663.001/5–850: Telegram

The United States Delegation for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers to the Secretary of State

secret

2498. Delau 460. Western deputies today concluded report1 on Austrian Treaty problems for Ministers’ consideration which reiterates that aim of three western powers is to secure earliest possible completion of treaty leading to withdrawal of Soviet forces and restoration of free and independent Austria. Report contains following:

I. Treaty Issues

“The US, UK and Fr delegations recommend that the Ministers agree:

(1)
That if and when the Soviet government show themselves ready to complete the treaty, the western powers should settle the unagreed Articles as quickly as possible and on the best terms they can get.
(2)
That our present positions on each of the unagreed Articles should be maintained until the Soviet government demonstrate their readiness to complete the treaty.
(3)
That in the treaty negotiations the western deputies should continue to place the blame for the delay on the Soviet deputy for his attitude on Article 48 bis, and for his introduction of other pretexts, and to emphasize their own readiness and desire to settle all outstanding issues.
(4)
That the continuity of the deputies’ negotiations should be maintained in order to keep alive Austrian hopes and to be in a position to take advantage of any possibility of a settlement. But so long as the present Soviet attitude persists frequent meetings can serve only to encourage hopes which are bound to be disappointed, to increase Austrian pressure on the western powers to make concessions to the Soviet Union, and to provide the latter [Page 458] with a propaganda forum. Meetings of the deputies should therefore not as a general rule be held more frequently than every six-eight weeks”.

II. Action in Austria

  • “(A) The US, UK and Fr delegations recommend the three governments should make it their policy:
    (1)
    To treat Austria as far as possible as if it were a free and independent country, by reducing the intervention of [or] interference of the Allied authorities in matters of Austrian sovereignty, jurisdiction, and administration, whether national or local, to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of the quadripartite organization and the execution of their duties by the occupation forces;
    (2)
    To lessen the cost of the occupation to Austria as much as possible by reducing to the minimum consistent with security requirements and with the execution of the tasks of occupation the numbers of troops and of Austrians employed by three armies, the number of buildings requisitioned by their forces, and the number of civilian staffs of their elements on the allied commission, and by effecting all other possible economies.2
  • (B) Furthermore the US and UK delegations whose governments have already decided to appoint civilian high commissioners in Austria recommend that Ministers agree all three western governments take this step in concert in order to provide the most effective means of putting above principles in execution.
  • (C) US delegation recommends that Ministers agree three Western Governments should each assume costs of its occupation in Austria as is already done by US Government. In order to facilitate this decision, US Government is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to any proposal which might give offsetting financial advantages to governments concerned.
  • (D) The UK, US, and Fr delegations recommend that reply to Austrian request (i.e. recent Austrian note) be drafted in the light of Ministers’ decisions.”

It was not considered necessary to recommend Foreign Ministers’ consideration few remaining differences with respect to individual Articles as these can be adjusted at appropriate time at deputies’ level.

Sent Department 2498, repeated Paris 793, Vienna 104, Moscow 138.

  1. The Deputies report was designated MIN/TRI/P/20 in the records of the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. (Conference Files, Lot 59 D 95, CF 20) Lot 59 D 95 is a collection of documentation on certain official visits of European Heads of Government and Foreign Ministers to the United States and on major international conferences, including North Atlantic Council sessions, attended by the Secretary of State for the period 1949–1955, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
  2. In telegram 2185, Audel 262, May 10, to London, Reber was advised that the Department of Defense felt the level of United States troops in Austria was “at or below minimum required for security and occupation mission and no reduction in strength tactical troops and essential supporting units shld be made now.” (663.001/5–1050)

    In view of this opinion the Western Deputies rewrote this paragraph to read:

    “To lessen the cost of the occupation to Austria by effecting all possible economies consistent with the tasks of occupation including economies in requisitioning buildings, in the size of the civilian staffs of their elements on the allied council and in the number of Austrians employed by the three armies. The number of tactical troops and their essential supporting units shall be kept at the levels imposed by security requirements.” (Telegram 2566, Delau 461, May 11, from London, 663.001/5–1150)