Subject: Letter to the Secretary of Defense
regarding the Anglo-Egyptian question.
At a meeting on October 26 between the U.S. and British Chiefs of
Staff at which Ambassador Jessup represented the Department and the
British Ambassador the British Foreign Office, it was agreed that
the Department and the Foreign Office should discuss further the
advisability of a joint approach to Egypt pointed towards a
tripartite agreement on bases and equipment with Egypt.2
It is believed desirable to request the Defense Department to
indicate whether a price should be paid, and, if so, how high a
price, having in mind that this “price” might be the deciding factor
as to whether the British retain their strategic facilities in
Egypt.
As you will recall this letter was originally sent up to the
Secretary for his signature, but it was decided that because of the
urgent developments in Korea, it would be inadvisable to present
this matter on a high priority basis. However, in view of the
discussion of October 26, we believe that it is essential that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the problem as soon as conveniently
possible.
That you sign the attached letter (Tab A) to Secretary of Defense
Marshall.3
[Tab A]
Draft Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary
of State (
Matthews
) to the
Secretary of Defense (
Marshall
)4
top secret
[
Washington
, undated.]
My Dear General Marshall: I quote the
following agreed minute regarding the meeting of October 26,
1950, between the United States and British chiefs of staff. On
this occasion Ambassador Jessup represented [Page 327] the Department and the British
Ambassador the British Foreign Office.
“Egyptian Base Facilities”
“It was agreed that the State Department and Foreign Office
would conduct further discussions on the advisability of a
joint approach to the Egyptians pointed towards a tripartite
agreement on bases and equipment with Egypt. The question
was raised as to the positive results which might be
obtained, but it was further observed that, at the least,
the proposed course of action would give the Egyptians
opportunity to say that the end result was a joint defense
agreement with two great world powers and Egypt, all on an
equal basis.
“It was generally the concensus of opinion that if the
tripartite approach were agreed upon, the agreement itself,
the use of Egyptian territory as a base, including airfield
facilities for the United States, and equipment for the
Egyptians should all be in the same package.”
In preparation for further discussions with the British Foreign
Office, with whom the initiative now lies, we requested the
views of Ambassador Caffery in Cairo (enclosure 1) and now have
his reply (enclosures 2 and 3).5 You will note that
although Ambassador Caffery is cautious as to the outcome of any
US-UK approach to Egypt he feels that “a possibility exists if
the United States is prepared to pay the price involved.”
Although he indicates that “the price is particularly difficult
to assess offhand,” he is certain that it would be “high” and
would include “armament, Egypt participation in any pact on an
ostensibly full sovereign basis, some sort of security
guarantee, at least a facade of military consultation, and
something on Palestine.”
Since the announcement at the opening of the Egyptian Parliament
on November 16 that the Egyptian Government was considering the
abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, popular feeling
in Egypt against the presence of British troops has run high and
there have been a number of anti-British demonstrations. While
the Egyptian Government has banned further demonstrations, at
least during the period of the talks between Foreign Secretary
Bevin and the Egyptian Foreign Minister in London, it is
undoubtedly true that the demand for the immediate evacuation of
British troops has a widespread and genuine popular basis and in
our opinion this demand will continue to gain momentum. The
tension in Anglo-Egyptian relations was recently further
increased by the action of the opposition in the British
Parliament in forcing the British Government to halt the
shipment of 16 Centurion tanks which had already been contracted
and partially paid for by Egypt. The present international
events may have a sobering effect on the Egyptian Government [Page 328] in connection with the
Treaty question. However, this effect may well be transitory and
we believe that if the demand for evacuation is pressed, the
British will be unable much longer to withstand it, unless a new
element is injected into the picture. A tripartite agreement
with Egypt along the lines indicated in the minute quoted above
is one of the alternatives which might constitute such a new
element.
In view of this situation we believe that there is an added
urgency to the need for definitive discussions with the British.
We fully understand that urgent needs elsewhere in the world
dictate that we keep any investment in Egypt to the bare minimum
necessary to insure our security requirements there. As a basis
for these talks, however, we need an indication from the
military point of view, of whether a
“price” should be paid, and, if so, how high a “price”, having
in mind that this “price” might be the deciding factor as to
whether British troops remain in Egypt. In all candor I must
tell you that we are not optimistic that exchange of United
States arms for base rights will be sufficiently appealing to
the Egyptians to cause them to forego their “national
aspirations” to be free of foreign troops.
We also recognize that on our side there will be other difficult
problems which would have to be faced in reaching a final
determination of this question. Among these problems would be
the availability of arms, the ability to obtain authority to
transfer such arms on a basis acceptable to Egypt, the Palestine
question and the attitude of Congress.
I hope that you will have attention directed to this question and
that you can arrange to let me have your views at an early
date.
Sincerely yours,
For the Secretary of State:
H. Freeman Matthews
