Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

663.001/4–650

Memorandum by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ( Bevin )¹

secret

[ Washington , April 6, 1950.]

1. As Mr. Acheson will recall from the discussions I had with him and Monsieur Schuman in New York last autumn,² I have for some time been concerned at what may happen in Austria if there is no Treaty. It was for that reason that I pressed Mr. Acheson and Monsieur Schuman last autumn to agree to make such concessions in the Treaty negotiations as might be hoped to secure agreement with the Russians.

2. Six months have now elapsed, and I am just as much convinced of the desirability of getting the Soviet out of Austria in the interest both of European pacification and of the maintenance of Austria’s will and capacity to survive as an independent State. I think that both Mr. Acheson and Monsieur Schuman are in agreement with me on this, and on the desirability of completing the Treaty as soon as possible. Unfortunately the Russians do not appear to be willing to conclude the Treaty at present. The result is that the efforts we made last year to reach agreement have so far proved vain.

3. Five articles remain outstanding—16, 27, 42, 48 and 48–bis. The Soviet Deputy has repeatedly said that he cannot change his position on articles 42 and 48 until the questions falling under 48–bis have been settled. Those questions were referred for study to the Soviet experts last October, and the Soviet authorities are making no attempt to settle them. So long as this remains the Soviet attitude there can be no settlement of Articles 42 and 48 on the basis of the Western texts. Moreover it is now by no means to be assumed that the Soviet would settle 42 and 48 on our terms even when 48–bis is out of the way. The Soviet attitude in regard to Articles 16 and 27 is less clear. Last November Zarubin indicated that the Soviet might give way on Article 27 if they got satisfaction on 16 and 48–bis as well as 35. Since then the Soviet position seems to have hardened, and there is no certainty that our acceptance of their article 16(5) would lead to withdrawal of their objectionable clause in Article 27.

4. His Majesty’s Government’s position in regard to these four articles is as follows. We consider that the effect of accepting the Soviet 16(5) is less serious than has been suggested. We are prepared to agree to it. While we do not like the Soviet addition to Article 27 we would in the last resort be prepared to accept it as part of a final settlement. I cannot feel that the Russian addition to Article 27 is of intrinsic importance in regard to Austria’s future ability to protect herself within the Treaty limits. Austria can only be made able to protect herself against a putsch and local disorders, and not against invasion, and for this the assistance of foreign technicians in her aviation etc. is not indispensable. In any case Article 27 will not prevent Austria from sending her technicians to study abroad. On articles 42 and 48 we are examining whether agreements could be reached with the Austrian Government outside the Treaty which would make it possible for us, if necessary, to accept the Soviet texts. I am hopeful that it will prove possible to make such agreements.

5. As I understand it, the attitude of the United States and the French Governments has hitherto been that, subject to satisfactory arrangements proving possible outside the Treaty for articles 42 and 48, they would be prepared to accept the Russian texts for the four articles if this was necessary in order to get agreement, and if such acceptance would in fact secure agreement on the whole Treaty text. (I appreciate that the United States Government are not themselves interested in Article 48 in which for us substantial sums are involved.) I understand this point of view and have not hitherto wished to press the United States and French Governments to make further concessions on the Treaty if these were unlikely to lead to agreement on the whole text. In the last three months I have, however, received repeated and strong representations from the Austrian Government to get these four articles settled, even though this would not lead to full agreement. I have been bound to give consideration to these representations. The Austrians arguments are as follows:—

(1) If the Russians were to decide to settle questions under Article 48-bis, the responsibility for holding up the Treaty would be thrown on the Western Powers if they were then unable to accept the Soviet texts of 42 and 48. The Western Powers could be made to appear as blocking the Treaty for the sake of their restitution and financial claims on Austria.

(2) So long as the Western Powers insist on including clauses in the Treaty for the restoration of their property and for the payment of pre-Anschluss loans, the Soviet are able to pose as protecting Austria from Western claims.

(3) If there is to be no early Treaty Austrian morale must be fortified, and the best way for the Western Powers to do this is by making progress with the Treaty, by settling these four articles and so giving evidence of their determination to do everything that lies in their power to complete the Treaty.

(4) If these four articles could be settled it would be clear to the whole world, as it is not at present, that it is the Soviet alone who are holding up the Treaty.

6. I am impressed by these arguments and in particular by the argument about the effect on Austrian morale and by the awkwardness of the situation which would arise if the Soviet were to settle 48-bis while we were unready to settle 42 and 48. I agree that there is no certainty that the settlement of these four articles would lead to the completion of the Treaty, but their settlement would undoubtedly put the Russians on the spot, and it is at least conceivable that the Soviet Government might then be led to complete the Treaty, relying on delays in signature and ratification if they wished further to delay its early implementation. (In this connexion it may perhaps be significant that M. Gromyko recently informed the Austrian representative in Moscow that article 48-bis was quite unimportant in comparison with the issues involved in the other four outstanding articles and that while he could foresee no solution of article 48-bis so long as the deputies made no progress on the latter he anticipated no difficulty on it once the other four articles had been settled.) I recognise the importance of ensuring that outside arrangements can be made with the Austrians which will satisfactorily protect our claims and those of other United Nations nations for the restoration of their property and the payment of pre-Anschluss loans. It is perhaps arguable that the Soviet would make these outside arrangements an excuse for delaying the conclusion of the Treaty, but I feel that it would be difficult for them to hold up the Treaty just because the Austrian Government chose voluntarily to meet United Nations claims which they are already in principle prepared to settle. Such a course would make Soviet obstruction too obvious.

7. I am therefore myself in favour of getting these four articles settled if we can, and my hope is that at our May meeting³ we shall be able to make progress on some of these matters which, like the Austrian Treaty negotiations, impede our plans for building up our position and for the consolidation of Western Europe. But I recognise the difficulties which some of these four articles represent for American and French opinion, and I do not want now to ask Mr. Acheson to make concessions which might cause difficulties for him with Congress. I would, however, ask him to reflect on this Austrian problem in the light of the considerations which I have mentioned above, in the hope that between now and May he may be able to make it possible for us to make progress with the Austrian Treaty at our meeting.

1. The source text was an attachment to a memorandum of conversation between Thompson and Bernard A. B. Burrows, Counselor of the British Embassy, dated April 6, not printed (663.001/4–650).
2. Regarding the Western Foreign Ministers discussion of the Austrian Treaty at New York during the autumn of 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 1146 ff.
3. Documentation on the London Foreign Ministers meeting, May 11–13, is in vol. iii, pp. 828 ff.