth ties gave UK unique opportunity to strengthen area. While we certainly do not want to suggest anything in nature of dividing area of world in spheres of influence, we felt that in view of many world-wide interests, it was natural that in certain areas one power or the other should assume initial responsibility. In case of Indian Sub-continent, it was natural because of ties mentioned above that UK should continue assume this function. This analysis is what had lead us to our conclusion that US should act in complementary role in Indian Subcontinent to that played by UK.

Dening agreed this concept.

B. Kashmir.

Hare followed line recommendation 2 of D–5.⁵ UK representatives felt that while partition may be ultimate solution of Kashmir problem, it would be grave mistake to indicate in any way at this juncture that we were considering such possibility. This is largely question of tactics. Once we gave India any inkling that we might give way on plebiscite we would have nothing to hold them to. If India knew we were considering partitition and dropping plebiscite, her demands under partition formula would become extreme. Hare emphasized we were merely suggesting our two governments give sympathetic consideration to any future proposal if made by UN representatives or parties. Would UK be prepared to go this far? UK representatives very hesitant, particularly drawing distinction between suggestion for partition by UN representative and one which might be agreed to by two parties. They would not go so far as to oppose in principle but thought agreement both parties essential in any real settlement.

C. French and Portuguese possessions.

Hare followed line recommendation 3 of D–5.⁶ Fry said UK understands negotiations between Indians and French in Paris going slowly but well. Dening seemed think that on whole French taking realistic and reasonable attitude, and that its main concern is to get out of situation without loss of face. Re Portuguese possessions, Portugal maintains enclaves part of metropolitan Portugal and are unwilling discuss any change in sovereignty, although they do appear willing discuss treatment of Indians in territories. Whole question Portuguese possessions presents awkward problem to UK in view its treaty alliance with Portugal on one hand and its Commonwealth ties with India on other. At present time problem not acute. Should it become so, UK will use its best efforts with both sides to bring about friendly settlement, but contemplates no action at present.

D. General Indian-Pakistan relations.

Garner said UK much relieved at outcome Nehru-Liaquat talks and are pleased with progress made in ensuing economic conversations.⁷ However, there are still many factors in situation that cause concern, especially Indian troop dispositions on Punjab frontier. Despite New Delhi agreement, India has made no move, so far as UK aware, to withdraw troops. In recent conversation during Liaquat’s visit here Ikramullah⁸ said he was satisfied Nehru’s sincerity in Delhi agreement, but indicated his doubt as to Nehru’s ability control situation. He thought, for instance, Nehru had lost control of situation in Bengal disturbances. All in all, UK feels basic factors still exist for recurrence of recent crisis, perhaps in even more serious form.

II. Afghanistan.

Hare followed line recommendation 4 of D–5.⁹ Hare said he felt Afghanistan has little to attract USSR in itself, but now it has great significance in relation to India. If and when USSR should make move against Afghanistan, it would probably mean USSR ready to move against India. Dening agreed this concept and said UK did not see any sign of overt or covert USSR activity in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, he thought Kremlin might well feel, as proved to be case in China, that there was no need to do anything except sit back and watch things deteriorate internally at which time it would be able take advantage of situation. Re Afghanistan-Pakistan dispute, Dening thought about all we can do is to wait and to see results diplomatic approaches which UK has suggested to various countries representing Afghanistan. Garner said Bajpai¹⁰ has told Nye¹¹ that India does not agree 100 percent with Pakistan’s claims and that it therefore does not feel that it should take diplomatic action with Afghanistan. Nye nevertheless thinks that there is still chance India could be persuaded. UK representatives did not feel there would be much hope for successful settlement this dispute if it were referred UN.

III. Burma.

Hare followed line D–7.¹² UK representatives indicated appreciation our policy that US aid complementary to that of UK and Commonwealth. Dening gloomy re possibilities effective assistance to Burma, emphasized particularly difficult nature of Burmese themselves and suspicions which they harbor. In view uncertainty present Burmese situation, UK somewhat hesitant extend too much assistance. Hare gave brief résumé our thinking re aid to Burma, pointing out it was not large but emphasizing psychological effect which it could have in helping stabilize present situation. In light recent events with China, Hare pointed out attention now focused on Southern Asia. Burma critical spot and unstable situation is commanding much attention throughout world. He wondered if Burma fell to Communists at some time in future whether we would be able defend our policies and say we had used our imaginations and ingenuity to utmost in order devise ways of saving Burma. Dening said he thought UK could satisfactorily defend its position on this score. UK willing and anxious help Burma, but main difficulty is with Burmese themselves. Without Burmese cooperation there was a definite limit to what could be done. In response Hare’s question, Dening thought present GOB best on horizon as unstable as it is. He mentioned disturbing telegram which had been received this morning from British Embassy Rangoon reporting possibility coup d’etat by Ne Win¹³ after Thakin Nu¹⁴ has left for UK, but said British Ambassador inclined minimize.

1. The meeting was held at 3 p. m. in the India Office.
2. James D. Murray, Head of the Southeast Asia Department, and Leslie A. C. Fry, former member of the British High Commissioner for India’s staff.
3. Joseph J. S. Garner, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Sir Robert W. D. Fowler, Commonwealth Relations Office representative on the United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations.
4. Recommendation one of FM D D–5, “Problems of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent,” dated April 25, not printed, stated that the United States role in this area should supplement and not supplant the role of the United Kingdom. This did not mean an abdication of any United States presence, rather that the United States would give special study to the economic and political problems of the area to determine where it might be the greatest help and where its activities would best dovetail with those of the British. (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Meeting C, D Series)
5. Recommendation two stated that the United States should express its appreciation for the role which the British have played in the negotiations between India and Pakistan at the United Nations and indicate its full support of these efforts.
6. Recommendation three stated that the main United States interest in the French and Portuguese possessions was that they should not become trouble spots. The United States felt that the French referenda in their four remaining possessions was the realistic way to determine their future and felt that the British might use their influence in Portugal to get the Portuguese to adopt a similar view with respect to Goa.
7. Documentation on the talks between Prime Ministers Nehru of India and Liaquat of Pakistan on April 2 in New Delhi and April 26 in Karachi, including the agreement on the protection of minorities in the two states is schedued for publication in volume v.
8. Mohammad H. E. Ikramullah, Secretary in the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Documentation on Prime Minister Liaquat’s visit to the United Kingdom, United States, and Canada during April and May is scheduled for publication in volume v.
9. Recommendation four stated that the United States would continue to provide moderate aid to Afghanistan with the aim of maintaining its stability as a buffer state between the U.S.S.R. and the subcontinent. The United States should continue to urge moderation on the Afghans in their border dispute with Pakistan and should encourage the British to take similar action with the Pakistanis.
10. Girja Shankar Bajpai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
11. Archibald Nye, British High Commissioner in India.

12. The recommendation in FM D D–7, “The Role of US and Commonwealth Aid to Burma,” dated April 13, not printed, read as follows:

    “It is recommended that, should the subject of aid to Burma be raised during the coming Anglo-American talks, we re-emphasize our policy that US aid to Burma is conceived of as complementary to that to be given by the UK and Commonwealth. It might be pointed out that we consider the Burma situation critical and believe that a real effort must be made to keep it from falling under Communist domination because, if Burma falls, all of Southeast Asia will be gravely imperilled.”

    A second draft of this paper, FM D D–7/a, dated April 24, not printed, contained a similar recommendation. (CFM Files: Lot M–88: Box 149: May FM Files C, D Series)

13. Dt. Gen. Ne Win, Commander of the Burmese Government forces fighting the Karen insurgents.
14. Thakin Nu, Burmese Prime Minister.