Subject: Egyptian Foreign Minister’s conversations
with you and Secretary Marshall
Tentative arrangements have been made for the Foreign Minister of
Egypt, Dr. Mohamed Salaheddin Bey, to call upon you on October 17.
Salaheddin Bey is at the present time in charge of his country’s
delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. He will see
General George Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, on October
18.
There is attached a summary of United States views and policies with
respect to the various questions which the Egyptian Foreign Minister
is expected to raise (Tab A). It is believed that we should continue
to adhere to these views and policies in our conversations with
him.
In view of the desirability of adopting a uniform position on these
matters in the conversations with the Foreign Minister, there is
also attached a proposed letter to Secretary Marshall (Tab B)2 transmitting a copy
of the summary of United States views and policies for his guidance.
General Marshall’s comments and suggestions have been invited.
[Tab A]
The Department of State’s Views and Policies
Concerning Certain Problems With Regard to Egypt
top secret
[
Washington
, October 11,
1950.]
The following is a summary of the views and policies of the
Department regarding questions which it is expected the Egyptian
Foreign Minister may wish to raise in his discussions with
Government officials:
- 1.
- Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Relations
- 2.
- Possibility of Egypt’s Association with NATO
- 3.
- Arms Shipment to Egypt from the United Kingdom
- 4.
- Arms from the United States
1. Anglo-Egyptian Treaty
Relations
There have been indications that the Egyptian Foreign Minister
may request this Government to mediate between Egypt and the
United Kingdom in their dispute regarding the stationing of
British troops in Egypt and the administration of the Sudan. The
Egyptian Ambassador in Washington has stated that his Government
would be happy to receive the suggestions of the United States
regarding this matter, and the press in Cairo has carried
reports that a request for mediation would be made.
Background: In 1936 the United Kingdom
and Egypt signed a Treaty of Alliance which permits the former
to maintain bases and troops in Egypt and which confirms the
arrangement by which Egypt and the United Kingdom jointly
administer the Sudan. This Treaty is to terminate in 1956 unless
revised earlier by mutual agreement.
Immediately following World War II, Egypt indicated its desire to
revise it, and negotiations with the United Kingdom were begun,
only to be broken off in 1947 by Egypt. The Egyptian Government
took the question before the Security Council, claiming that the
presence of British troops in Egypt was a threat to the peace,
but the Council action was inconclusive.
The Treaty has been discussed again, over the past few months, by
the parties on an informal level. No solution has been reached.
Egypt insists upon the evacuation of British troops, and has
gone so far as to state that it considers evacuation more
important than the defense of Egypt. The United Kingdom, on the
other hand, has refused to withdraw its forces until the
Egyptian attitude has modified to the extent that discussions on
future arrangements are more advanced. The matter of the Sudan
has also been brought into the discussions by the Egyptians, who
insist that the whole Nile Valley, including the Sudan, be
controlled by Egypt alone, without the United Kingdom.
The Egyptians have suggested that some arrangement might be [Page 305] worked out whereby the
British would remove their combat troops to the Gaza strip,
while maintaining the Air Force and certain technical and
administrative troops in the Canal Zone area. The United Kingdom
is considering the proposal but believes that there are a number
of serious objections to it, arising from the nature of the Gaza
strip (it is very small and overpopulated) and from the fact
that Israel, which surrounds the strip on two sides, might
object.
The United States believes that it is extremely important in the
interests of the maintenance of the security of the Middle East
and the preservation of world peace that the British have
certain strategic; facilities in Egypt. We believe that the
British should have (a) the right to
maintain these facilities during peacetime in such a condition
that they could be effectively and quickly used in case of
immediate threat to the security of the Middle East and (b) the right of reentry in order to make
full use of these facilities. We, therefore, hope that the
United Kingdom and Egypt will be able to work out a reasonable
solution, and to this end that it will be possible to convince
Egypt that it is in its own interest to arrive at such a
solution.
The Department and the American Ambassador in Cairo have made
clear to Egyptian officials that we strongly support the United
Kingdom in its desire to maintain strategic facilities in Egypt.
We have also indicated that insistence on evacuation would seem
undesirable and dangerous in the light of present world
conditions. We have, however, pointed out that we consider this
question as one primarily for solution by the two parties
concerned.
With regard to the Sudan, the Department believes that the
eventual status of that area should be decided by the Sudanese
people. Meanwhile we approve the British policy of bringing
Sudanese into the government of the area.
Recommendation: In view of the importance
which the Department attaches to the maintenance of British
troops in Egypt for purposes of defense, it is recommended that
this matter be discussed with the Foreign Minister along the
following lines:
- 1.
- While the Department appreciates the point of view of
the Egyptians on this question, it believes that under
the conditions presently existing in the world the
evacuation of British troops from Egypt would be
dangerous.
- 2.
- If Egypt would reach an agreement with the United
Kingdom by which substantial numbers of British troops
could remain in the country, the presence of these
troops could no longer be said to constitute an
infringement on Egyptian independence, but would instead
represent part of Egypt’s contribution to the defense of
the area.
- 3.
- If the Foreign Minister raises the question of United
States mediation, it is suggested that it be emphasized
that we consider the problem primarily as one for
solution between the United Kingdom and Egypt.
[Page 306]
2. Possibility of Egypt’s
Association with NATO
The Egyptian Government, through the Embassy in Washington, has
informally raised with the Department of State the question of
possible Egyptian association with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.3 In discussing the question with the
Department, the Ambassador indicated that the desire of Egypt
for some such association was prompted by the invitation
recently extended by the NAT
Council to Turkey, suggesting that that country cooperate in
such appropriate phases of the military planning of the NATO as concern the maintenance of
the security of the Mediterranean. The Egyptian Government has
expressed its disappointment at being left out of the planning
for the area of which it is a part, and may possibly press this
Government and the NAT Council
for an association similar to that offered Turkey and
Greece.
Background: Turkey has been anxious for
some time to become a member of NATO. However, it was the view of this Government
and of the NAT Council that it
was undesirable to extend the Treaty to Turkey because of the
military commitment it would entail and the precedent it might
create, and because the NATO
was itself in the early formative stages. The Turkish Government
was, therefore, informed that at the present stage of
development of NATO it would
not be feasible to extend the treaty to Turkey.
In view, however, of the difficult domestic position in which the
Turkish Government had placed itself by openly requesting
membership, some form of association was considered,
particularly in the light of certain military advantages which
would accrue from associating Turkey with such appropriate
phases of military planning as are concerned with the defense of
the Mediterranean. There was no question of admitting Turkey to
membership in the NAT, although
as a European state it was eligible for membership, since this
would involve the disadvantages set forth in the preceding
paragraph. Therefore, an arrangement was worked out whereby
Turkey could be associated with certain phases of military
planning on a limited basis without becoming a member. The
precise nature of this relationship is to be determined by the
NAT Defense Committee. A
similar arrangement is also to be made for Greece.
In the September, 1950, discussions of the NAT Council there was general
agreement that no further extension of the Treaty should at this
time be made, whether through membership or special
association.4
[Page 307]
Recommendation: If the Foreign Minister
should raise the question of Egypt’s possible association with
NATO, it is recommended
that the following reply be made:
- 1.
- It is the belief of the NAT Council that it would be undesirable to
extend the Treaty further, since the NATO is still in the
process of formation and development and since in any
event its primary purpose is the maintenance of the
security of the NAT
area, particularly Western Europe. The Treaty itself is
limited to European states.5
- 2.
- Greece and Turkey are European powers both of which
have had a long and active association with the West in
its economic and security efforts. They are recipients
of ECA aid and are
members of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation and the Council of Europe. With regard
specifically to security factors, Greece and Turkey
represent what might be termed the right flank of the
noncommunist states of Europe.
- 3.
- Greece and Turkey have not been invited to become
members of the NATO,
but only to associate themselves, in a limited way, with
certain aspects of its military planning.
- 4.
- If Egypt desires to cooperate in the defense of the
Near East area, there are a number of ways open to it to
do so. In particular, it could adopt a more conciliatory
attitude in its discussions with the the United Kingdom,
and it could cooperate more fully in the efforts of the
United Nations to develop an effective security system,
including for example, efforts which have been directed
toward the restoration of Korean independence.
3. Arms Shipment to Egypt from
the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has suspended the shipment to Egypt of certain
military equipment which had been promised to Egypt and some of
which had been partially paid for. It is expected that the
Foreign Minister may request this Government to intercede on
behalf of Egypt, and urge the United Kingdom to recommence the
shipments. The Acting Foreign Minister has addressed such an
appeal to the American Ambassador in Cairo who replied
informally that he believed the action to have been dictated by
military necessity.
Background: Following the lifting of the
United Nations embargo on arms shipments to the Near East on
August 11, 1949, the British Government began the shipment of
armaments to the Arab States, particularly those, like Egypt,
with which the United Kingdom has treaty relations. In the case
of Egypt, the United Kingdom planned to form an Anglo-Egyptian
military partnership to defend the Near East in the event of
Soviet aggression. These plans called for the strengthening of
the Egyptian army, partially through the shipment to Egypt of a
certain amount of heavy tanks and jet planes.
[Page 308]
On September 11, 1950 the British Government informed Egypt that
it intended to suspend the shipment of jet planes, tanks, and
certain types of radar which the Egyptian Government had
ordered. The British Government stated that this action was
necessitated by military considerations involving increased arms
requirements in higher priority areas. It was thought possible,
however, that some of the tanks, which Egypt had partly paid
for, could be supplied before the end of the year.
A great deal of bitterness resulted in Egypt, where the move was
generally interpreted as retaliation for Egypt’s uncooperative
attitude with respect to treaty negotiations with the United
Kingdom. The Egyptian Government protested vigorously to the
British Ambassador in Cairo and requested the British Government
to reconsider its decision.
The Department believes that it is in the security interests of
the United States that the Near East be militarily strengthened
for defense against possible Soviet aggression, and that the
countries in that area obtain their arms from reliable and
friendly sources. However, this Government appreciates that
other areas are at the present time of greater military
importance than the Near East, and does not desire to question
the decision of the British Government that this fact required
diversion elsewhere of equipment destined for Egypt.
Recommendation: If the Foreign Minister
raises this question, and suggests that the United States
intercede with the British Government on behalf of Egypt, it is
recommended that he be informed that, while this Government is
in general sympathetic to the desire of Egypt for defensive
arms, it is aware of the urgent need for arms in other areas.
Therefore, we do not believe it desirable to question the
diversion of these arms by the United Kingdom to areas of more
immediate concern. If the Foreign Minister expresses the belief
that the British Government is withholding arms in retaliation
for Egypt’s position on the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty negotiations,
it might simply be stated that we understand the action was
taken on the basis of military priorities.
4. Arms from the United
States
The Egyptian Foreign Minister may request that this country
supply Egypt with quantities of arms in lieu of the shipments
from the United Kingdom, which have been suspended. It has been
rumored in the Egyptian press that he would make such a request
under the terms of the Tripartite Declaration on arms and
security of the Near East, issued by this Government, the United
Kingdom and France on May 25, 1950.
Background: When the United Nations
Security Council, on August 11, 1949, lifted the embargo on arms
shipments to the Near East, representatives of the United
States, France and the United [Page 309] Kingdom in the Council stated that their
respective countries did not wish to see an arms race take place
in the area. The United States subsequently decided to permit
the export of reasonable amounts of military material to Israel
and the Arab States. In view of our desire not to be drawn into
an arms race, it was decided that these shipments should be
limited to such equipment as we might consider necessary for the
maintenance of internal security and for legitimate defense.
In May, 1950, the Government of the United States, the United
Kingdom and France issued the Tripartite Declaration, in which
they recognized the need of the Near Eastern states to maintain
a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring
their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to
permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a
whole.
The Department has examined each application for the export of
arms on its individual merits in the light of the policy
originally set forth following the lifting of the arms embargo
and as stated in the Tripartite Declaration. From time to time
the export of certain military equipment has been authorized to
Egypt and other Near Eastern States. Egypt has recently received
eighteen AT–6 trainer aircraft,
heavy calibre ammunition for training purposes and a
considerable quantity of 75 and 37 mm guns for the armament of
tanks and other vehicles already in the possession of Egypt.
Recommendation: It is recommended that,
if the Foreign Minister requests that the United States supply
Egypt with larger quantities of military equipment, the
following line be taken:
- 1.
- Egypt is not at the present time authorized to receive
military equipment from this country on a grant or cash
reimbursable basis. Any arms which it desires it must
obtain on the domestic commercial market.
- 2.
- At the present time, the supply of military equipment
is extremely limited in this country due to extensive
domestic requirements and to large-scale commitments to
countries in more immediately vital areas.
- 3.
- With regard to such equipment as Egypt may locate on
the domestic market, the Department will consider
applications for its export in the light of the policy
set forth above. Certain material has already been
exported to Egypt in this manner, as described
above.
