601.6111/12–1450: Circular airgram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1

secret

The Intelligence Advisory Committee (consisting of representatives of the Department, CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force and FBI) have recommended that the following policy be adopted with respect to official representatives of Soviet and Satellite nations in the U.S.:

I.
General
A.
Insofar as possible the treatment of Soviet and Soviet Orbit official representatives in the U.S. shall be on a strictly reciprocal basis in accordance with the treatment of U.S. official representatives in the USSR and in the corresponding Soviet Orbit Countries.
B.
The term “official representatives” shall be interpreted to include all officials of these countries on duty in the U.S. in any official capacity, exclusive of those who are members of country delegations to the United Nations or are employees of United Nations organizations.
II.
Specific
A.
That, in general, unrestricted travel for Soviet and Soviet Orbit nation official representatives on duty in Washington, D.C., or wherever stationed, be limited to a radius of 35 miles from the limits of the District of Columbia or of the city where they are stationed, where the principle of reciprocity demands. (A more restrictive policy has already been implemented with regard to Rumanian representatives on a reciprocal basis.)
B.
That all such official representatives, whose movement is subject to restriction by interpretation of this policy, will accomplish travel outside of the restricted zone only after having notified the U.S. agency of primary concern (Diplomatic, Consular, and Civilian Personnel of Mission and Consulates and other civilian agencies—Department of State, Military Personnel—their corresponding Service Departments). Written notification of such travel shall be submitted [Page 61] by the Mission at least three days in advance of the intended time of departure with a statement of the following:
1.
Names of persons included in party.
2.
Complete itinerary, including places to be visited, duration of trip, mode of travel, and stopping places en route.
Any deviation in the itinerary, postponement, or cancellation of travel shall be communicated at least 24 hours in advance to the agency of primary concern by the mission.
C.
That the FBI shall institute “spot check” procedures on personnel movements as necessary and practicable in implementation of this policy. To this end, the FBI shall, on receipt of a travel notification or change therein, by any agency as mentioned above, immediately be notified. Any deviation by Soviet Orbit representatives engaged in travel from notified procedures shall immediately be reported to the U.S. agency of primary concern by the FBI.
D.
That infractors who are thereby detected will be subject to immediate recall by official declaration—“persona non grata”—contingent upon recommendations by the agencies concerned. Prior to final action, which rests exclusively with the Department of State, other agencies regularly represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee shall be consulted.
E.
That requests to visit specific U.S. installations or industrial plants of military, scientific, technological or strategic significance or any exercise or maneuver of a military nature will be permitted only on a reciprocal basis, subject to security regulations.
F.
That all matters concerning protocol in which U.S. and Soviet Orbit representatives are involved will be monitored by informal liaison between the agencies concerned.
G.
That this policy be reviewed quarterly or more often if necessary, and that prior to revision the proposed revision be submitted to the U.S. Missions in Moscow and in the Soviet Orbit nations for study and recommendations.

Your comments on the above recommendations would be appreciated.

The Department realizes that should the recommended policy be adopted, its actual application to the various countries concerned would require careful timing. Your comments on the method, circumstances and proper occasion for application are also desired.

Acheson
  1. This circular airgram, which was drafted in the Division of Acquisition and Distribution of the Office of Libraries and Intelligence-Acquisition, was sent to the Embassies in Moscow, Warsaw, and Praha, and the Legations in Budapest and Bucharest.