660E.0021/7–2450

Position Paper Prepared in the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs1

top secret

The Position of Finland in the Event of a General War

problem

To determine U.S. attitude toward Finnish neutrality in the event of outbreak of war between the U.S. and USSR.

[Page 584]

discussion

It is desirable to determine at this time, if possible, what position we should like to have Finland adopt in the event of the outbreak of war between the U.S. and the USSR. This determination might depend in part upon the theatre in which the outbreak occurs and upon the other nations involved. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the outbreak of war between the U.S. and the USSR would soon involve most if not all of the NAT countries, and, accordingly, this paper is written on that assumption.

There is little likelihood that Finland would join forces voluntarily with the Soviet Union in the absence of unprovoked aggression against Finland by the western powers. However, the Soviet interpretation of the Finnish-Russian friendship pact might be pressed to require Finland to engage in war on the Soviet side even though the circumstances might not coincide with the conditions set forth in the pact.

It is believed that Finland would prefer to remain neutral in any general war. It would appear that Finnish neutrality would be desirable from the U.S. point of view. If the USSR should believe that Finland intended to lend support—openly or otherwise—to the U.S. and its allies, there is every reason to believe that Finland would be occupied by forces of the Soviet Union unless the tide of war was such as to enable Western forces to get to Finland in substantial number. On the other hand, Soviet occupation would doubtless tie down substantial Soviet forces which might otherwise be employed against us in other theatres. Therefore, in finally determining our interests on the question of Finnish neutrality we should weigh these factors. The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be sought on this subject.

Assuming that it should be determined to be in our interest for Finland to remain neutral, the question remains as to the best method of seeking to accomplish this objective. This matter is dealt with in the attached memorandum of July 19, prepared by the American Minister to Finland, Mr. Cabot,2 after discussions with Department officers. The suggestion is made that the course best designed to accomplish Finnish neutrality would be for the U.S. to indicate to Finland when war had broken out or was obviously imminent, that the U.S. hoped that Finland would remain neutral and was prepared to give assurances to respect such neutrality. See paragraph numbered d of the attached memorandum for a more detailed statement as to the course of action suggested by Mr. Cabot. Two aspects of this suggested approach deserve particular consideration. First, it would be most unwise to make it unless and until there was an outbreak of war between the U.S. and the USSR. Second, it would seem of doubtful [Page 585] value to suggest to the Finns that they confirm to the USSR their intention to implement the Friendship Pact.

There can be no assurance that the suggested course of action would prevent a Soviet attack on or occupation of Finland. However, it offers a chance of accomplishing that purpose.

Before determining on this course of action, it would be necessary to know whether our military plans call for military action which would necessitate our infringing Finnish neutrality. If such would be the case, it is extremely doubtful that any assurances could be given to Finland. This subject should be discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

background

Finland entered into a friendship pact with Soviet Russia on April 6, 1948. The relevant provisions of the Pact are Articles 1 and 2 as follows:

Article 1—In the event of Finland’s or the Soviet Union’s, across the territory of Finland, becoming objects of military aggression on the part of Germany or another state allied with her, Finland, loyal to her duty as an independent state, will fight to rebuff aggression. In that event, Finland will send all the forces at her disposal to defend the integrity of her territory on land, sea and in the air, acting within the boundaries of her frontiers, in accordance with her duties by the present treaty, with the assistance, in the event of necessity, of the Soviet Union or together with it.

“In the above case, the Soviet Union will render Finland necessary assistance, on the rendering of which the parties will reach mutual agreement.

Article 2—The high contracting parties will consult each other in the event of the existence of a threat of military attack provided for under Article 1.”

recommendations

It is recommended that (a) the appropriate officers of the Department discuss this matter with the appropriate military authorities with the view to determining the answers to the three questions outlined at the end of the attached memorandum; (b) depending upon the outcome of such discussions, appropriate instructions be despatched to the U.S. Legation in Finland.

  1. The source text indicates Henry R. Labouisse, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, as drafter of this position paper, and also bears the initials of Benjamin M. Hulley. The source text is also initialed by G. Frederick Reinhardt, Deputy Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs.

    The source text is included in the Department of State files as an attachment to the following memorandum of July 24 from Labouisse to Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews:

    “The attached memorandum recommends that the above subject [the position of Finland in the event of a general war] be discussed with the appropriate military authorities. If you concur in the paper and its recommendations, will you let us know whether or not you prefer to handle this directly with the military authorities or, if not, whether you feel that EUR or someone else in the Department should do so.”

    The memorandum quoted here bears the following undated, handwritten notation by Matthews:

    “As a result of a meeting on Sweden at the Pentagon, I believe the wheels are in motion on this. Will you follow up?”

    Two copies of the position paper printed here were sent to Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs, on August 8 under cover of a brief letter from Matthews, not printed, requesting that the questions raised in the paper be given attention so that they could be discussed informally with officers of the Department of State (611.60E/8–450).

  2. Supra.