Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

751G.02/2–450: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia

confidential

Washington , February 7, 1950—7 p. m.

84. Urtel 133, Feb 4.¹ Dept much concerned over possibility Yugo recognition of Ho.² Sov recognition of Ho in present circumstances clearly designed further Commie expansionist aims. Recognition by Yugo wld strengthen very forces against which it is fighting for its own independence. Yugo action in recognizing Ho wld not be understood by those who voted for Yugo membership SC since it wld be considered as active Yugo participation in Cominform conspiracy against others.

The provocative and disruptive effect of such action by Yugo shld not be underestimated. In Washington, for example, we have been taking the most extraordinary steps to find funds with which to support Yugo independence. The effort has required personal attn of President, Secretaries of State, Defense and Treasury, Directors of Exim Bank and may require help from Congress. Recognition of Ho by Yugo wld raise such formidable difficulties we frankly cannot see how we can get through them. Further, such action by Yugo wld increase pressure on France, wld increase Fr requirements for men and material and wld thereby bring about greater Fr demands upon US for assist. We cannot dissipate our limited resources in any such fashion.

Since Yugo has no important interests in Indo-China and Ho wld presumably not in any case acknowledge recognition, Yugo action wld appear to be unnecessary, wld probably produce a rebuff and wld constitute a gratuitous gesture likely jeopardize rather than promote Yugo interests.

We do not wish make direct threats Yugo Govt but you shld use as much of foregoing as necessary to ensure they clearly understand seriousness of obstacles which Yugo recognition of Ho wld create.³

Acheson

1. Not printed.
2. Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Ho regime was recognized by the Soviet Union on January 31, 1950. For documentation on the interest of the United States in developments in Indochina, see vol. vi, pp. 690 ff.

3. In a memorandum of February 8 to Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, John Paton Davies, Jr., member of that Staff, observed that the warning contained in this telegram was fine as far as it went, but that it did not go far enough. Davies feared that it might occur to Yugoslav leaders that the United States was seeking to persuade them to recognize the regime of Bao Dai in Indochina. Davies observed that it would not be advantageous to either Yugoslavia or the United States for Yugoslavia to recognize Bao Dai. Such recognition would place Yugoslavia further in the so-called “imperialist” camp and thereby seriously compromise its utility to the United States as the inspirer of nationalist deviation in the Soviet orbit. Furthermore, Davies suggested that it could be advantageous to the United States were Yugoslavia able to establish contacts with the Ho regime (768.02/2–850).

   Yugoslavia recognized the Ho Chi Minh regime on February 25, 1950.