703.00/10–450: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Austria (Keyes) to the Department of the Army
secret
Vienna, October 4,
1950.
P–5631. For JCS and State from PACG signed Keyes.
- 1.
- Subject is Communist disturbances in Austria.
- 2.
- As Allied Council chairman I convened the British and French High Commission on 28 September to discuss the Communist provoked disturbances arising from the recent wage/price agreement. All were in agreement that the Soviet element has given active assistance to Austrian Communist elements that instigated the recent riots. As a result of this meeting we decided that a formal protest should be made at the 28 [29] September meeting of the Allied Council and that we should, in advance, advise responsible Austrian representative of our action.
- 3.
- Accordingly, I summoned Chancellor Figl, Vice Chancellor Schaerf and Minister Helmer to my office the morning of 29 September and in the presence of the British High Commissioner and French Deputy Commissioner told them of our plans and pointed out to them the steps we felt they should take. I emphasized to the Austrian Government representative the need for them to utilize all security resources and adequate publicity in party news media to prevent internal disorder. I stated that the employment of occupation TPs to supress disorders would, in my opinon, be the ultimate step in diplomacy and could be used as a pretext by the Soviets to counter with similar measures by Soviet armed forces.
- 4.
- The Chancellor stated his conviction that the Austrian police and gendarmerie were loyal and would carry out their duties dependably. He felt that the majority of the demonstrators on 26 September were either spectators or impressed into joining the marchers. He acknowledged the seriousness of committing US, British and French TPs to quell any future riots. Minister Helmer likewise vouched for the integrity and loyalty of his police, but attributed any ineffectiveness to the serious material shortages they suffered. He needed immediate rubber clubs, steel helmets, tear gas, tear gas masks, carbines, machine pistols, and ammunition. Possible supply sources were discussed, and the French Deputy Commissioner promised to check on the availability of former German equipment in France. Minister Helmer complained bitterly of Soviet interference in the transfer of police reserves from the Soviet sector of the city, as well as other restrictions placed upon the employment of police.
- I carefully pointed out that should US TPs ever be committed, they would be forced to rely upon their arms and not on their numbers which would undoubtedly mean bloodshed. In conclusion, the Austrian office [officials] expressed gratitude for the understanding shown by the US element and were firm in their conviction that the Austrian Government would be able to cope with the situation once the number of police have been increased and the necessary weapons provided.
- 5.
- The statements of the four High Commissioners in the Allied Council on 29 September were transmitted in paragraph 7 of our P C 25431 of that date.1
- 6.
- The control of demonstrations in Vienna is governed in detail by the Vienna inter-allied command decision of 9 January 1947. This may be found on page 9 of the Allied Commission Gazette for January 1947, No. 14.2
- 7.
- On 3 October the chancellor tendered a letter to the Allied Council reporting a conference between the Vienna police president and the acting Vienna Soviet city commandant. The Soviet representative, Colonel Pankratow, declared that Soviet orders issued last week which restricted the movement of Austrian police from the Soviet sectors of Vienna would remain in force. Only police who had been removed by order of the Soviet authorities could leave. Dismissals and transfers of police officials in the Soviet sectors would not be carried out without the consent of the Soviet element. Police forces of the Soviet Zone would not be employed in another zone. Finally, the Soviet acting commandant demanded the immediate dismissal of the police commandant of the 21 bezirk. This was characterized by [Page 409] the federal chancellor as contrary to the control agreement, an obstacle to the preservation of law and order, and constituted Soviet support of activities directed against the Austrian Government. Since it was an avowed task of the Allied Commission to support the Austrian Government, the chancellor drew the conclusion that the actions of the Soviet element were therefore directed against the Allied Council itself. The federal chancellor’s letter was referred by the allied secretariat to the Vienna inter-allied command which held a meeting at 1430, 4 October to consider it. After a 2 hour session, during which the Soviet representative refused to consider a US proposal to notify the police president that he had full authority to dispose of his forces as he saw fit, the letter was returned to the allied secretariat in disagreement. The Soviet member would neither confirm nor deny that he had given the unilateral instructions as charged in the chancellor’s letter. He insisted that no further instructions to the Austrian police were necessary beyond the standing allied orders of 1947, and denied that the Soviet element had violated the control agreement or past VIAC agreements.
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Keyes
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