Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series

Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council ¹

top secret
NSC 103/1

Washington , February 14, 1951.

The Position of the United States With Respect to Greece

1. It continues to be in the security interest of the United States that Greece not fall under communist domination.

a. Greece occupies an important strategic position which, in the hands of an enemy, would be a threat to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez, Turkey and the Turkish Straits. Communist domination of Greece would serve as a springboard for communist penetration, political and military, into the Eastern Mediterranean and Near East area.

b. Communist domination of Greece would damage U.S. prestige and weaken the will to resist in other countries threatened with communist domination.

c. Communist domination of Greece could only be viewed as one in a series of military and political consequences which would gravely threaten the security of the United States.

2. Accordingly, the United States should:

a. Manifest publicly its active interest in the maintenance of the political independence and territorial integrity, of Greece and its continued support of the Truman doctrine as applied to Greece.

b. Provide appropriate international political support to Greece.

c. Promote the development of a stable democratic Greek government oriented to the West.

d. Provide economic assistance and advice in order to develop a viable Greek economy.

e. Lend appropriate support to the Greek military establishment to assist it in:

(1) Maintaining internal security.

(2) Repelling an attack by satellite forces augmented by guerrillas.

(3) Causing maximum practicable delay to an attack by satellite forces with indirect Soviet assistance or to an attack involving direct Soviet participation.

(4) …

f. Provide Greece, within the limits of existing priorities and availabilities, military matériel, supplies and guidance necessary to the accomplishment of the objectives listed in e above.

3. … the United States should:²

a. Press now for the inclusion of Greece as a full member of NATO, this being the most desirable form of reciprocal security arrangement.³

b. If full membership of Greece in NATO would be unacceptably delayed, conclude alternative security arrangements which would include Greece and would not prejudice Greek membership in NATO at the earliest practicable date.⁴

4. A Soviet or satellite attack against Greece would threaten the security interests of the United States and so increase the danger of global war that the United States in common prudence pending the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements, including the United States and Greece, should assist in opposition to the attack in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of circumstances then existing, including the following general courses of action:⁵

a. Place itself in the best possible position to meet the increased threat of global war.

b. Seek, by political measures, to stop the aggression, localize the action, and restore the status quo.

c. Provide such military matériel and deploy such forces to the general area as can appropriately be made available without jeopardizing the security of the United States … in the light of recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.

d. Urge other nations to take similar action, including appropriate measures in the United Nations and NATO.

5. After conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements, including the United States and Greece, the United States should respond to a Soviet or satellite attack against Greece in a manner and scope to be determined in the light of the recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the circumstances then existing, and within the framework of the obligations of the United States under those arrangements.⁶

1. A covering note by Executive Secretary James S. Lay states that NSC 103 was considered at the 83d meeting of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 437) on February 14, with the President presiding and the Acting Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Defense Mobilization in attendance. The statement of policy contained in NSC 103 was adopted subject to the amendment of paragraphs 2–e–(2) and (3) proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 12 (supra) and of paragraphs 1–c and 3–c proposed by the Senior NSC Staff on February 12 (see footnote 3, p. 462). Accordingly, the National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization forwarded the source text, which was the amended version of the draft policy statement contained in NSC 103, to the President as NSC 103/1 for his consideration. The note is in S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 103 Series. In a memorandum to the National Security Council of February 15, the Executive Secretary reported that the President had approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 103/1 and directed its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State (S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 103 Series).

   The Executive Secretary of the NSC, in a covering note dated May 11, 1951 to NSC 109 (a draft policy statement on Turkey printed on p. 1148), informed the Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that the NSC Staff, in preparing the draft statement, had recommended that revisions be made to NSC 103/1 along the lines of paragraph 3 of the draft statement of policy on Turkey. On May 24, 1951, the Executive Secretary informed the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that the President had that day approved the revisions to NSC 103/1 as proposed in NSC 109 and had directed their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under coordination of the Secretary of State. The revisions are indicated in subsequent footnotes.

2. This paragraph did not appear in the text of NSC 103/1 as approved by the President on February 15, 1951; it was drafted by the Department of State and recommended by the NSC Staff in NSC 109 for incorporation in NSC 103/1. Paragraph 3, approved by the President on May 24, 1951, was added by substitution of a revised page to NSC 103/1 circulated to the National Security. Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization by the Executive Secretary, NSC, under a covering memorandum dated May 24, 1951.
3. In May of 1951, the Department of State formally broached the subject of Greek and Turkish membership in NATO to its NATO allies as a solution to the various strategic and command problems involved in protecting and possibly expanding the southern flank of the Western defense system. There followed 4 months of extensive debate and diplomacy within NATO and between the United States and various NATO governments until, at its Seventh Session at Ottawa in September 1951, the North Atlantic Council formally extended an invitation to both Greece and Turkey to adhere to the North Atlantic Pact. There followed months of negotiation between the Turkish Government and the United States, United Kingdom, and France concerning the precise command relationship to be established between the original NATO powers and the proposed new members, and this carried question of formal Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization beyond the end of the year. For documentation on the question of Greek and Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 460 ff.
4. For the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to the statement in paragraph 3b expressed to the Secretary of Defense in a memorandum dated May 22, 1951, and circulated to the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization that day, see footnote 1, p. 1148.
5. This paragraph was numbered 3 in the text of NSC 103/1 approved by the President on February 15. The phrases “pending the conclusion of reciprocal security arrangements, including the United States and Greece” in lines three to five of the paragraph were added as proposed in NSC 109 in the revised page circulated by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, under cover of his memorandum of May 24, 1951. See footnote 2, p. 464.
6. The text of NSC 103/1 as approved by the President on February 15 did not contain this paragraph 5. Approved by the President on May 24, 1951, as a revision to NSC 103/1 as recommended by the NSC Staff in NSC 109, the paragraph was added in a new page to NSC 103/1 circulated to the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of Defense Mobilization under cover of a memorandum by the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated May 24, 1951.