762A.00/5–750: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Acting Secretary of State

secret

3912. In my interviews with German political leaders I have, both before and after the receipt of Deptel 2779 April 21, adopted with them the line of thought set forth in the final paragraph of this cable. I have tried to impress upon these political leaders the high desirability of rising above purely internal German considerations and the necessity of facing the reality of Germany’s position. I have strongly [Page 636] deplored the idea that the present situation could be used to extract concessions from the west and have urged them to take more positive steps to convince the western world of the solidity and growth of German democracy and liberalism. I have strongly impressed upon them that Germany must also do its part to re-establish western confidence in its people after two aggressive wars. I have specifically recommended that Germans take initiative in hastening the solution of the aftermath of the war and the Hitler regime which are still irritants abroad, such as internal restitution assistance to persecutees, completion of denazification without fraud, resisting tendency to make nationalistic gestures for internal political advantage, etc. I have urged these considerations upon all party leaders with the exception, of course, of the Communists. As I am able to spend more time in Bonn, I shall continue to stress this policy.

With respect to the SPD position, there is some indication that although Schumacher is determined to oppose, he is not altogether happy about his opposition to the Federal Republic entry into the Council of Europe. I am told he is hopeful that London may produce a larger scheme for the organization of Western Europe which will enable him to drop the Saar issue. In any case, we learned that the SPD is already fighting internally over who will be its representatives in the Federal Republic delegation to Strasbourg.

Regarding Federal Republic entry in the Council of Europe, Adenauer told me recently that he intends to put the government’s proposal for entry before the Cabinet on May 9. He did not, however, indicate when it would be laid before Parliament and it may well be that he will await the outcome of the London conference. In a lengthy discussion with the Chancellor, I found him in a much less intransigent mood and outwardly at least more willing to respond to arguments designed to explain why Germany must help to create a climate in which greater progress toward European integration ean be achieved. I regret, however, to state my impressions that Franco-German relations which are so vital in this connection have not materially improved inside of Germany in spite of what I believe to be the sincere desire of Adenauer to come to a real understanding—a desire which is constantly compromised by his own tendency to hold to a nationalistic line in his speeches. It is also partly the result of the French fear complex and partly the real clash of personalities which seems to have developed between Francois-Poncet and the Chancellor.

Adenauer’s disinclination to take advice on foreign affairs and the unimpressive stature of his Cabinet likewise contribute to these difficulties. We had been urging the Chancellor to get his consular service organized and into the field so that the Federal Republic can receive its own reports on the feeling towards Germany in other countries. The Chancellor, we find, is frequently impressed with the reports the [Page 637] third rate agents who pretend to have intimate contact with this or that leading political personality abroad and whose judgment and reliability are frequently open to question to say the least.

I fully concur with Department’s estimate that the present political situation in Germany reflects a lack of understanding of the realities of foreign affairs in general and the east-west situation in particular.

I cannot but feel that Adenauer’s attitude as expressed in my recent cables was basically a maneuver to obtain concessions in connection with the entry into the Council though he was impressed by his talk with Schumacher and indeed still is.

When he saw I was unwilling to recommend something in the way of a “gesture” in connection with the European Council, he quickly adapted himself and has now determined to push the matter forward. As for Schumacher, I feel that though he had doubts regarding the possible effect it might have on unification he would have agreed to entry but for the Saar matter. Adenauer feels Schumacher has also a latent idea that he can pull a number of members away from the SED if unification should ensue. I hope to see Schumacher again to judge how deeply his refusal to join the Council really goes. Le Monde’s and Lippman’s articles and certain English hints as to the wisdom of “neutrality” have been read here and have caused comment but if we act with continuity and good sense in our relations with Germany and there is no defection among the other Western European Powers, I feel there is little doubt that West Germany will act with the West. The situation requires continuous pressure and explanation on the part of the High Commission and decision, or at the least, understandings in the forthcoming London conference to take further steps to impress the Federal Republic with western strength and determination.

Sent Department 3912; repeated London 227; Paris 353.

McCloy