781.00/8–151: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece ( Peurifoy ) to the Department of State
574. As stated Embtel 561, Jul 31,1 we consider Emb shld refrain from intervention or public comment on Papagos entry into politics except as we may wish informally to deny rumors that Amers inspired or encouraged his action. Privately and discreetly however we intend if it seems necessary to attempt to minimize 2 possible effects of marshal’s steps.
One wld be unconstitutional maneuvers by palace to eliminate marshal from campaign or call off elections or so to act as to drive marshal into open hostility to monarchy. While we trust wiser counsels will prevail, anger and bitterness of King and Queen might impel them to such action. Ominous symptom was instruction of King to Venizelos to deal henceforth with Potamianos rather than Pesmazoglou. We suspect this is because latter as he indicated mins had advised King to accept sitn calmly and to seek reconciliation with marshal. Ventiris is apparently giving similar advice but others of palace entourage can be counted on to add fuel to flames.
Second untoward development might be polarization polit forces into extreme right-left camps, one behind Papagos and other behind Plastiras. We consider this danger less serious particularly if Papagos continues present effort to develop center rather than rightist constellation and if Plastiras sticks to assurances he will refuse any alliance with Commies. Immed fusion of Libs and EPEK might incline both generals to moderation but we doubt Plastiras will accept unless optimism regarding his prospects severely shaken.
While bulk of Papagos support will probably come from Populists which accts for virulence of Tsaldaris attack we incline to belief marshal will draw strength from all elements of non-Commie electorate. Many of those disgruntled with old polit leadership, who wld previously have gone with Plastiras may now vote for Papagos. Markezinis even with such leading Libs as Mavros, Averoff and Glavanis will switch to marshal and this while unlikely is possible. At all event Papagos practically certain to be one of three largest parties and cld conceivably have or approach absolute majority of Parl seats. Emb will endeavor earliest obtain and report country wide reaction and prospects.
Shld Papagos gain control of govt, admin wld probably become more firm, consistent non-defective and ECA prog wld benefit. Extent to which this wld be true wld however depend on character of principal collaborators marshal chooses. …
[Page 493]Real disadvantage Papagos entry into politics is long term one which has hitherto persuaded Dept and Emb to consider him last card for use only in great emergency. Artificial and probably temporary crystallization of polit forces around marshal will interrupt gradual normalization of Greek polit life and reconstitution 2 traditional parties as predominant powers. Even if he shld succeed in his immed task this most fundamental work will have to be recommenced when he retires, probably after further period of splintering and confusion. This eventuality must conceivably be avoided if Papagos in effect inherited Populist party while Venizelos and Plastiras reconstituted strong Liberal counterweight. It seems unlikely at this writing however that any thing so clean cut will emerge.2