663.001/2–1450: Telegram
The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Secretary of State
252. Deptel 175, January 30.1 We agree Western Powers should take steps strengthen sovereign control Austrian Government in event no treaty. Possible actions fall into two classes: Proposals to Soviets, which it is unlikely they will accept, but which should be given full publicity to demonstrate Soviet responsibility for continued occupation; and measures which can be put into effect by Western Powers alone. Actions should, of course, not prejudice treaty negotiations, since no mitigation of occupation can satisfy Austian population as taking place of treaty nor should they endanger present functioning of quadripartite controls as long as Soviets continue reasonable adherence thereto.
In first phase we recommend proposal to Soviets for immediate termination of occupation. When this is refused, we may then press for substantial reduction of occupation forces, abolition of zonal boundaries, renunciation of occupation costs, and elimination of unnecessary functions of AC.
In likely event Soviet rejection of these proposals it will be impossible to alter basic pattern of occupation, but significant steps can be taken to ease burden somewhat. Such steps would have to go beyond French proposals; US at least has already terminated most controls in its zone and further reduction of administrative staff could not effect considerable reduction of occupation forces. We see four possible fields of relaxation: [Page 371]
- (1)
- Renunciation of occupation costs by British and French.
- (2)
- Termination of comparatively few unilateral controls maintained in Western zones, most important being order that Military is not to deal with Austrians on local level, and abolition of all Military Government Courts.
- (3)
- Appointment of Civilian High Commissioner, which would symbolize end of military phase of occupation.
- (4)
- Reduction of occupation forces. Actual security functions of troops are now minimal, chief need is to have forces available in emergency. We suggest this might be met partly by encouraging Austrians to increase size and efficiency of police forces, partly by combining troops in Austria and Germany under one command so that forces could be quickly brought in if necessary. If no reduction is possible, burden of requisitioning might be decreased, and a main source of complaint against occupation forces eliminated, by stationing troops in barrack areas away from centers of population, and by initiation of housing project under US auspices, possibly from counterpart funds, to construct or repair housing units equivalent to those occupied by US Forces.
These suggestions made on assumption that unilateral Soviet actions will not fundamentally change present situation. Contrary assumption discussed separate telegram which follows.2 In any event, and to counteract possible Soviet and Austrian misapprehensions regarding our future intentions, we recommended that any steps towards relaxation of occupation be accompanied by strong reaffirmation of our continuing interest in Austria and our determination not to desert Austrian people.
This message has been shown USFA, but in absence of High Commissioner does not, of course, have their concurrence. General Keyes may be reached through P and O,3 Department of Army, for his comments.
Sent Department 252; repeated London 38, Paris 36.