IO Files

Minutes of Twenty-ninth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly, Paris, December 10, 1951

secret
US/A/M(Chr)/216

[Here follows list of persons (51) present. Mrs. Roosevelt was in the chair.]

1. Committee 3 Developments

Mr. Taylor called upon Mr. Green to outline the developments in Committee Three which required the urgent attention of the Delegation. Mr. Green referred to the joint draft resolution submitted by twelve Moslem states, calling for the inclusion in the Covenant on Human Rights of an article which would read as follows: “All peoples shall have the right to self-determination”. (See A/C.3/L.186.) The resolution might well be entitled “Variations on the old Moroccan Theme”. He recalled that the Fifth General Assembly, over the opposition of the United States, had adopted a resolution requesting the Human Rights Commission to study the problem of self-determination of peoples. The matter had not been considered in the Human Rights Commission in its session of the past summer, and so was being reintroduced by the Moslem states at this time. The United States would find this language very difficult to accept in that it was extremely ambiguous, both as to when it would become applicable and in what manner. The Assembly had decided in its last session to make all the provisions of the Covenant applicable equally to states ratifying the Covenant and to the non-self-governing territories administered by such states. When this proposed new article was read in connection with that action of the Fifth General Assembly, the implications of this move for Morocco were obvious. It could be argued that a party to the treaty was obligated to grant the right of self-determination immediately to its territories. This obviously would create difficulties for the United States and other administering powers.

Mr. Green commented that the situation in Committee Three had been additionally complicated by a speech made by the Belgian Delegate, Mr. Dehousse, last Friday. In it he had said that certain delegations which were characterized by “obsolete monarchies”, religious persecutions, and suppression of minorities were not qualified to talk [Page 777] about human rights. This statement had provoked considerable reaction and hostility among many states, especially the sponsors of the joint resolution.

The immediate problem was what approach the United States should take to this latest maneuver. He suggested that the United States could say it had always favored the right of self-determination as a principle, and wanted to obtain acceptance for this principle on as broad a basis as possible. The objection which we had to the proposed new article was that it did not show that this principle already obtained in the Charter itself. For this reason the United States could propose the amendment contained in paragraph (2) of Delga 573.1 This would refer to the Charter provision on self-determination and imply that all states, not simply those which adhere to the Covenant, are bound to respect this principle. The amendment would also bring out the fact that the Charter binds all states to respect this principle in their colonies, and in “satellitized” countries and states infiltrated by the Soviets, and not just in non-self-governing territories. He asked for the Delegation’s views on this proposed course of action.

Mrs. Roosevelt felt that this amendment would not be satisfactory to the sponsors of the joint resolution, even if it were a better argument than we had made in the past on this point. She foresaw a defeat for the United States on this proposal. She added that it was an improper course for the Assembly to adopt articles for insertion in the Covenant. She felt that the best argument we could make was that the joint resolution would have the effect of limiting rather than broadening the mandate of the Charter on self-determination. All states were obligated by what was contained in the Charter, whereas this joint resolution would apply only to those states becoming parties to the Covenant and by implication would leave others free to observe or not those principles of the Covenant.

Mr. Plitt favored the widest possible broadening of the principle here referred to. He pointed out that this joint resolution was sponsored by the solid bloc of Islamic powers with the single exception of Turkey. We must at some stage go along with these powers in order to break up their bloc. To oppose their joint resolution would be “adding another rivet to this super-heated steamboiler”. Mrs. Roosevelt agreed that something must be done along those lines but felt it extremely hard to break up such a bloc on such a measure.

Mr. Vorys called such a provision “selfish determination” and thought such ideas in the present-day world were false. It was extremely unwise, in his view, to favor such fractionalization in the world where no state could today depend on its neighbors to respect the rights of sovereignty. “Unlimited self-determination”, he said, “is as ‘phony’.” Mrs. Roosevelt commented that the United States can very [Page 778] well say that when talking about itself, but to say it abroad where there are so many countries in which human rights are not being observed would sound very inappropriate. Mr. Vorys agreed that his remarks were not germane to the discussion, but he wished to register his views on the general topic.

Mr. Cohen asked whether a provision for self-determination was now contained within the Human Rights Declaration. If it were not, he suggested that it would be much wiser to work for its inclusion there, and not, by insisting on its insertion in the Covenant, thwart whatever possibilities the Covenant had for ratification. It could better be declared as a standard toward which all could agree to work. It would be unfortunate to endanger the Covenant and any value it might have in such a way.

Ambassador Gross stated that he was not afraid of the language in either form. He felt that it took an “overspecialist” to object to the 12 power language and not to our amendment. If this matter were submitted to the American public, 99-½% would express themselves in favor of affirming the right to self-determination. It might be that they would do so without an adequate understanding of the problems involved, but no such understanding would be elucidated in the United Nations.

Mr. Gerig said that the Committee 4 aspect of this question was whether the United Nations would put itself on record in favor of the right of secession of peoples from a unitary state. Considering our own history, he felt that the question was raised of how far the United States should go in accepting this principle. Mrs. Roosevelt said that that was the very reason it should not go into the Covenant. However, since it would go in anyway in some form or other, it was up to the United States to work for language in the best possible form, even if this meant being voted down.

Miss Bacon supported the remarks of Ambassador Gross. She suggested voting for the proposed language, while explaining in full the reasons for which we would prefer different language, and stating our understanding of what the proposed language would mean. Mrs. Roosevelt was not sure this would be satisfactory to the sponsoring delegations. Mr. Maffitt also adhered to the point of view expressed by Ambassador Gross and Miss Bacon. He said that the United States should not appear to be opposing the fight for self-determination. We could merely state the preference for wording this matter another way.

In agreeing with Mrs. Roosevelt, Mr. Maktos said that the United States ought to anticipate the argument that since this matter was already expressed in the Charter the United States could surely not oppose the further expression of it in this Covenant. Mr. McKeever said that a United States vote against this proposal would be misunderstood both at home and abroad. The technical reasons we might [Page 779] put forward for opposing it would not be understood, however justified. He asked, therefore, why the United States must “saddle itself with that albatross for a Pyrrhic victory”! Ambassador Jessup submitted that albatrosses were not worn as saddles.

Ambassador Kirk referred to the Belgian attitude, and stated that in view of the great importance of the Belgian Congo, as the primary source of uranium ore, both to Belgium and the United States, it would be wise for the United States not to forget its own self-interest in this problem. Mrs. Roosevelt commented that the United States was not forgetting its own interests, but the Belgian speech, which incidentally had been on a very high plane, had contained this unfortunate reference to “obsolete monarchies” and has aroused the national and religious prides of many a country. She felt that the result of the speech would be to set us back considerably and perhaps lose the fight for two Covenants. If, however, the Delegation felt that the United States should say we think the proposed joint resolution is bad procedure, we could offer our amendment as better procedure. We could then stand in favor of this right, and if our amendment were not accepted, not oppose the joint resolution as a principle.

Senator Cooper wondered whether the United States would be willing to agree that for example Hawaii or Alaska could determine for itself whether it wished its independence. Mrs. Roosevelt recalled the Civil War and the fact that we had fought to keep peoples within our federation, and that although this might seem slightly inconsistent, the greater principle had been for the freedom of the individual. Senator Cooper thought that the United States should stay on the ground that it agreed in principle with this idea, as a purpose toward which we could work. To include it in the Covenant would make ratification very difficult for the United States and others.

Ambassador Key said that since everyone agreed to the principle of self-determination, the problem was one of drafting. The 12 power draft was a step backward. We wanted words which would conform to the Charter.

In regard to Ambassador Kirk’s remarks on uranium, Dr. Tobias stated that the United States should keep in mind the principles which it sought to safeguard by the protection the atom bomb gave.

Mr. Sandifer pointed out that this joint resolution gave the right to one state to protest that other states were not granting the right of self-determination. The United States questioned the propriety of such a step at this time.

Ambassador Gross recalled the Genocide Convention discussion, and the fact that the United States was certain to face a similar defeat on this matter. The more we attacked the position that would succeed in the end, the worse we would appear in the end for having opposed [Page 780] it and lost. He preferred the amended wording, but the choice of final acceptance by the General Assembly was of course not up to us.

Mrs. Roosevelt summarized the feelings of the Delegation to be that the United States would make the best possible speech, indicating the reasons for its preference for the amendment language. The United States would not oppose the inclusion of this right of self-determination, but would in fact support it, while at the same time making clear that ratification of a Covenant with this wording in it might experience further difficulties.

[Here follows discussion of other agenda items.]

Charles D. Cook
  1. Dated December 8, supra.