887.00 TA/3–850

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs (Berry) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Hare)1

confidential

Subject: Proposed Procedure for Submission of Requests for Point IV aid by Iraqi Government.

Discussion:

Dennis Greenhill2 of the British Embassy called on Mr. Burns and Mr. Clark on June 26 and left a copy of a Note (Tab A3), dated June 14, 1950, addressed by Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy at Baghdad to the Iraqi Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, confirming an informal agreement between the British Ambassador and the Iraqi Prime Minister4 as to the procedure whereby the Iraqi Government should submit requests for Point IV aid to the US Government.

Mr. Greenhill stated that this question, which arose out of the British treaty position in Iraq, had been discussed in general by Mr. McGhee with Michael Wright during his visit to Washington last November, and had been in the subject of a letter, dated February 17, 1950, addressed by Mr. McGhee to Mr. Wright following the latter’s departure to London (Tab B5). He recalled that the British and American Embassies in Baghdad had, in consultation with Iraqi officials, tentatively and informally agreed some time ago on a procedure under which the Iraqi Government would submit its requests for Point IV aid to the British Embassy in writing with a copy to the American Embassy (Tab C6).

Mr. Greenhill stated that Iraqi officials had expressed some dissatisfaction with this procedure and that as a result of consultation between British Embassy officials and Iraqi officials the agreement in the attached Note of June 14 had been arrived at, whereby the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs in future would send Notes Verbales containing requests for experts both to the British Embassy and to the US Embassy at Baghdad.

Mr. Greenhill said that he hoped this arrangement would be satisfactory to the Department and would appreciate receiving an informal oral indication as to our attitude in this regard as soon as possible. He said that it was the desire of the Foreign Office to facilitate the [Page 646] handling of Point IV requests and to avoid any appearance of placing obstacles in the way of the transmission of such requests by the Iraqi authorities.

It will be noted that an exception is made in the reference Note to “posts such as those in the Ministry of Defense and those in the Ministry of Education where teachers would be expected to work on a curriculum similar to the British. …”

Mr. Clark inquired whether the words “post such as …”indicated that there were other lines of activity in Iraq in which only British technical experts would be expected to be employed. Mr. Greenhill replied that he did not know of any other, save possibly the police force where he knew a British officer was serving. Mr. Clark also inquired whether it was contemplated that American professors, for example, should not be selected for Iraqi Government schools, and Mr. Greenhill replied in the negative, saying that he understood only those schools operating exclusively on British curriculums and furnished with British equipment were referred to. Any private American school in Iraq would likewise not be affected by the arrangement. He then gave Mr. Clark an excerpt from a letter from the British Embassy in Iraq to the Foreign Office describing in fuller detail the understanding arrived at between the British Ambassador and the Iraqi Prime Minister (Tab D7).

ANE perceives no objection to the procedure outlined in Mr. Bromley’s Note of June 14, and regards it a considerable improvement over the procedure previously proposed. The proposal appears to correspond with Mr. McGhee’s suggestion to Michael Wright in his letter of February 17 that “our relations should be along the lines of and in accordance with the more enlightened spirit of the Portsmouth Treaty rather than the existing Anglo-Iraqi Treaty.” You will note that in a despatch just received our Baghdad Embassy concurs in this view (Tab E8).

Recommendation:

It is recommended that, if you concur, ANE be authorized to inform Mr. Greenhill orally that the Department perceives no objection to the above-outlined procedure which is proposed to be followed in connection with requests for Point IV assistance in Iraq, and that we appreciate the co-operative attitude of the British Government which has made the establishment of this procedure possible.9

  1. Drafted by Harlan B. Clark and Norman Burns of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs.
  2. First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Tawfig Suweidi became Prime Minister of Iraq on February 5, four days after the resignation of Ali Jawdat al-Ayubi and his Cabinet.
  5. The letter under reference was not attached to the source text.
  6. Tab C, not printed, was a copy of despatch 221 from Baghdad, March 8.
  7. Not printed.
  8. Tab E, not printed, was a copy of despatch 733 from Baghdad, June 17.
  9. Handwritten at the top of this memorandum was “OK—R[aymond] A. H[are].”